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ABSTRACT 
 
To mark the 300
th
 anniversary of the event in question, this thesis analyses the first 
British attempt to conquer the French colonial city of Quebec.  The expedition was a 
product of the turbulent political environment that was evident towards the end of the 
reign of Queen Anne.  Its failure has consequently proven to be detrimental to the 
reputations of the expedition‘s commanders, in particular Rear-Admiral Sir Hovenden 
Walker who was actually a competent and effective naval officer.  True blame should 
lie with his political master, Secretary of State Henry St John, who ensured the 
expedition‘s failure by maintaining absolute control over it because of his obsession 
with keeping its objective a secret.  After recently celebrating a succession of 
tercentenaries concerning the War of the Spanish Succession, this thesis hopes to 
draw attention away from the famous military commander, the Duke of Marlborough, 
and instead focus upon a little known combined operation.  The expedition helped to 
alter British strategy by renewing an interest in ‗blue-water‘ operations that would see 
huge success later in the century, ultimately resulting in the eventual conquest of 
French North America in the Seven Years War. 
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Notes 
 
All dates follow the ‗Old Style‘ convention, which is prevalent in the source material, 
unless otherwise specified.  The Julian calendar was ten days behind the ‗New Style‘ 
Gregorian calendar in the seventeenth century and eleven days behind after 1700.  For 
clarity, the year begins on 1 January and not 25 March. 
This thesis covers the period surrounding 1707 when the Act of Union came 
into force, therefore ‗England‘ and ‗Britain‘ are both used where appropriate. 
Spelling and punctuation in quotations have been modernised.  Names of 
people and places have been standardised as there are numerous spellings in the 
manuscripts. 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The abortive expedition to capture Quebec, sent under the auspices of Secretary of 
State Henry St John towards the close of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-
1714), was the first large-scale British military endeavour to combat the French in 
Canada.  Led by General John Hill, it comprised an impressive array of units needed 
to conduct military operations in Canada, and was then the largest military force ever 
assembled in that part of the world.  The fleet which carried them, commanded by 
Rear-Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker, met with ruin on the approach to Quebec on the 
night of 23 August 1711.  Several troop transports and hundreds of lives were lost off 
the rocky north shore of the notoriously dangerous St Lawrence River, which brought 
to an end this unprecedented combined operation.  Upon receiving news of the 
disaster, the colonial force making its simultaneous landward thrust towards Montreal, 
under Lieutenant-General Francis Nicholson, also withdrew.
1
   
The expedition could easily have succeeded given better political leadership.  
As this was lacking, it was doomed to fail from its very conception.  The ambitious St 
John had enforced a culture of secrecy surrounding the expedition‘s organisation 
because it was his personal project and so it needed to be hidden not only from the 
French, but also from the scrutiny of his political opponents.  He did this by acquiring 
an insufficient quantity of provisions, which would imply that the fleet being 
assembled would be sent somewhere in Europe.  This proved to be extremely 
detrimental to the expedition‘s chances of success as not only was it dispatched from 
England precariously late in the year for a Canadian campaign, but this plan also 
                                                 
1
 Hill and Nicholson temporarily held these ranks for the purpose of the expedition.  At the time Hill 
was a brigadier-general, whilst Nicholson was a colonel, Dalton, Charles, (ed.), English Army Lists and 
Commission Registers, 1661-1714, VI, (London, 1904), p. 20. 
 2 
required the fleet to rendezvous at Boston in order to acquire further supplies.  
Logistically, this was very problematical and served to expose differences between 
the British and the colonials which would become even more apparent several 
decades later.  Another reason for failure was the St Lawrence itself.  It had never 
before been sailed upon, or charted, by the Royal Navy.  The river was a dangerous 
enigma to sailors unfamiliar with its navigation.  Considering how events unfolded 
and escalated into catastrophe, Walker and Hill ultimately arrived at a sensible 
conclusion when they decided to return to Great Britain. 
The expedition was a result of the turbulent political environment towards the 
end of Queen Anne‘s reign.  Interminable military campaigning and high wartime 
taxes had served to quell public enthusiasm for the war.
2
  However, it was the 
misguided impeachment of the High Tory Anglican clergyman, Dr Henry 
Sachaverell, which altered the British political landscape and brought down the Whig 
ministry in 1710.  The duumvirate of the captain-general, the Duke of Marlborough, 
and the lord high treasurer, the Earl of Godolphin, had dictated policy for long 
enough.  In an age that lacked freedom of speech, Sachaverell was brought to trial by 
Godolphin for attacking the 1688 revolution, and the rise of the Whigs and their 
Dissenting allies.  Sacheverell consequently became a rallying-figure for the Tory 
cause, securing great public support, prompting the London mob into action.
3
  
Godolphin‘s old colleague from the days of the triumvirate delivered the death blow 
to the Whig ministry.  Robert Harley, who had become disenchanted and forced to 
resign from office in 1708 by the partnership of Marlborough and Godolphin, had 
                                                 
2
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(MA), 1990), pp. 199-202; Trevelyan, G. M., England Under the Stuarts, (London, 2002), pp. 484-485. 
3
 Biddle, Sheila, Bolingbroke and Harley, (London, 1975), pp. 162-166; Holmes, Geoffrey, British 
Politics in the Age of Anne, (second edition, London, 1987), pp. 92-93. 
 3 
returned to prominence.  His steady efforts to gain royal influence had succeeded 
through his ties with the Queen‘s favourite, and Hill‘s sister, Abigail Masham, who 
had supplanted Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough.  Queen Anne began appointing 
Tories to ministerial positions and Harley eventually became head of the new ministry 
in August 1710, when he was awarded the position of chancellor of the exchequer.  
The new political configuration was confirmed in the following month by the 
electorate‘s overwhelming support.4   
The Marlborough-Godolphin period had ended and in their place came two 
experienced politicians who were also great friends.  Harley and St John dominated 
the final years of the Stuart era.  Once they assumed office, their immediate agenda 
was to find a way to end the war.
5
  To do so, the Tories had to disentangle Britain 
from its commitments to Austria and the United Provinces.  These allies had stood 
together with Britain on the battlefields of Europe, but Marlborough‘s victories 
fostered hugely inflated expectations of what could be achieved against France.  It 
was thought that the Whig ‗continental‘ approach to strategy was disastrous and 
unpatriotic, by contributing vastly expensive land forces to the cause of their Austrian 
and Dutch allies.  Instead, the Tories believed that a ‗blue-water‘ policy should have 
been implemented, the concept being that a cheaper war should have been fought in 
the maritime and colonial sphere, which would have reaped huge rewards in terms of 
trade and territory.
6
 
                                                 
4
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 4 
War had been inevitable since the death in 1700 of the childless King Carlos II 
of Spain.  Complex royal bloodlines resulted in there being two principal rival 
claimants to the Spanish throne, one each from the two most powerful royal houses in 
Europe – the Austrian Habsburgs and the French Bourbons.  This would have serious 
implications for the European balance of power.  King Louis XIV of France 
recognised the Will of Carlos II, and thus his grandson, Philippe, Duke of Anjou, 
became Felipe V, King of Spain, in direct contravention of the Second Partition 
Treaty, agreed in conjunction with King William III of England.  To protect his 
grandson‘s position, Louis ordered French troops to occupy the barrier fortresses of 
the Spanish Netherlands, to prevent a Dutch challenge.  This was unacceptable to 
William, as he was also stadtholder of the United Provinces.  A French army also 
moved to occupy parts of the Spanish Italian territories, resulting in war with Austria 
in 1701.  The French had also gained advantages in trade with the Spanish colonies 
and, upon the death of James II, the deposed king of England, Louis disregarded the 
Treaty of Ryswick he signed in 1697 and recognised James‘ son, the Old Pretender 
James ‗III‘, as England‘s new monarch.  For these reasons the maritime powers, the 
English and Dutch, joined Austria in a ‗Grand Alliance‘ to preserve the balance of 
power against the threat of a Bourbon hegemony.
7
  England‘s growing influence had 
made it the central pillar of the alliance and English power would dominate both on 
land and at sea.   
With William‘s death in 1702, Marlborough became captain-general of the 
allied armies in Flanders.  An ambitious strategic vision was realised in that same year 
                                                 
7
 Clark, G. N., ‗War Trade and Trade War, 1701-1713‘, The Economic History Review, vol. I, no. 2, 
(January 1928), pp. 268-269; Lynn, John A., The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714, (Harlow, 1999), pp. 
266-268; Roosen, William, ‗The Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession‘, in Black, Jeremy (ed.), 
The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 151-175, Trevelyan, England 
Under the Stuarts, pp. 445-449. 
 5 
when it was recognised that permanent naval superiority in the Mediterranean would 
provide great benefits for the alliance.  This was an extension of the Williamite policy 
in the Nine Years War (1688-1697) that sought to establish naval superiority in the 
Mediterranean to support a large army deployed in Europe, after the French naval 
threat was largely extinguished at Barfleur and La Hogue in 1692.
8
  With the outbreak 
of war, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Rooke was therefore dispatched to capture 
and secure the Spanish port of Cadiz as a naval base for further Mediterranean 
operations.  Cadiz would also offer the added benefits of denying the Spanish a 
significant proportion of their trade, whilst offering the opportunity to open an Iberian 
front.  However, Rooke did not meet with success.  The troops employed lacked 
discipline and committed several atrocities against the local populace whilst drunk, 
outraging much of Europe.
9
  After re-embarking them, Rooke, who had been worried 
about French encirclement by both the Brest and Toulon fleets, recognised that he had 
to follow up failure with success to give the politicians in London faith in a maritime 
strategy (Marlborough had taken almost as many fortified cities in 1702 as had been 
taken by the Allies during the entire preceding Nine Years War).  The navy had to 
prove its worth.  Illustrating the new global vision that then gripped naval thinking, 
part of Rooke‘s force was detached from his fleet, led by Commodore Hovenden 
Walker, and sailed for the West Indies to attack French colonies there. 
                                                 
8
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1689-1713‘, Canadian Journal of History, vol. X, no. 1, (April, 1975), pp. 4, 15; Harding, Richard, 
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of Combined Operations in the Eighteenth Century‘, The Historical Journal, vol. XXXII, no. 1. 
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80, 84-85; Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, pp. 40-41. 
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 Owen, J. H., War at sea under Queen Anne, 1702-1708, (London, 1938), pp. 71-81; Rodger, N. A. 
M., The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, (London, 2004), pp. 165-166. 
 6 
After news of Cadiz reached London, St John‘s uncle,10 the Tory secretary of 
state, the Earl of Nottingham, imparted his vision for naval strategy to Marlborough.  
Acknowledging that Cadiz had been an ignominious failure, Nottingham declared that 
England‘s honour must be restored, especially considering the outrage caused by the 
dishonourable actions of some of the troops.  These incidents, which had included the 
desecration of churches and the torture of locals, had been a public relations disaster 
for the administration.  Nottingham thought it was imperative to counter this with a 
naval victory as soon as one could be achieved.  For this he suggested that Rooke 
intercept the French squadron at Vigo which had accompanied the Spanish treasure 
fleet from the Americas.  Nottingham emphasised the value of Mediterranean 
operations when he noted that the French had thirty capital ships in that sea and 
therefore thought it necessary to counter them by sending a fleet of no less than forty 
ships-of-the-line there each campaigning season.  He also recognised, despite Rooke‘s 
failure, that a Mediterranean base remained essential to maintain a fleet there, so that 
ships could repair and winter on station.  A base would also deny the French the trade 
from the Levant and vital corn supplies from North Africa.   
Nottingham also stressed the importance of the coastal waters around Britain, 
where he thought sixty-four frigates and men-of-war should be stationed to protect 
trade and the coastline from any French threat.  To counter this, Dunkirk was 
specifically mentioned as a suitable candidate for blockade as it was a haven for 
French privateers.  Nottingham also indicated that colonial operations could offer 
huge advantage to England.  He thought that Cartagena and Havana presented 
opportunities to increase power and influence in the West Indies and thought that the 
                                                 
10
 Horwitz, Henry, Revolution Politicks: The Career of Daniel Finch Second Earl of Nottingham, 1647-
1730, (Cambridge, 1968), p. 198. 
 7 
Dutch should assist in this wider strategy.
11
  Nottingham attached great value to naval 
policy as he feared that a purely land-based conflict would result in a similar outcome 
to the Nine Years War, where little advantage was gained from a great effort.
12
   
Much of Nottingham‘s foresight proved to be accurate.  Although he was 
oblivious to the fact, Rooke, displaying initiative, had already either taken or 
destroyed the vessels of the Spanish treasure fleet and its accompanying French 
squadron at Vigo Bay.
13
  Although Walker‘s squadron had been dispatched to the 
West Indies, it had not followed its intended plan.  The expedition focused on 
Guadeloupe and did not receive the planned support of a Dutch contingent, which 
Nottingham and the lord lieutenant of Ireland, the Earl of Rochester, had organised in 
a secret Cabinet committee – a body that was not again seen until St John began to 
plan for the Quebec expedition.
14
   
Several ports were acquired over the course of the war to assist Mediterranean 
operations.  Lisbon was utilised from 1703, when Portugal switched sides after 
months of negotiating the Methuen Treaties.  Also, the presence of an Anglo-Dutch 
fleet off Lisbon demonstrated to King Pedro III that the maritime powers were best 
placed to defend (and attack) his South American empire.  He thus agreed to join the 
war against France and Spain.
15
  However, this also altered the alliance‘s war aims to 
include the ridiculous ambition of placing the Archduke Charles upon the Spanish 
                                                 
11
 Hattendorf, John B.; Knight, R. J. B.; Rodger, N. A. M.; Till, G., ‗British Naval Documents, 1204-
1960‘, Navy Records Society, vol. CXXXI, (1993), pp. 208-211, Nottingham to Marlborough, 6 
October 1702. 
12
 Hattendorf, John, England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and 
Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712, (New York; London, 1987), p. 70. 
13
 Owen, War at sea under Queen Anne, pp. 81-86; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 166. 
14
 Burton, Ivor F., ‗The Secretary at War and the Administration of the Army during the War of the 
Spanish Succession‘ (University of London PhD thesis, 1960), p.160; Horwitz, Revolution Politicks, p. 
177. 
15
 Chandler, John, Marlborough as Military Commander, (London, 2000), p. 110; Rodger, The 
Command of the Ocean, pp. 166-167. 
 8 
throne which prolonged the war.
16
  A permanent naval presence was established in the 
Mediterranean when Gibraltar was taken in 1704, after a council of war decided not to 
attack their original target of Cadiz, whilst Port Mahon on Minorca was captured in 
1708.
17
  
The only major fleet battle of the war took place off Malaga in 1704, where 
approximately fifty line-of-battle ships on each side pounded one other, inflicting 
thousands of casualties.  Although not a single vessel was lost, Rooke‘s 
Mediterranean presence was preserved as the French fleet, under Louis‘ illegitimate 
son, the Comte de Toulouse, withdrew to its base at Toulon.  Some Tories absurdly 
attempted to place Rooke‘s victory above that of Marlborough‘s at Blenheim, which 
had occurred almost two weeks earlier, as an example of the benefits of a maritime 
over a continental strategy.  Nevertheless, Malaga secured Gibraltar and Rooke had 
unwittingly prevented the junction of the entire French Navy for the duration of the 
war, as the French later scuttled their Mediterranean fleet in 1707.
18
 
Nottingham‘s vision of a primarily naval Mediterranean strategy had also been 
communicated to the Grand Pensionary of the United Provinces when he argued that 
naval superiority there would block French involvement with the Barbary States; help 
the Huguenots in the Cevennes; assist in Sicily; transport Austrian troops; and 
persuade Savoy to switch sides.
19
  All of this was achieved during the war primarily 
due to the efforts of the fleet.  After 1707, the Royal Navy, accompanied by a small 
number of Dutch warships, dominated the Mediterranean.  The fleet was able to 
                                                 
16
 Trevelyan, England Under the Stuarts, p. 465.  The original war aims were in fact achieved in 1706, 
with even Louis XIV willing to accept the peace terms, Chandler, Marlborough as Military 
Commander, p. 187. 
17
 Hattendorf, England in the War of the Spanish Succession, p. 45. 
18
 Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, p. 147; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 170. 
19
 Hattendorf, England in the War of the Spanish Succession, pp. 69-70; Owen, War at sea under 
Queen Anne, p. 43. 
 9 
prevent enemy naval activity and deny the French access to North African sources of 
grain, which had a devastating effect when the French harvest failed over the winter 
of 1708-1709.  British ships were also able to freely transport Austrian troops between 
the Italian and Spanish theatres of war.  This establishment of superiority in the 
Mediterranean was clearly a turning point in British fortunes.  The French Navy no 
longer possessed control over their coastal areas or obvious spheres of influence.  The 
danger posed by the possible link-up of the French Brest and Toulon squadrons had 
passed to be replaced by a new threat from state-sanctioned privateers.  Consequently, 
the importance Nottingham subscribed to Dunkirk soon became evident.   
After the Battle of Malaga, the French were unable to maintain an effective 
fleet to counter the Anglo-Dutch presence due to poor finances and the need to 
provide for their large armies, which faced strong opposition in the characters of 
Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy.  French naval policy was instead reduced 
to financing privateers to target allied trade.
20
  Such activity was primarily centred on 
Dunkirk which protected over 100 privateering vessels, although St Malo also 
harboured forty.  Allied convoys were not well protected and the privateers had a 
devastating impact on trade.  With the concentration of the Royal Navy on 
maintaining a fleet in the Mediterranean, its other duties were neglected so much that, 
in 1707, London merchants created uproar, demanding an end to their constant losses 
at sea.  An Act of Parliament was passed in 1708 for the ‗better securing the trade of 
this kingdom by cruisers and convoys‘.  The first article of this Act was to secure 
forty-three vessels for the sole purpose of trade protection around Great Britain.
21
  
                                                 
20
 Clark, ‗War Trade and Trade War‘, p. 263. 
21
 Black, Jeremy, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, (London, 2002), pp. 147-148; Clark, ‗War Trade 
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 10 
This came six years after Nottingham first identified the need to station cruisers in 
such numbers to protect Britain‘s trade. 
The strategy outlined by Nottingham in the early stages of the war, when the 
Tories still retained some influence, allowed England to become a member of the first 
rank of European powers.  He resigned his office in 1704 in protest at the steadily 
increasing dominance of the Whigs in the ministry.
22
  Blue-water policy therefore 
took a blow as no major operation outside of Europe ensued and supporters of the 
Tory strategy fell silent with Marlborough‘s successful land campaigns.  Nottingham 
did, however, understand the need for balance, unlike Rochester who advocated an 
exclusively naval war.
23
  Marlborough also agreed that a Mediterranean presence was 
crucial as it would divert French attention.
24
  However, Nottingham did not entirely 
agree with the Duke‘s policy and argued that the war should not be prosecuted in 
Flanders, but in Italy, Spain and the West Indies where colonies and trade could be 
seized without maintaining a large and expensive army.
25
  The Mediterranean and the 
Americas were clearly central to his vision of a global maritime and amphibious 
strategy.
26
   
In sum, the Royal Navy performed a supporting role in the war, but 
nevertheless established superiority at sea.  Its operations were primarily intended to 
support land forces in the Mediterranean and also had a role in protecting British 
                                                                                                                                            
the Administration of the Navy of Queen Anne, 1702-1714‘, Navy Records Society, vol. CCIII, (1961), 
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23
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24
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Naval Mastery, p. 85. 
25
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26
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1717‘, The William and Mary Quarterly, Third series, vol. XXVI, no. 3 (July, 1969), p. 394. 
 11 
trade.
27
  Other theatres were clearly peripheral, as naval operations in the colonies 
generally occurred at the request of colonial governors intent on securing their 
interests.
28
  There had not been a grand imperial strategy laid down in London.  
Successive ministries were often only concerned with trade protection and the Whigs 
only agreed on colonial operations as long as they did not interfere with their 
European strategy.
29
  Had Tories such as Nottingham held power during the course of 
the war then British strategy would have been very different. 
As Marlborough‘s campaigning had not yet won the war by 1710, the Tories 
highlighted the ineffectiveness of the continental strategy.  Harley and St John 
recognised that political propaganda could further their goal of ending the war.  In 
order to detract from the previous administration, Jonathan Swift was employed to 
comment on the failings of the Whigs and to sell the Tory point of view.  In his 
famous pamphlet, The Conduct of the Allies, Swift stated that the war was fought by 
the Whigs as ‗principals‘ when the Tories thought the British should have been mere 
‗auxiliaries‘.  Essentially, Swift mirrored the Tory argument that the war should have 
been prosecuted primarily in Spain, which was the focus of their war aims, and at sea 
and in the colonies, where wealth could be acquired, rather than in the costly and 
protracted land campaigns in Flanders that spanned a decade.  These maritime versus 
continental debates would permeate a series of British administrations throughout the 
century.
30
 
Swift was also used to convince an already sceptical public of the benefits of 
ignoring their treaty obligations and negotiating a unilateral peace at the expense of 
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their allies.  Swift called for British disengagement from the ‗Dutch‘ war, as he 
alleged Britain was fighting for foreign interests.  Both Allies had duplicitously 
broken the articles of the Grand Alliance, for example, the Dutch contrived to trade 
with France and did not meet their naval quotas, while the Austrians had held secret 
negotiations with France in 1706.
31
  Swift also declared that, through the Whigs‘ 
unquestioning support for the Allies, the cost of the war had ruined Britain.  There 
was truth in these accusations, yet the Tories were themselves engaging in secret 
negotiations with the French.  In essence then, the Whigs should have followed a 
blue-water strategy to achieve security and success, and left the Allies to perform a 
holding action against France on the continent.  With the rise of the Tories and the 
instigation of the Quebec expedition, Britain saw the reversion to traditional English 
foreign policy, harking back to the privateers of Elizabeth I, and the official blue-
water policies of the Commonwealth and Charles II.
32
  William‘s Mediterranean naval 
policy had not invoked blue-water thinking as it was initiated to maintain the army in 
Europe, rather than focus on taking colonies or trade.
33
  Ironically, Swift‘s pamphlet 
was published in October 1711 when Walker had just returned from Canada after his 
unsuccessful attempt to demonstrate the advantages of blue-water warfare.
34
 
The politics of Anne‘s reign is amply covered by the historiography.  Harley 
and St John were two contrasting personalities, attracting much attention.  By 
securing office, this great friendship soon turned sour.  Harley was from a dissenting 
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background and had changed his political colours, but was never a High Tory.  He 
believed in moderation and disliked the rise of party within Parliament, and thought 
the interests of the Court and Crown were best served if they were not hampered by 
factional fighting between the growing forces of Whig and Tory.  As de facto head of 
the new ministry, Harley was able to put his thoughts into effect by offering positions 
to both moderate Whigs and Tories, and he secured an ally in the form of Queen 
Anne.  Yet he found difficulties in implementing his scheme for moderation.  As the 
election of 1710 had returned a huge majority for the Tories in the House of 
Commons, many Tory politicians expected the High Tories to gain positions of 
power.  By creating a moderate government, Harley had made himself vulnerable and 
his position ensured that the majority of High Tories would serve to hamper his 
ministry, rather than support it.
35
  Thus he would have to rely on the support of a 
handful of moderate Whigs to remain in power.  His philosophy was a creditable one 
yet the strength of the Tories, which ironically allowed him to form a ministry in the 
first place, would eventually bring about his demise.   
The High Tories looked elsewhere for leadership and found the young 
secretary of state for the northern department, Henry St John.
36
  This office was held 
by Harley when he was part of the triumvirate, when St John served under him as 
secretary at war.  Despite returning to office, St John was disappointed with his new 
appointment, desiring the more prestigious southern department instead.  His personal 
qualities were the opposite to those of the ‗incorruptible‘ Harley.37  He was young, 
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atheistic, ambitious, adulterous, astute, and he picked up the baton for the High Tory 
cause when he sensed opportunity.  His ambition was plain for the world to see and he 
was convinced by traditional Tory blue-water strategy.
38
  To feed his ambition for 
advancement he concocted the idea for the expedition to capture Quebec which had 
originally been considered, but not executed, by the previous Whig ministry.  The fall 
of Quebec would help to end the war quickly and serve as a bargaining chip at the 
peace negotiations.  It would also divert attention from Marlborough in Flanders at a 
time when the ministry still relied upon him, especially as several of his regiments 
were withdrawn from Flanders for the expedition.  Whereas Europe was deemed a 
priority by the Whigs, North America had been considered to be of little importance 
to overall grand strategy.
39
  Indeed, for politicians in Europe, the area of North 
America and the West Indies was seen as a geographical whole.
40
  Even St John 
himself had once referred to his Quebec project as the ‗West India Expedition‘.41  
Such a vast area was inconceivable to the imagination of most Europeans, perhaps 
resulting in a misunderstanding of its strategic value which did not mature until the 
Seven Years War (1756-1763).  St John attempted to change this lack of interest in 
blue-water and colonial policy.  The expedition‘s failure and the later collapse of the 
Tory ministry would, however, consign a negative view on his scheme in the 
historiography. 
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In the manner of St John, this thesis shall turn away from Marlborough‘s land-
based European campaigns.  A Whiggish perspective of the War of the Spanish 
Succession has continued to influence historians, resulting in three primary 
characteristics concerning the British historiography.  Firstly, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, it is overwhelmingly Anglocentric.  Secondly, its naval dimensions 
have been severely neglected.  Thirdly, most works have concentrated on the career of 
Marlborough.  Even here, his campaigns in Flanders and the 1704 march on the 
Danube have received the greatest interest to the detriment of the other aspects of the 
war.  As a result, the actions of the other participating nations are largely ignored 
unless Marlborough was personally involved and the war seemingly ended after his 
last campaign in 1711.  Little attention is given to the conduct of the war in Germany 
(excluding the 1704 campaign), Iberia, Italy or the Americas.  The campaigns in 
which the British were not engaged (those of 1701, 1712 and 1713) are only rarely 
and fleetingly examined.  Furthermore, although British naval ascendancy was 
confirmed during this period, the maritime sphere has received scant attention in 
comparison to other periods in the Royal Navy‘s history, with only Ruth Bourne and 
J. H. Owen covering limited aspects of the British naval war in any great detail.
42
  It is 
my intention that this thesis will contribute towards correcting this imbalance by 
studying a little known combined operation of an unprecedented scale, which was sent 
to the colonies in the latter stages of the war.   
That is not to say Marlborough was unimportant, nor his biographies 
worthless.
43
  Clearly his dominant role in both military and political affairs 
                                                 
42
 Owen, War at sea under Queen Anne and Bourne, Ruth, Queen Anne‟s Navy in the West Indies, 
(New Haven, 1939). 
43
 Barnett, Corelli, The First Churchill: Marlborough, Soldier and Statesman, (London, 1974); 
Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander; Churchill, Winston S., Marlborough: His Life and 
 16 
necessitates much discussion, but this has come at a cost.  For instance, English 
biographies of Prince Eugene of Savoy are a rarity despite his influential presence at 
all but one of Marlborough‘s famous victories and the fact that he went on to 
command the allied army in Flanders, in 1712, after the Duke‘s dismissal.44  The war 
was fought over the Spanish inheritance, but very few works have covered that theatre 
of war and the Whig mantra of ‗no peace without Spain‘45 has not been adequately 
reflected in the historiography.  Only the works of David Francis, J. A. C. Hugill and 
Henry Kamen have provided a detailed analysis of that theatre.  The French are 
equally neglected, but slightly better served thanks to studies of the French army 
during the reign of Louis XIV.
46
  Marlborough‘s most able opponent, the Duc de 
Villars, has just a single biography written in English to his name.
47
  The French 
victory in 1712 at Denain – the last battle in the Flanders theatre which reversed much 
of Marlborough‘s gains – is largely absent from the British record because the Duke 
did not command the allies there.  Likewise, the Quebec expedition has been largely 
ignored because of its failure at a time when Marlborough took the fortress at 
Bouchain. 
Although Marlborough is unavoidably featured in these pages, they shall 
mostly be punctuated by the lesser names of Hill, Nicholson, St John and Walker.  It 
is the latter to whom most attention shall be focused.  Walker, when not omitted from 
the annals of history, has received most of the blame for the disaster on the St 
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Lawrence.
48
  C. T. Atkinson has even absurdly claimed that the Quebec expedition 
denied Marlborough ultimate victory at Paris because of the reallocation of several 
battalions from his army.
49
  Walker does not deserve such derision.  As the naval 
commander, Walker undoubtedly held responsibility for the tragedy on the St 
Lawrence; however, he was operating under very difficult circumstances, much of 
which were outside of his control.  His considerable naval experience indicates that he 
was a competent mariner, especially as he had convoyed ships on numerous 
transoceanic voyages.  Still, a modern view of naval operations should not be allowed 
to distort the huge challenge of safely conveying a fleet to Quebec.  Walker took 
command in an age when maritime journeys were extremely perilous.  Crossing the 
Atlantic in the early eighteenth century was a difficult and dangerous task in itself, yet 
he then had to continue into the confines of a dangerous river without adequate charts 
or pilots.  Indeed, the majority of combined army-navy operations of the period 
resulted in failure and Walker‘s mission of sailing to Quebec was a much harder 
prospect than might be imagined today.
50
  He later suffered, like many suspected Tory 
sympathisers, from the political turmoil resulting from the accession of the 
Hanoverians in 1714 and the long ascendancy of the Whigs.  Consequently, Walker 
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later felt the need to defend his record and published his journal from the expedition 
in 1720.   
Little secondary material has been published about the expedition in modern 
times.  Gerald S. Graham‘s indispensable republication of Walker‘s ‗Journal‘, which 
also includes relevant correspondence, provides a great source of information.
51
  
William Thomas Morgan and, more recently, Richard Harding have contributed 
articles concerning the expedition, but it is surprising that there is little more than 
this.
52
  Unfortunately, most other secondary works which have referred to it have 
often relegated the expedition to a single paragraph, usually to merely note its failure.  
This is because it is often included to illustrate the political fluctuations of the time, 
rather than as an example of a new strategic element in the war against the French, 
especially as it serves as an example of the decline in Marlborough‘s power.  With 
such little published, this thesis, therefore, overwhelmingly relies on archival material, 
sometimes published in journals and calendars, but mostly in their original form.  
Luckily, there is a wealth of letters and documents preserved amongst the State Papers 
and Admiralty, Colonial and War Office records, most of which have received little 
attention.  These are primarily located at the National Archives, the British Library 
and the National Maritime Museum‘s Caird Library.  Additionally, Cabinet papers 
located at the Staffordshire Record Office have proved invaluable.  Unfortunately, the 
Edgar, Walker‘s flagship, exploded at Portsmouth on his return from Canada, 
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destroying the majority of his personal papers and documents, which ensured that 
some details will forever remain hidden. 
The historiography of British eighteenth-century joint operations has generally 
been devoted to the naval share of operations at the cost to the study of the army.
53
  
This is not the case here.  Colonial, political, military and naval aspects of the 
expedition are all covered.  Inevitably, some aspects will be favoured above others at 
times, yet a wide-ranging picture of the expedition will emerge.  The colonial history 
of North America shall be discussed, as the American colonists had been clamouring 
for the mother country to assist in conquering the French North American empire for 
decades.  Therefore, the political background is of immense importance.  As already 
mentioned, the expedition was born out of this period of political turbulence.  St John, 
in forming the project, usurped the Earl of Dartmouth‘s authority as the southern 
secretary, in whose jurisdiction colonial affairs lay, so that he could ideologically end 
the war using blue-water strategy and garner further power and promotion.  Also, 
Harley did not favour launching the expedition and the reasons why St John was able 
to press ahead with it must be analysed. 
Central to the argument is Walker‘s defence and Hill is held more accountable 
for much of the operational detail.  Although he cannot take responsibility for the 
navigation of the St Lawrence, Hill was instrumental in the decision to return to 
England without attempting to attack the French in Newfoundland, which was the 
expedition‘s secondary target.  As brother to the Queen‘s favourite, Hill obviously 
received his position through patronage, whereas Walker achieved his command 
through merit.  Many historians have thought it absurd that these commanders were 
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picked to command in the first place.
54
  Therefore the biographies of Walker and Hill 
have been compiled to challenge their perceived shortcomings and to illustrate that 
they were capable and competent commanders.   
Real blame for the failure of this expedition lies with St John‘s covert 
organisation of the expedition.  Owing to the expedition‘s neglected place in the 
historiography of the War of the Spanish Succession, this thesis will mainly draw 
upon primary sources in order to closely reconstruct a narrative of its organisation and 
execution.  The accompanying analysis will also allow a measured judgement of the 
expedition.  The advantage of reconstructing this episode is that it allows for a 
detailed examination of how an early eighteenth-century expeditionary force was 
organised and assembled, albeit in unusual circumstances which revealed the 
imperfections of the process. 
Along with the course of the Quebec expedition, the French ability to defend 
its colony shall also be considered, as well as the colonial effort against Montreal 
which was intended to divide the attention of the defenders of New France.  The latter 
operation has received little coverage in the literature owing to the lack of material 
related to it.  Here, this neglect is rectified somewhat as the diary of a Connecticut 
chaplain offers a detailed insight into the martial abilities of the colonies during, what 
the colonists referred to as, Queen Anne‘s War.55 
Despite being an abject failure, the expedition had little impact on events in 
the closing stages of the war.  Fortunately for the British, its consequences were not 
overwhelmingly negative; unfortunately for Walker, his reputation suffered and he 
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deserves to be exonerated.  As Hill did not have the opportunity to prove himself at 
Quebec, this thesis naturally skews its focus towards the Admiral.  It is 
understandable that, upon first glance, historians have relegated the expedition as 
being just one of many ambitious military operations which failed as the result of 
incompetence.  However, this expedition should not be dismissed as an inglorious 
folly, but counted as something quite different, even unique.  It represented an 
alteration in strategy which attempted to divert attention away from the costly land 
campaigning of continental Europe.  This was a new commitment to the American 
theatre never seen before, where for at least twenty years the colonials had sought to 
neutralise the threat posed by their northern French neighbours.  It was the first time 
Britain had acted on the colonial desire for large-scale imperial expansion on the 
North American continent.  Such was this commitment that the force led by Walker 
and Hill was the largest ever seen in that part of the Americas up to that point.
56
  In 
short, the expedition opened up North America to the potential of European 
campaigning.  The 1711 expedition is naturally overshadowed by Wolfe‘s successful 
victory at Quebec, which dominates the military historiography of North America 
during the pre-American Revolution era.  It is therefore necessary to compare the 
1711 expedition with the operations in Canada during the Seven Years War and also 
other attempts which show that St John‘s objective was a difficult task for Walker and 
Hill to achieve.  Whilst not a success, the 1711 expedition set a precedent for British 
administrations later in the century when the great project finally succeeded in 1759 
on the Plains of Abraham.   
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CHAPTER 1 
COLONIES AND POLITICS 
 
The 1711 Quebec expedition was not the first time a strategy for the conquest of 
North America had been proposed, nor executed.  It was, however, the first to have 
the full backing of the British state.  Previously, after an easy victory at Port Royal in 
1690, Massachusetts hubristically attempted to eliminate its French colonial rivals by 
conquering Quebec.  English forces then adopted similar plans to take New France in 
each successive war fought with the French.  These plans were not initiated by an 
imperialistic design originating in London, but by the repeated requests of the 
colonists to the mother country to aid them in their desire for security. 
 
I: The North American Colonies 
North America had witnessed rapid change because of large-scale colonisation during 
the seventeenth century.  Spain had begun its colonisation drive, primarily in the 
south, during the sixteenth century.  However, by the eighteenth century, as a power 
in irreversible decline, the Spanish proved to be of little trouble to the British colonies 
in the north, other than their occasional scrappy incursions around Florida.
1
  The 
northern part of the continent would set the scene for most of the friction between the 
British and French colonial empires.  By the outbreak of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, America was inhabited by hundreds of thousands of European-descended 
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settlers.  There could not have been a greater contrast between the English and French 
colonies, as each imitated the distinct characteristics of their mother nations.   
New France consisted of vast wilderness, punctuated by its riverine lifeline – 
the St Lawrence.  This river provided New France‘s capital of Quebec with a 
communications route to the Atlantic and onwards to Europe.  Quebec was ruled as if 
it were an extension of France.  The personal rule of Louis XIV had stretched over the 
Atlantic to the forested swathes and snowy peaks of Canada, when royal control was 
established in 1663.
2
  The colonists there were French, Catholic and held close 
alliances with the indigenous peoples, a minority of whom angered their tribal 
communities by converting to Catholicism.  Usually their reasons were selfish rather 
than because of any particular religious motivation – to be saved from diseases that 
could not be cured by traditional shamans or to allow a trade in muskets.  The Jesuits 
and Sulpicians were particularly active in New France, whilst the nuns at the Ursuline 
convent in Quebec schooled native girls.
3
  The colony did not attract large numbers of 
settlers from France, with perhaps only 15,000-19,000 inhabitants in an area of many 
thousands of square miles.
4
  The population of the city of Quebec numbered less than 
3,000.
5
  Nevertheless, these hardy settlers and their Indian allies developed a 
bellicosity that posed a great threat to the neighbouring colonies of New England. 
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The history of Anglo-French competition in the region was a long one, 
stemming from the first established permanent settlements.  When Quebec was still a 
small trading post it was briefly occupied by the English Kirke brothers, from 1629 to 
1633.
6
  When it reverted to French control, a small fortified château was built, which 
served as the city‗s citadel.  Similarly, Port Royal in Acadia (what is now Nova 
Scotia) had been taken on two occasions before the War of the Spanish Succession, in 
1654 and 1690.
7
  The New Englanders actively sought to conquer their colonial 
neighbours during wartime, not only to heighten the economic benefits of the fur and 
skins trade, but to provide security from the proliferation of French and native border 
attacks.   
New France was, in a sense, divided into three separate colonies, those of 
Canada, Acadia and Louisiana, and was modelled on the French provincial system.  
Each of these were further divided into districts, though Quebec would emerge as the 
most significant settlement and would serve equally as the capital of New France, 
Canada, and the Quebec district.  In New France power was centralised, manifested 
ultimately in the person of the King and represented by a governor-general residing in 
Quebec.
8
  Although he took responsibility in military and diplomatic affairs, the 
governor-generals took instructions directly from Paris, like any other French 
province.  Given the distance, this resulted in very slow and inefficient government.  
The other Canadian towns of Montreal and Trois-Rivieres were also fortified and 
were capitals, under lieutenant-governors, of their own districts within the colony of 
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Canada.
9
  Only Roman Catholics were allowed to settle and all religious issues were 
handled by a bishop in Quebec.
10
  France clearly wanted to retain its huge territorial 
claims and maintain the power of absolute monarchy, and the Catholic Church, in the 
New World. 
The rigid, absolutist structure of New France did not face any internal threat to 
its system of government, even though its people lived in a completely alien 
environment compared to the population of an average French province.  This was 
despite its proximity to the British colonies which were developing individual systems 
of government.  The British colonies were given a great deal of autonomy from the 
mother country and Protestant non-conformists were allowed to settle and rule 
according to their own particular beliefs.
11
  With a rich mix of Christian traditions and 
immigrants from all over Europe, this cosmopolitanism provided for a diverse and 
expanding population, yet united under the British sovereign.  The roots of the ideals 
of federalism and democracy in the North American continent were, however, evident 
even at this early stage.
12
 
Both the French and British colonists were very much aware of their 
respective strategic positions.  The population of the British colonies hugely 
outnumbered that of New France, but they were usually the victims of border raids by 
the French and their Indian allies.  This occurred despite British America dwarfing 
New France in terms of population, boasting 350,000-400,000 colonists, though 
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spread thinly across the eastern seaboard of the continent.
13
  The centralisation that 
the government of New France offered allowed its people to fortify their towns and 
build outlying forts to act as a buffer to any potential attack.  France also built a series 
of forts across North America to protect its territorial claims in an area which 
comprised huge swathes of sparsely populated territory.  The capitals of each district 
were also fortified.  This was quite a contrast to the English colonies where, although 
fearful of French and native attack, settlements were left unfortified.
14
  The French 
forts were primitive compared with the Vauban fortresses in Europe, naturally being 
smaller in scale and required to defend against raiding parties rather than large armies.  
However, the larger French settlements gradually built up their defences to provide 
formidable protection, not only against raiders, but European forces.   
Skilled French engineers were responsible for fortifying much of New France.  
These ‗King‘s Engineers‘ were experts in fortification and were picked according to 
their abilities.  Indeed the profession was held in such high esteem that the King‘s 
Engineers were not part of the army‘s structure but were a separate entity.15  Vauban‘s 
most famous forts were located in Flanders, the perfect area for siege warfare, with 
large expanses of flat land, and numerous rivers and water obstacles that could be 
diverted to suit the requirements of a particular fortification.  Yet Flanders could not 
be more dissimilar to French North America.  With rocky mountains, river rapids, 
huge expanses of forest and swamp, geographical factors would determine a 
completely new attitude to the conduct of warfare.  True geometrical Vauban-style 
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fortresses could not be built in such a challenging domain, especially due to the lack 
of suitable labour.  A compromise in fortress design had to be made.  For North 
American warfare the rules would have to be rewritten, as would the great French 
tradition of fortress design.  Many small fortress outposts were almost medieval in 
character, which suited the wilderness far better than contemporary European designs, 
and were more suited to repelling raids than huge armies.
16
  Even stone windmills 
were used as strong-points and one served as a defensive point in Quebec during the 
siege of 1690.
17
  Also, Canada lacked a road-based infrastructure, forcing armies to 
travel along rivers, even more so than in Europe, due to the impassable terrain and 
vast distances involved.  Experience in the vast, but sparsely populated, New World 
would dictate new challenges to the Europeans in terms of warfare.  The blurred, 
indistinct and ever-changing borders of colonial territories would only add to the 
confusion.   The old rules of battle were of no use in this harsh and unforgiving 
environment, whilst the familiarity of formal engagement in open warfare was 
reshaped with the involvement of native tribes.   
The English colonies engaged in warfare with their French counterparts not 
just to gain territory, trade or advantage for the mother country, but primarily for 
security.  French and Indian border incursions, which destroyed farms and villages, 
and kidnapped local inhabitants, were relatively commonplace.  The raid on 
Deerfield, Massachusetts, in 1704, is a particularly notorious example of the French 
threat to their neighbours in time of war, when an entire community was decimated 
with over 150 residents kidnapped or killed.
18
  New Englanders were also unsafe at 
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sea.  Port Royal in Acadia provided a haven for French privateers that would harass 
the merchant shipping of the British colonials.
19
  The colonies of New England were 
not the only areas prone to attack.  New York suffered from its large border areas and 
relied on maintaining good relations with the tribes of the Five Nations to remain 
intact.
20
  The individual colonies were not centralised like those of New France, nor 
were they martial in character.  The colonists‘ individualistic temperament was 
exacerbated when the Tories assumed office in 1710, as they had consistently tried to 
force the Occasional Conformity Bill through Parliament.  The colonial Dissenters 
were suspicious of Tory plans for the colonies although, ironically, it was the Tories 
who actually responded to their demands for an expedition against Canada.
21
  Such 
differences were illustrated in 1702, when Bostonian guns fired upon the Royal Navy 
sloop Swift when it attempted to leave with impressed seamen aboard.
22
 
Unlike in New France, the natives were generally badly treated in the British 
colonies.
23
  For the British this represented a lost chance at rapprochement with a 
potential ally knowledgeable of the local geography, which could prove critical when 
engaged in conflict with the French.  The British colonials, therefore, had not 
exploited this resource, allowing the French a virtual monopoly over Indian support, 
which more than made up for a lack of French numbers.
24
  Later in the century, the 
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colonials would, however, diverge from the European style of warfare and adopt some 
Indian practices which would become peculiar to that theatre.
25
 
Whereas differences between Briton and colonial were already apparent, 
another group was present, other than the natives, which would contribute to further 
campaigns.  As many as 2,500 Palatines, German refugees escaping their war-ravaged 
homeland, had made their way to New York in 1710.  Many would volunteer for 
service in 1711.  It was initially hoped that these new settlers would serve as a 
bulwark against the French and Indians, as well as providing a trade in naval stores.
26
  
North America was valued for its pines for use as masts and expansion into Canada 
would have increased this important resource for the navy, which relied heavily on 
Baltic suppliers.
27
  Even if it were not for the naval stores and the fur trade, Quebec 
remained a vital military target given its strategic location. 
The capture of Quebec would certainly be problematical, but strategically it 
was one of the most important cities in North America and not only because of its 
political importance.  ‗Quebec‘, in the local Algonquin tongue, translates as ‗where 
the river narrows‘, that river being the St Lawrence.28  About seventy miles wide at its 
mouth, it narrows at Quebec to less than a mile.  The capital of the French empire in 
North America guarded the Canadian interior.  Its strategic value was amplified by the 
fact that the St Lawrence flows from the Great Lakes.  From there, access to the 
Mississippi allowed the masters of Quebec to venture throughout the continent, right 
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down to the shores of the Gulf of Mexico where the French later established the city 
of New Orleans.   
Along this route the French were able to establish forts to prevent the British 
colonies from expanding and to foster friendly relations with local Indian tribes.
29
  
Indeed, this strategy was identified by English contemporaries.  Robert Quary, 
surveyor-general of customs in America, asserted that the French colonial presence 
‗enclosed all [of] the Queen‘s empire in North America‘.30  Quebec was vital in 
maintaining communications between France and its North American possessions.  As 
it was the furthest point inland that oceangoing ships could reach, it was an economic 
centre where goods could be loaded and unloaded for further distribution around New 
France.  It was also where French troops disembarked.
31
 
This strategic importance was not always realised three thousand miles away 
in London, where North America did not feature in Britain‘s immediate priorities.  
The New Englanders constantly pressed the ministry to take the war to New France.  
The British colonists desired security and they realised that if Quebec was taken, then 
New France would follow in its entirety.
32
  Port Royal was an irritating nest of French 
privateers.  It had been a serious problem to the British colonies, all of which relied on 
the sea.  Vessels from Port Royal had captured thirty-five ships, mostly Bostonian, 
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and 500 prisoners in 1708 alone.
33
  The port was a logical target for the British as a 
precursor to attacking Quebec.   
A Quebec expedition had been mooted several times during the War of the 
Spanish Succession after it had been raised by its staunchest advocate, Colonel 
Samuel Vetch.  He had managed to convince the Whig ministry to launch an 
expedition in 1709, but it was abandoned as European-centric priorities saw the 
regiments earmarked for Canadian service sail for Portugal instead.
34
  Vetch had 
figured prominently in the campaign to convince the mother country to assist in the 
destruction of the French North American empire.  His paper, Canada Survey‟d, 
written in 1708, had stated the case for the New Englanders, arguing cogently for the 
capture of Quebec for its economic and security benefits.
35
  Vetch had even suggested 
what forces and equipment would be needed for the task; these were broadly similar 
to those involved in the 1711 expedition.  He emphasised the use of colonials, which 
was optimistic considering the often poor ability of the colonies to raise troops.  Vetch 
had wanted 1,200 men from the provinces of New York (550), Connecticut (350), the 
Jerseys (200) and Pennsylvania (100); aided by an unspecified number of Indians, 
from the Iroquois Confederacy, to strike at Montreal.  For the main force attacking 
Quebec, Vetch had envisaged 3,000 men from New England, New Hampshire and 
Rhode Island.  In addition, Vetch suggested that two regiments of 1,560 regulars be 
sent from Britain.  He also thought that three bomb ketches and thirty guns with fifty 
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rounds of shot each were required.
36
  However, a different version of the pamphlet did 
not discuss artillery and required only ‗one or two‘ bomb vessels, 1,500 colonial 
troops against Montreal and 1,000 colonial militia to join the two regular regiments.
37
   
This influential pamphlet may have been drafted prior to 1708 and before the 
Act of Union came into effect in May 1707, as the copy sent to the Commissioners for 
Trade and Plantations on 27 July referred to ‗British‘ advantages, unlike that sent to 
Secretary of State Sunderland six weeks earlier which instead spoke of ‗English‘ 
interests.  Indeed, the tract draws upon information gained from Vetch‘s visit to 
Quebec in 1705, which he used for a similar paper in 1706.
38
  Whenever it was 
produced, Canada Survey‟d was very influential and can be credited with arousing 
British interest in Canada. 
However, almost as soon as war with France had been declared in 1702, the 
New York Governor, Viscount Cornbury, had discussed the case for preparing for war 
against the French colonies and their Indian allies, by trading with the latter in order 
to garner intelligence.
39
  This is surprising considering Cornbury‘s general animosity 
towards the native peoples.
40
  In fact, such engagement only began in 1709 once 
Cornbury had left office.
41
  Stemming from his grasp of the strategic effects of French 
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encirclement in North America, Robert Quary appears to have suggested a direct 
attack on Quebec as early as 1705.
42
   
Another, unnamed, source had concocted a strategy for taking Quebec that 
was linked to the West Indies.  Stating that the capture of Havana would give the 
Royal Navy an additional port in the Caribbean, thereby increasing regional security, 
the forces used could then sail to take Quebec in cooperation with forces raised in 
New York, New Jersey and New England.  The author claimed that the second part of 
the plan would help to ‗recover troops diseased by the services against the French 
islands‘, illustrating glaring ignorance of the fact that the Canadian swamps were also 
infested with malaria and that its summers were as unbearably hot, as its winters were 
desperately cold.
43
  Such were the plans submitted by colonials for the capture of New 
France during the War of the Spanish Succession.  Only Vetch‘s would catch the eye 
of the ministry in London, however.  Still, they must have all been inspired by the 
events of 1690 and by the consequent realisation that they could only succeed with the 
help of Britain. 
King William‘s War (the Nine Years War in Europe) first gave New 
Englanders an opportunity of conquering their continent.  Colonel Nicholas Bayard of 
New York even suggested the importance of merging Canada into a vast British North 
American empire in 1689.
44
  It is clear that during this period it was the colonials who 
urged such an expansionist policy and not London.  The importance of this strategy 
was so heartfelt that Massachusetts decided to take the initiative.  In May 1690, a 
Massachusetts force, under Sir William Phips, had set out from Boston and captured 
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Port Royal, which was in too poor a state to wage an effective defence.
45
  Emboldened 
by this success, the Massachusetts government, along with Phips, decided to follow 
up this victory with an attack on Quebec itself.  The fall of Port Royal had been a 
catalyst for Quebec, fearing imminent attack, to improve its defences.  Quebec was 
not as yet walled, although it already benefited from being sited on a cliff-edge 
adjoining the St Lawrence and flanked by the St Charles River.  The landward, rear-
side of the city facing the Plains of Abraham was unprotected by geography.  A 
straight wooden palisade with intermittent stone towers, serving as redoubts, was built 
covering that approach, whilst several batteries of eighteen-pounder guns were 
mounted for Quebec‘s further defence.46   
The government in Massachusetts could barely finance this new expedition, 
but nevertheless secured at least thirty-two vessels (though lacking pilots), which 
were supplied with three months‘ provisions.47  Phips sailed on 9 August – extremely 
late in the year.  Meanwhile, Massachusetts‘ simultaneous landward thrust to 
Montreal had descended into chaos.  Major-General Winthrop marched to Montreal 
with 500 troops and seventy Indians, but turned back at Wood Creek on 15 August 
after an outbreak of smallpox and the dawning realisation that they were woefully ill-
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equipped for the task.
48
  Phips eventually arrived at Quebec on 5 October, after 
wasting valuable time by needlessly stopping at every opportunity to claim a portion 
of unpopulated enemy territory, and because his want of pilots made the voyage slow 
and perilous.
49
   
Winthrop‘s retreat enabled the French to concentrate their forces at Quebec.50  
The city‘s defences were extremely weak, but the resolve of Governor-General 
Frontenac could not be doubted when he responded to Phips‘ call for Quebec‘s 
surrender: ‗tell your master I will answer him by the mouth of my cannons‘.  Quebec 
was reinforced by at least 2,100 regulars, militia and Indians.
51
  These faced 1,300 
New Englanders under Major Walley, who landed on the Beauport shore on 7 
October, driving their opponents back from the landing site.
52
  It is worth allowing 
one of Walley‘s officers, Major Savage, to explain their circumstances: 
 
Our men had spent most of their ammunition, having brought only fifteen or eighteen shot 
ashore with them, and two biscuits apiece. The reason was that we expected the small vessels 
to bring us everything that night. We had about five men killed, and twenty wounded in this 
skirmish…About midnight they sent us ashore six eight-pounder field-pieces, which we knew 
not what to do with, for the place was marshy with several small gullies to be crossed. They 
sent us also half a barrel of powder—you may judge how poor an allowance for 1,200 men—
and no provisions. No sooner were we engaged at our landing than our four big vessels 
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weighed anchor, contrary to orders, and fell to battering the town. They had spent the best part 
of their ammunition by the time they got back, and the Admiral [Phips] was forced (so they 
say) to slip his anchor and cable. We had several skirmishes while ashore, but little harm 
done. Prisoners tell us that if we had come four days earlier, we should have found but 600 
people in the town: but our long voyage up the river gave them warning, so that they had now 
3,000 men in the town and 800 in the swamp by our side. We often sent on board to get 
victuals, for we found little ashore, and at last they told us that they had no more ammunition 
and sent us a biscuit apiece, with orders to re-embark.
53
 
 
A retreat necessitated by a lack of food and ammunition indicates just how poorly 
planned the venture was.  Also, cold and smallpox had begun to take their toll.  Phips 
had attempted to divert the French by sailing his four largest vessels (mere frigates 
and sloops) to attack the lower town of Quebec.  This effort brought only damage to 
the hulls of the ships from the enemy‘s cannon and Walley‘s exhausted force had re-
embarked by 11 October.
54
  
Shortly after, a terrible storm inflicted huge damage to Phips‘ fleet.  At least 
three vessels were destroyed and those that survived took many weeks to reach 
Boston, having been widely dispersed by the storm.
55
  One anonymous writer said that 
the storm killed over 400 men
56
 and, as of 3 December 1690, eight ships with 500 
men were still missing.
57
  Four vessels were actually lost, along with their crews and 
the soldiers that they carried.
58
  The author accurately summed up the New 
Englanders‘ situation, ‗we are undone for want of help from England, and the great 
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author of all our mischief is about to sail to ask for it [Phips consequently lobbied for 
further attempts against Quebec].
59
  In our expedition to Port Royal we kept bad faith, 
and our perfidy has been retaliated on us in Canada by a shameful overthrow‘.60  In 
order to succeed at Quebec, it was realised that the limited assets of Massachusetts 
were not enough.  Money and resources from England was essential for success.  
Meanwhile, the French commissioned investigations into their defences, with one 
suggestion being the construction of two galleys to be used as picket boats.
61
  They 
realised that if they sat idly by, then their colony would be conquered. 
In 1693, Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Wheler commanded an expedition that 
would see him sail to the Caribbean and thence to North America in an ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to strike at Quebec.  He found that the colonials had not 
prepared sufficiently for his arrival and so turned his attention to Newfoundland, 
which he found to be too strong.  The expedition was abandoned.
62
  Ironically, Wheler 
did not receive the help he required from Phips (despite his lobbying) to make the 
expedition a success.
63
  The lone victory at Port Royal was soon reversed as it was 
retaken by the French in 1691 because Massachusetts did not have the resources to 
occupy it.
64
  The Treaty of Ryswick confirmed it as a French possession in 1697.
65
 
The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession (or Queen Anne‘s War to 
the colonials) provided another opportunity to rid the English colonists of their 
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northern adversaries.  They were no doubt aware that they needed the backing of the 
English state in order to achieve their goal of an America free of French influence.
66
  
The resources and military manpower of the colonies were simply not sufficient to 
take and hold their objectives in the north; three unsuccessful attempts were made to 
take Port Royal alone during the war.  Any dreams of imitating the success of 1690 
and taking the fight to Quebec were shattered by the evident improvements in French 
defences.   
Cooperation with the mother country was further necessitated by the 
amateurish nature of the New Englanders.  Whilst enthusiastic in taking the fight to 
the French in Canada, those that volunteered for such operations quickly became 
disillusioned.  Many had volunteered to fight the Canadians, to plunder and destroy 
settlements, but not to conquer.
67
  These colonists were concerned with retaliation for 
French or Indian incursions on their territory.  They were willing to leave their homes, 
families and farms for short periods to gain vengeance, profit and excitement, but 
were unwilling to do the real work of soldiering.  The wearying monotony of 
garrisoning a fort for months on end, in the face of a hostile population, was not what 
they volunteered for.  Occupying Port Royal was not what these men had envisaged 
and with the end of the campaigning season in 1690, they were intent on returning to 
their farms and families. The freedom-loving colonial liked to do his bit on his own 
terms, but the work of extending an empire carved from New France was a job for 
professionals without local ties and interests.  Such a plan needed to be driven by a 
common policy of the colonial governors with the ministry in London.  This was 
demonstrated by the further attempts on Port Royal, which was a minor port lacking 
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in serious defences, but which posed a significant challenge to the inexperienced 
colonial forces.  Governor Dudley of Massachusetts had first suggested an attack on 
Port Royal in 1702.  He argued that it would free Massachusetts to contribute to the 
war in the West Indies.
68
  This was ambitious strategic thinking by a man concerned 
with the running of but one of the American colonies.  Expeditions against Port Royal 
were mounted in 1704, twice in 1707, and 1710.
69
   
Only 500 Bostonians mounted the 1704 attack, which utterly failed.
70
  It was 
probably attempted in response to the Deerfield raid earlier in the year.  Both 
expeditions of 1707 reaffirmed the need for British backing, as persistence could not 
wear the French down.
71
  Port Royal was no longer the easy prey it had been in 1690; 
nevertheless, Dudley had decided to flatter the public‘s desire to ‗go and destroy that 
nest of hornets‘. 72  The resources of New England could only produce a little over 
1,000 men for the first 1707 operation.
73
  Dudley‘s own words best described the 
ineffectiveness of that colonial force: 
 
I equipped 1,000 musketeers and put them on board proper transports…in June they landed 
upon Port Royal headland…they found it impracticable to bring up any great cannon, nor had I 
any mortars to supply them with, more than two small ones of fifty weight the shot, very 
unequal to the enemies for number or bigness, whereupon they burnt all the town home to the 
fort gate and all the depending settlements, and destroyed their cattle, 1,000 horned beast, and 
sheep and hogs to a far greater number, and came off the ground sooner than I intended, upon 
which I stopped them in their return, and reinforced them and made them go upon the ground 
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again, and stay there some longer time, rather to show their obedience than in hopes of taking 
the fort, which is a very regular work of forty pieces of cannon.
74
 
 
This attempt was followed that August with another equally ineffective expedition.  
Port Royal had been strengthened and the Massachusetts men withdrew after their 
fifteen-day siege had inflicted only three French casualties.
75
  The fort at Port Royal 
had improved significantly since Phips‘ day, becoming a Vauban-style earthwork with 
four bastions as well as an additional battery to tackle any threat from the shore.
76
   
This marked the end of independent colonial operations of this scale.  
Massachusetts needed the help of Great Britain.  However, British imperial strategy, 
formulated in London, was incredibly defensive.  This was despite the display of 
bellicosity by its American colonists who had rejected an approach by the governor-
general of New France, Marquis de Vaudreuil, to establish colonial neutrality.
77
  The 
ministry had shown little enthusiasm for extra-European projects, believing in most 
cases that colonial issues should be settled diplomatically at the peace, rather than 
militarily during the war.
78
  London only grasped the importance of an expedition to 
Quebec when faced with Vetch‘s strategic arguments and with a letter by William 
Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, which described the interdependence of the North 
American colonies with the West Indies and how the French colonies threatened them 
both.
79
  Also, the French attack and capture, in 1708, of St John‘s, capital of the 
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British division of Newfoundland, may have stirred up some colonial enthusiasm in 
London.  This came after the cancellation of an expedition, due to be sent to take 
Placentia in the French part of Newfoundland, because of poor planning.
80
 
Quebec was seriously considered as a strategic target in 1709 as France 
appeared to be on the brink of collapse.  In 1708-1709, France had suffered from a 
terrible winter that was exacerbated by a famine resulting from a poor harvest.
81
  With 
the armies of the allies encroaching upon its borders, poised for the last strike towards 
Paris and victory, the Whigs were complacent and over-confident.  The ministry 
thought it prudent to heed the nagging colonials and send an expedition against 
Quebec.  Secretary of State for the Southern Department Sunderland had not shown 
any particular warmth to Canada Survey‟d, but his temporary absence in 1708 saw the 
involvement of Henry Boyle, the northern secretary.  The Council of Trade and 
Plantations had recommended Vetch‘s paper to the Queen and saw the potential of 
conquering Canada.
82
  Boyle‘s enthusiasm for the proposal consequently gave the 
project much greater support and the organisation of this expedition was well 
advanced before resources were redirected to more urgent areas.
83
  1709 did not turn 
out as the Whigs and their allies had envisaged, as the Battle of Malplaquet was not 
the easy victory anticipated against a demoralised and starving army.   It was instead a 
pyrrhic victory, whose casualties outraged much of Europe and severely depleted the 
strength of Marlborough‘s army.84 
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The expedition had been authorised as a direct consequence of Vetch‘s paper 
and his lobbying in London.
85
  Vetch was issued with orders to prepare the colonies 
for the expedition and Dudley‘s services were also mobilised.86  The colonials had 
made huge preparations and were eager for success.  This preparation was also 
indicated in the list of officers that were raised for the effort.
87
  The ministry was to 
provide five regiments, under Major-General Macartney, combined with a naval 
squadron.
88
  However, on 11 October, Dudley received news that the British 
contingent had been diverted to Portugal instead.
89
  This disappointing news was 
brought by the Enterprise on an indirect Atlantic crossing.  The decision to cancel had 
been made on 27 July, but the letter sent to Dudley had not been sent until August, 
suggesting the little importance placed upon these affairs by the ministry.
90
  It must 
have taken the colonials by surprise as they had been ready for some time, yet the 
delay encouraged sickness and desertion, as well as the depletion of their supplies.
91
  
Further, it has been suggested that the colonial forces, despite their obvious 
preparations, were not suitable for the mission because of an inadequate logistical 
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system and poor quality troops.
92
  Still, considerable disappointment was felt across 
the Atlantic as the mother country had once again neglected its colonies, which had 
put considerable effort into raising five regiments of provincial troops for the 
expedition.  The perceived apathy of the ministry had already convinced the colonials 
to send a permanent agent to London, Jeremiah Dummer, to lobby and correspond on 
their behalf.
93
  It was likely that the Whig ministry, mostly uninterested in North 
American campaigning anyway, was responding to French suggestions of peace 
negotiations, which could result in the acquisition of Canada by diplomatic means.
94
 
Vetch‘s plan in Canada Survey‟d had desired the British force to be at Boston 
by early May at the very latest, but the preliminary peace conference of 1709 delayed 
its dispatch.
95
  As an Edinburgh man and veteran of the infamous Darien fiasco, the 
idealistic Vetch had proposed that the force should be solely comprised of Scots, in 
the hope that it would attract hardy settlers to establish a successful Scottish colony in 
Acadia.
96
  However, a new figure eventually emerged to champion the colonies‘ 
interests.  Colonel Francis Nicholson would rise to dominate the military proceedings 
of the colonies.  He had wide experience of fighting in Europe and at Tangier before 
serving as a lieutenant-governor of both New York and Virginia.
97
  Nicholson then 
ingratiated himself in colonial political life and became involved with Vetch‘s plans 
for the conquest of Canada. 
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In order to sustain enthusiasm for the capture of Canada, the colonial 
governors sent five sachems to London in 1710, with Nicholson and Mayor Schuyler 
of Albany.
98
  This visit came when power was shifting in Britain.  These Indian 
‗kings‘ became a symbol of Tory blue-water ambitions, raising the importance of the 
colonies in British grand strategy.
99
  Significantly, the visit also cemented relations 
with the Iroquois Confederacy.
100
  Such a display in London must have also raised 
public awareness of North American affairs.  Whilst possibly influencing the 
incoming Tories, it did not create an atmosphere that caused a sudden renewed 
interest in Canadian matters, as a new expedition for 1710 had been decided upon 
before their arrival.
101
   
After the disappointment of 1709, the wary colonials did not adequately 
prepare for British aid the following year.
102
  Contrary to all expectations, a small 
British force was dispatched across the Atlantic in 1710 as the unnecessary expense to 
which the colonies had been put prompted the ministry to repair relations.
103
  This 
force was led by Commodore George Martin and came in the form of three line-of-
battle ships, two frigates and a bomb vessel, as well as 500 marines.
104
  Combined 
with five regiments from New England they decided to attack Port Royal, which was 
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the only viable target for such a small force.  Massachusetts, again shouldering the 
greater part of the colonial effort, bore a large and disproportionate cost, raising two 
of the New England regiments and sending its Province Galley along with the 
expedition.
105
  Vetch was adjutant-general to General Nicholson as commander in 
chief, who held the power to award commissions.
106
  They sailed from Boston on 18 
September, arriving at Port Royal on the 24
th
.
107
  The 300 French defenders were 
hopelessly outnumbered.  British and colonial troops were aided by the navy‘s bomb 
ketch which sent several shells and carcasses into the fort each night when the 
weather was suitably calm.
108
  This led to much correspondence between Nicholson 
and the French commander, Governor Subercase, over its distressing impact upon the 
ladies of the town.
109
  After a valiant defence, the articles of capitulation were drawn 
up on 2 October, allowing Subercase to march out with the full honours of war.
110
  
The day before, the surrounding British artillery had pierced the walls of the fort.
111
 
After its capture, Port Royal was renamed Annapolis Royal in honour of the 
Queen and it was soon mapped by its conquerors.
112
  Vetch was left there to govern, 
where his garrison began to succumb to disease, death, desertion and boredom.
113
  As 
the scourge of coastal New England fell in October, it was far too late in the year to 
follow up such a victory at Quebec – but this was still seriously considered.  The 
Cabinet had met in July 1710 to discuss such an eventuality.  The Lords 
                                                 
105
 CSPC, 1710-1711, pp. 29-30, no. 81.iii, Dudley to Council of Trade and Plantations, Account of 
charges accruing to the Massachusetts Bay, from the intended expedition to Canada, 31 January 1710.  
106
 Nicholson and Vetch normally held the commission of colonels, Dalton, Charles, (ed.), English 
Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714, (London, 1904), VI, p. 287; 289-290. 
107
 Nicholson, ‗Journal‘, pp. 64-65. 
108
 Ibid., pp. 67-69. 
109
 Ibid., pp. 69-75. 
110
 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
111
 Ibid., p. 79. 
112
 TNA, MPG 1/274, Plan of Annapolis Royal, October 1710. 
113
 Leach, Roots of Conflict, p. 31. 
 46 
Commissioners of the Admiralty had accompanied Dummer, the colonial agent, and 
three sailing masters to Cabinet, to give an account of the ‗seasons in the West Indies 
especially relating to Boston in New England and the River Canada [St Lawrence]‘.  
They had determined that Boston lay 200 leagues from the mouth of the St Lawrence, 
with Quebec being 100 leagues upriver.  Whilst not precise, this was a fair estimate, 
the actual distances being longer.  September and October were identified as being the 
best months to sail upriver to gain the advantage of the winds.  It was also estimated 
that the St Lawrence was a league and a half broad as far as Quebec, with nineteen 
fathoms of water, whilst it would take seven weeks to journey to Boston and a further 
ten days onwards voyage to Quebec with a fair wind.
114
  This made the journey sound 
like a long but easy passage and ignored the difficulties of sailing on the St Lawrence.  
Dummer had previously pleaded with the Earl of Dartmouth that it was not too late to 
send an expedition to Quebec in July 1710, based on his knowledge of Phips‘ 
expedition.  He misleadingly stated that Phips‘ ‗ships got safe to Boston November 19 
[1690]‘ knowing this was not the real story.115 
Viscount Shannon was appointed to command a potential expedition to 
Quebec.
116
  He was due to rendezvous with Commodore Martin, but he did not leave 
England.
117
  Three men-of-war were given orders to sail for Canada; however, the 
expedition was abandoned at the end of August.
118
  The reason given to the colonial 
governors was that contrary winds and ‗other important services which intervened‘ 
had prevented its departure and it was then too late to dispatch.  Nicholson and Vetch 
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were told that sufficient troops could not be spared.
119
  Details are sketchy, but 
Shannon was appointed to command five regiments which embarked upon transports 
at Portsmouth in October, which was far too late in a European campaigning season, 
let alone a Canadian one.  They were again stood down when it was deemed too late 
in the season to make an attempt against Quebec and were instead sent to Spain.
120
  
The confusion over its dispatch may have been a result of the change of ministry 
which occurred that August.   
The prospect of sending such an expedition had been the subject of much 
discussion.  Marlborough and Lord High Treasurer Godolphin were against this 
venture.  They thought it too diversionary from the European war and it was left for 
the ensuing Tory ministry to revitalise the project.
121
  Godolphin, illustrating the 
geographical ignorance of British politicians, referred to Canada as the ‗West 
Indies‘.122  There was much correspondence between Marlborough and Godolphin 
which suggested that the expedition would not go ahead in the first place.  After the 
Cabinet meeting with Dummer, Godolphin declared that an expedition was ‗not yet 
absolutely laid aside, but will certainly not go on‘.123  On 24 July, Marlborough wrote 
to Godolphin and to Boyle as he had heard that Shannon‘s ‗expedition to the West 
Indies is not to proceed‘.124  The Admiralty reportedly favoured the opinion ascribed 
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to a Captain Dallaval that it should not go ahead.
125
  This suggests that there was little 
intention in sending an expedition to Quebec until the Tories acquired office in the 
late summer, when Shannon was put in command of his troops. 
The 1710 capture of Port Royal nevertheless finally provided a success in 
Queen Anne‘s War as it used the combined resources of Britain and its colonies, 
rather than those of New England alone.  Yet it did not receive adequate recognition 
in Britain.  When one colonial, Colonel William Taylor, complained to the Queen that 
he had not received his pay, the Secretary at War could not determine what authority 
raised his regiment, what funds were to pay for it, nor what establishment it was put 
on.  Taylor‘s petition declared that he had provided for his regiment at some personal 
expense.
126
  The case is strange as Taylor was listed to command the Massachusetts 
militia in 1709,
127
 and he was the person chosen to seek the surrender of Port Royal 
on 1 October.
128
  These costs were not included in another sum earmarked to pay for 
the officers and their various charges.
129
  Although inconsistencies in pay were 
common enough in Europe, this would have served to further strain colonial relations 
with Britain.  The capture of Port Royal was nevertheless what New England had 
dreamed of for years, but it should be made clear that Subercase was outnumbered 
five to one, whilst his fort was a crumbling outpost of French power that had not 
received any supplies for three years.
130
  Quebec would be a different matter. 
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Operations against Quebec reveal the problems in sending a military force 
across great distances into a completely alien environment.  Problems stemmed from 
extended supply lines, the unfamiliar geography of the New World and the culture 
shock for ‗enlightened‘ Europeans trained in the formal style of warfare common to 
Europe.  The strategic challenges faced by commanders of such expeditions were 
huge.  Quebec‘s remoteness and comparatively small population does not mean that a 
simple siege was all that was required.  It would be an operation in need of immense 
planning and a colossal allocation of resources precisely because of its remoteness.   
A siege was necessary as Quebec was a semi-fortified city, but an attacking force 
would also need to prepare against attacks by irregulars from the surrounding forests.  
Therefore, such a force would have to be quite substantial and sustained over a long 
period of time.  It would have to be transported 3,000 miles from England, protected 
by a considerable squadron of warships, before sailing up the treacherous and 
uncharted waters of the River St Lawrence, arriving within range of the enemy‘s 
artillery in order to perform an amphibious landing.  Meanwhile, a logistical chain, 
stretching over thousands of miles, would have to be maintained.  In the early 
eighteenth century this would have been a daunting task even if Britain were not 
simultaneously engaged in large-scale commitments on the European continent.  To 
plan for such an attack, a reasonable estimate of Quebec‘s defences had to be made.  
Prior to 1711 only a handful of British colonials had even visited the city, resulting in 
General Hill complaining that ‗the accounts we have had of the strength and situation 
of the town of Quebec, [differed] so much from one another‘.131   
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Gradual improvements had been made at Quebec over preceding years.  After 
Phips‘ expedition the Royal Battery was constructed at the waterfront with gun 
embrasures for twenty-four- and eighteen-pounder cannon (eleven of which were 
located at this battery in 1711).
132
  In 1710 new works had been authorised given the 
resurgent threat posed by the fall of Port Royal.
133
  Still, despite Quebec‘s importance 
these works were ad-hoc in nature.  The French had previously neglected its 
fortifications; huge costs and meddling from Versailles saw slow progress on the 
improvement of its defences.
134
  Its walls were only completed in 1690, just before 
Phips‘ arrival.  These walls were simply a wooden palisade linked by eleven redoubts 
to cover the weak and exposed western side, and did not even include a ditch.
135
  
Quebec‘s eastern and southern sides were protected by cliffs.  The only attacks that 
were envisaged by Governor-General Frontenac were by Indians, which was why 
palisades were deemed sufficient for defence.  Phips‘ attack ensured that ‗‗European 
style‘ military architecture‘ was built at Quebec when in 1693 the palisades were 
incorporated into earthworks.  Quebec‘s defences were further improved with 
additional batteries built and strengthened, and stonework redoubts and strong points 
established.  Batteries were also established at Lévis across the river from the city.
136
   
Fortifying Quebec came at huge expense.  The masonry enceinte that Engineer 
Levasseur desired was opposed by the intendant, Raudot, who thought it was more 
suitable to Flanders than Quebec.  His reasons were threefold: firstly he thought siege 
warfare was ‗practically impossible‘ in such a place; secondly, the Canadian 
campaigning season was relatively short; thirdly, he envisaged the British and 
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colonials would not have sufficient resources to take Quebec in any case.
137
  In 1711, 
the defences at Quebec were unfinished and had not been constructed with any sort of 
coherent purpose.  Although some defences were strong, others were intended to be 
only temporary.  They would still pose a challenge for any attacker, but Quebec had 
many chinks in its armour.  In response to the threat posed by Macartney‘s expedition 
of 1709, the landward defences were hastily improved with 300-600 men working 
daily to strengthen them.
138
  
Dudley had suggested forces to be sent in the 1708 campaign season, to capture 
Port Royal or Quebec, before the publication of Vetch‘s paper.  He passed on his own 
intelligence as to its strength: 
 
Quebec, upon Canada River, is a fortified town, where the French General resides, has in it a 
regiment making about 500 regular forces; the towns of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres and other 
French settlements, who make in the whole about 3,000 men, and so distant and divided to 300 
miles at least, that they can be no assistants to each other, unless they leave the whole country 
void. These settlements have no manner of shipping, except a few fishing boats of no force, but 
only once a year in August, one frigate usually comes from Placentia with two store ships for 
their year's supply.
139
 
 
It is unknown where Dudley‘s sources originated, but it is fortunate that Major 
John Livingston served with the expedition to Port Royal in 1710.  He was sent by 
Nicholson, accompanied by a French representative, to Quebec to inform Governor-
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General Vaudreuil of the British success in Acadia.
140
  Journeying along the icy 
Penobscot River, Livingston arrived at Quebec on 6 December 1710 after seven 
weeks of travel.  He celebrated Christmas there amongst English prisoners, followed 
by dinner with Vaudreuil.  He remained until 10 January 1711 when he left for Boston 
accompanied by French envoys.  This arduous 400 mile journey took the same route 
as the land expeditions to Montreal in both 1690 and 1711, but he had not experienced 
the sailing route on the St Lawrence.   
Livingston finally arrived at Boston on 23 February 1711.  His movements were 
not restricted at Quebec, allowing him to make a reconnaissance of its fortifications 
and also the wider defences of New France as he travelled back to Boston.  In Quebec 
alone, Livingston found that there were mounted eighty-nine ‗great‘ guns, as well as 
eleven ‗pateraros‘141 and two mortars.  These were manned by 250 militia and 150 
regulars – a small force.  Yet, as he scouted the French lands to the west and south, he 
calculated that the French had a further 3,670 men and 830 natives to call upon for the 
defence of Quebec, a remarkably similar number of men who served in the seven 
regiments of the British Army embarked on Rear-Admiral Walker‘s fleet.142   
Livingston‘s reconnaissance was the latest intelligence that could be useful for 
the 1711 expedition.  Whilst at Boston, Vetch, oblivious that an expedition was then 
being assembled, had written to London of his intention to send Livingston to 
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disseminate the information he had acquired.
143
  However, Livingston did not embark 
upon this transatlantic journey because of bad weather.
144
  It is fortunate that this 
valuable information remained in the Americas, as it was likely that it would have 
arrived in England after Walker‘s departure to Boston.  Livingston and Vetch had an 
interesting connection.  They were brothers-in-law and, during the early stages of the 
war, were involved in an illicit trade with the French colonies by using Livingston‘s 
sloop.
145
  This presented an unusual situation whereby the pair, trading illegally with 
the enemy and even selling small arms, were also the foremost advocates of the 
British conquest of Canada.   
Vetch‘s illegal trading at Quebec provided dated knowledge from 1705 or 
1706 of the enemy‘s disposition.146  In his tract, he declared that there were twenty-
eight companies of French troops stationed in Canada, with three of those at Quebec 
‗who seldom exceed thirty men a company‘ whilst perhaps another 300 men could be 
raised.  He also stated that there were six and seven companies respectively at Trois-
Rivieres and Montreal, and three companies at various forts ‗upon the frontiers of 
Albany‘, allowing for a total of 570 regular soldiers in the vicinity of Quebec.147  The 
artillery defences of Quebec were described as consisting of the shore battery with six 
eighteen-pounders; a battery of twenty guns, no larger than twelve-pounders; and a 
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stone redoubt with six small guns in the upper town near to the fortified Governor‘s 
residence.  He also described a battery on the opposite shore of the river (at Lévis) 
with eight twelve-pounders placed without any sort of barricade.  Vetch did not 
mention specific numbers of militia that could be raised, nor how many Native 
Americans could be called upon to aid the French defence.
148
  Livingston‘s report 
implies that the defences at Quebec had been reinforced over the previous few years.   
The accuracy of Livingston‘s and Vetch‘s approximations of manpower can 
be verified by a letter of Vaudreuil‘s in 1709.  250 regulars were stationed at Quebec, 
with 100 at Montreal.  An unspecified number were also detached to Detroit.  Out of a 
total of 4,850 potential militiamen, including 500 sailors and 500 Indians, 2,350 and 
1,000 would defend Quebec and Montreal respectively.  The remaining 1,500, 
composed of younger teenage and elderly males, would protect women and children 
evacuated to the countryside with their livestock.
149
  Livingston reported that 280 
officers and soldiers were stationed at Montreal and 150 regulars at Quebec along 
with a further 250 militia, but he did not travel as far as Detroit.  His estimates appear 
to have been reliable.
150
   
Sources on the number of cannon at Quebec vary widely, however.  A French 
letter implied that seventy-four cannon could quickly be increased to 100 during 
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1711.
151
  Major Lloyd, commanding St John‘s, Newfoundland, until its capture by the 
French in 1708, was subsequently held prisoner at Quebec.
152
  In captivity he sent a 
letter stating that Canada had a total of 6,000 men for its defence and that Quebec 
itself had seventy-two cannon, ‗which they call 100; it is a very foolish fortification 
that cannot be defended with less than 20,000 men, it being at least eight or nine miles 
round, of no strength in several places, though strong in some others‘.  Lloyd also 
mentioned that the French had experimented with wood held together with iron at 
Quebec, which would be set on fire and released into the powerful current of the St 
Lawrence if enemy ships ever anchored nearby.
153
  Whilst Livingston asserted there 
were eighty-nine cannon, even seventy-two was a formidable number for the town‘s 
defence and corresponds with the French source.  Vetch‘s estimate of forty cannon 
was probably erroneous, particularly as he was relying upon memory and acting as a 
merchant, he may not have visited the upper town.   
However, some of Lloyd‘s other details prove to be exaggerated.   20,000 men 
would certainly have been sufficient for Quebec‘s defence.154  Such a number would 
even have defeated Wolfe in 1759.  Also, rather than the ‗eight or nine miles round‘ 
the fortified area was little more than two miles in circumference and there was 
certainly not 6,000 men able to defend Canada.  It is interesting to note that whilst in 
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captivity, Lloyd had heard that Macartney was meant to sail to Quebec in 1709 along 
with a landward thrust to Montreal.
155
  As he was in captivity, it can be assumed that 
the French had similar knowledge and would be prepared for any further attempt.   
Despite France not sending any reinforcements, French Canada did everything 
within its power to combat a potential invasion with the construction of new defences.  
Fort Chambly was built of stone in 1710 (noted by Lloyd whilst a prisoner) to cover 
the land route from New York to Montreal and was capable of garrisoning 500 men, 
armed with forty cannon.
156
  Trois-Rivieres, however, had lost its strategic value due 
to its proximity to Quebec and Montreal.  Although it remained a fair size, it retained 
its obsolete wooden palisade.
157
 
One final note concerning Major Livingston‘s Quebec visit: his bravado may 
have inadvertently alerted the French to a possible invasion of Quebec.  Though it 
may have been the next logical target for the British after taking Acadia in 1710, 
Livingston, oblivious to how near to the truth he really was, threatened that an army 
would soon be sent to take Quebec in 1711.  The French then began to reinforce their 
defences by building a new stone battery for six cannon; constructing lodgings at the 
Cap Diamond redoubt; bomb-proofing the magazines; and closing breaches and open 
parts of the wall.  Further work would be completed if actual news of an expedition 
was confirmed, namely by increasing the number of cannon embrasures in the upper 
town and readying smaller calibres of cannon for field use in order to counter the 
landing of troops.
158
  Although defences were gradually improved over the years at 
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Quebec, preparations were accelerated after the reports of the 1709 expedition, the 
taking of Port Royal and Livingston‘s visit. 
 
II: The Decision to Dispatch the 1711 Expedition 
Whig interest in Quebec had been aroused by Vetch‘s Canada Survey‟d, but only 
half-hearted preparations for its capture had been initiated by the ministry.  Only the 
limited assistance given at Port Royal reversed this trend.  Greater enthusiasm was 
shown by the Tories, however and it was only when St John assumed control of these 
plans that the British state acted with the determined intention of taking Quebec.  
Raids, such as that at Deerfield, had caused an outcry in New England that would lead 
directly to the dispatch of the 1711 expedition to Canada.
159
  Whilst Nicholson had 
superseded Vetch in his military role as colonial commander from 1710, it has been 
suggested that the reason for this was because of the Tory inclinations of the 
former.
160
  After the capture of Port Royal, Nicholson clamoured for further action.  
Although it was too late in the season to dispatch Shannon‘s force, the colonials 
persisted.  The colonial agent and staunch Tory, Jeremiah Dummer, petitioned the 
Queen ‗in compassion to her plantations, to send an armament against Canada‘ and 
now it must be seen how St John was able to launch the first British expedition to 
Quebec.
161
 
Whilst the party struggle created an overwhelming desire for peace amongst 
the Tories, St John championed the Quebec expedition to his Cabinet colleagues.  Not 
only would it gain him personal glory and advancement, it would divert attention 
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from Marlborough, vindicate blue-water strategy and would win Britain an advantage 
at the peace.  St John had been obsessed with keeping the expedition secret despite the 
fact the French may have expected such a feat, given the aborted expeditions of the 
previous few years.  He tried to secure the Chancellor of the Exchequer‘s support for 
the project with flattery in January 1711: ‗if it succeeds you will have done more 
service to Britain in half a year, than the ministers who went before you did in all their 
administration‘.162  However, Robert Harley was opposed to such an undertaking, as 
shall become clear; nevertheless, he was in favour of adopting a blue-water policy.  
This was made plain when Harley wrote into the Queen‘s speech of 1714 that her 
subjects should be congratulated on being ‗delivered from a consuming land war… 
[as] our true interest…[is] most formidable by the right application of our naval 
force‘.163  Harley could not be convinced to support St John, but other officials 
assisted in the preparation of the expedition.   
The Earl of Dartmouth, as secretary of state for the southern department, 
should have possessed overall control of such projects, as colonial expeditions were 
within his remit.
164
  Consequently, it was he who was approached by Dummer when 
he petitioned for the subduing of Canada ‗the American Carthage‘ which may be a 
factor in his initial involvement.
165
  However, this was St John‘s personal project and 
he was not going to allow the notional limits of his office to deter him from 
organising it.  Still, Dartmouth was involved in several aspects of the expedition, 
though he must have been directed by St John.  Secretary at War George Granville, 
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was heavily involved with the organisational details, but he operated only as an 
intermediary – receiving precise instructions from St John for assembling the land 
forces.
166
  Granville did not have a ministerial position; he was essentially a clerk 
concerning military affairs.
167
  Incidentally, Brigadier-General Hill owed his 
parliamentary seat to Granville, which may have been how St John began his 
association with him.
168
   
The Admiralty certainly did not know what was in store, its main contact 
being the Admiralty secretary, Josiah Burchett, who may even have known more than 
his masters.  There was no political leadership or Cabinet representation in the 
Admiralty in 1711, leaving St John unhindered in his organisation of the 
expedition.
169
  Another minor figure was John Drummond, a Scottish merchant based 
in Amsterdam.  He became an intermediary between the new Tory administration and 
Marlborough, to keep the alliance intact whilst peace was negotiated.
170
  Further, he 
mediated between the Tories and the Dutch Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius, 
after the latter became aware of the secret peace negotiations in 1711.
171
  Drummond 
had secured luxury goods for figures including St John and Prince Eugene of 
Savoy.
172
  The merchant had also been linked with James Brydges, who as paymaster-
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general dealt with the accounts of the Canadian expedition.
173
  Drummond was said to 
have been very honest and deplored those who acquired wealth illegally.  He was 
perhaps unaware of the fraudulent qualities of his contacts, particularly St John and 
Brydges, who used their positions for profit.
174
  St John repeatedly bore responsibility 
for the expedition and his desire for its success was made clear when he informed 
Drummond during the summer: ‗I am glad to find that whatever guesses curious 
people may make, there yet appears no more light into the secret of Mr Hill‘s 
expedition.  As that whole design was formed by me, you will easily imagine that I 
have a sort of paternal concern for the success of it.‘175    
The reasons why the expedition had not been organised to depart earlier were 
essentially political.  St John‘s enthusiasm for the project was not matched by Harley 
who made things more difficult without his support.
176
  His opposition stemmed from 
St John‘s increasing power amongst the High Tory faction and from his alliance with 
Masham.
177
  Preparations had begun, thanks to the authority of a monarch who still 
retained considerable political power.  With Harley‘s indisposition after Guiscard‘s 
assassination attempt on 8 March, St John was able to force his project through with 
greater speed.
178
  He should not have launched the expedition as he did; rather, he 
should have acquired the proper authority to press ahead with it earlier, before it was 
too late in the year to be effective.  His rationale in continuing his project can be 
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summarised in a single point – his ambition, or more specifically, his desire to lead 
the ministry.
179
   
The Quebec expedition was St John‘s means of achieving this and enhancing 
his political reputation.  In order to authorise it he would need to enlist the Queen‘s 
support through the manipulation of her favourite, Abigail Masham – an ally and 
cousin of Harley.  To cement an alliance with Abigail, St John appointed her brother, 
‗Mr Hill the instrument of doing so much honour‘,180 to command the Quebec 
expedition.  The fact that Harley opposed it played into St John‘s hands, winning the 
backing of Abigail, at the expense of the Chancellor‘s influence and so the plan was 
set.
181
  Abigail, with her brother‘s interests close at heart, embraced St John and was 
therefore able to secure the Queen‘s influence for the authorisation of the expedition 
before declaring it to the Cabinet.
182
  St John always referred to his project as ‗Hill‘s 
expedition‘.  It had to be Hill‘s so that he could curry favour with Abigail and the 
Queen.  Hill was duly appointed as general and commander in chief on 1 March 
1711.
183
  This appointment was made over a month before Walker received his 
commission.
184
   
Significantly, by February, St John‘s rift with Harley had already begun and 
the Chancellor avoided the committee meetings regarding the expedition.
185
  When 
Jeremiah Dummer approached Harley to discuss the New England troop quotas, he 
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refused to become involved and instead directed Dummer to Dartmouth.
186
  Even after 
his attempted assassination, Harley had asked his brother to inform the president of 
the council, the Earl of Rochester ‗that it was his dying request that he would advise 
the Queen that it might be laid aside.  This was the unfortunate expedition to 
Canada‘.187  Harley remained worried by St John‘s growing influence over Masham. 
Rochester was in very much the same frame of mind as Harley and thought it 
prudent that, in light of the death in April of Emperor Joseph I, it would be wise to 
reconsider overall strategy and prevent the Quebec expedition from departing.
188
  The 
balance of power in Europe had completely altered as the new Emperor, Charles VI, 
would gain both the Spanish and Austrian inheritance – precisely what the Grand 
Alliance was fighting to deny the French.  Shortly before, things were made more 
complicated as the Dauphin had also died.  Rochester had previously been Harley‘s 
eyes and ears at the Quebec meetings that he had refused to attend, ‗as he desired 
him…to be a means to the Queen to hinder that expedition‘.189  Nevertheless, St John 
seems to have enjoyed his new status, feigning surprise at Rochester‘s efforts to put a 
halt to his project: ‗[Rochester] surprised me very much last night in Cabinet, when he 
spoke of stopping Mr Hill, as what might be expedient upon the alteration in public 
affairs occasioned by the Emperor‘s death‘.190  He continued to say that, as Britain 
was in a worse condition because of this untimely death, then they could only expect a 
worse peace, therefore, the expedition should proceed without delay.  With Harley 
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recovering from his wound, Rochester reported, ‗the wind at present stops the troops, 
no other order was given in that affair‘.191  It is apparent that the Cabinet was 
powerless to stop St John‘s scheming having won support from the Queen through 
Masham, particularly with Harley‘s absence from public affairs. 
Harley had not hindered the expedition by ignoring it, nor by employing 
Rochester to do his utmost to dissuade the Queen from allowing it.  Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that Harley favoured a South Sea expedition to complement the 
South Sea Company‘s establishment.192  This was unlikely, however.  Admiral Sir 
James Wishart had already proposed a similar Anglo-Dutch expedition to attack the 
French in the East Indies, or the Spanish in the South Sea, which the Dutch 
rejected.
193
  St John even suggested that, because of this, the Dutch had no right to 
protest against the sending of the Quebec expedition.
194
  Had Harley been more open 
with his old friend and new rival, then things may have worked out differently.   
However, St John was oblivious to events that a large part of the Cabinet were 
involved in – the secret peace negotiations with France.  Harley had deliberately kept 
St John in the dark about these negotiations.  This was more than likely why some of 
his colleagues were not keen on executing his plans, as St John was becoming more of 
a divisive character and a ‗party‘ man.195  He had only found out on 26 April, when 
the entire Cabinet had been informed, that these talks had been taking place since 
1710 and was understandably enraged at the discovery.  His anger was amplified 
when it was revealed that Dartmouth, as the other secretary of state, was included in 
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the ‗inner circle‘.196  St John had been excluded precisely because of his disdain for 
the allies and his desire for Britain to negotiate an advantageous – and separate – 
peace.
197
  It was feared that St John‘s enthusiasm for a Quebec expedition could derail 
the talks.
198
  St John thought it too late, by this time, to halt the expedition – too much 
expense and effort had been invested in it, especially as it was virtually ready to 
depart and he finally had the authority to do so.  He wanted to prove himself and 
perhaps enrich himself on the back of its success.  The rising opportunity and the 
realisation that the Emperor‘s death was changing European attitudes to the war, 
enveloped in him a sense of urgency, as was shown in his frantic correspondence with 
Admiral Walker, urging him to hurry and clear British waters.
199
  St John was solely 
responsible for organising the expedition and was opposed by a critical Cabinet.  
Parliament had not been consulted, and with the growing schism with Harley, this was 
blatantly an act of defiance against his mentor.
200
  Were his expedition to fail, the 
consequences were potentially disastrous for his career. 
St John actually admitted the danger of failure in a letter to Governor Hunter 
of New York
 
which is worth quoting at length as it reveals, quite uniquely, the degree 
of hope and emotion he had invested in his project.  Firstly, he acknowledged that, if 
it failed, he had not followed the correct political channels in organising the 
expedition, as he did not possess much in the way of political support:   
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It is my favourite project, what I have been driving on ever since I came last into business, 
what will be an immense and lasting advantage to our country if it succeeds, and what if it 
fails will perhaps be particularly prejudicial to me, who in the carrying it on hitherto have not 
been backed by those forms and orders, which are necessary safeguards in a government, 
where the best designs are converted into crimes, if they want success, and where the worst 
are very often applauded for no reason but because they have it. 
 
St John should have abided by his own warning here.  However, this letter more than 
any other revealed his own zeal for the attempt on conquering New France.  It also 
illuminates, in all their ignorance and xenophobia, his reasons for persisting in 
launching the Quebec expedition.  First, there were the economic advantages it would 
offer, although he admitted that he ‗cannot pretend to understand the nature of trade 
[nor] to be fully informed of the present condition of the Queen‘s territories in 
America‘.  This implies that this was not foremost in his mind when he concocted the 
plan.  Second was simple patriotic pride for: 
 
if one supposes the French driven out from Canada, and the Queen mistress of the whole 
continent of North America, such a scene opens itself, that the man who is not charmed with 
it, must be void of all sense of the honour, of the grandeur, and of the prosperity of his 
country. 
 
The third and most important reason that he gave in this letter was ultimately political.  
It was very much Swift‘s argument and that of the High Tories in general, which was 
the reason for his split with Harley and his more moderate course of action:  
 
 66 
We have exhausted ourselves with little or no concurrence from any of our allies to support 
the war in Spain…We have laid forth our utmost strength in the Netherlands, as if the 
obtaining that barrier was not our remote, but our immediate security.  Gifts, loans and 
subsidies have been scattered from hence through the whole extent of the alliance, as if we 
were defending provinces of our own, or as if we were ourselves a province to each, and 
obliged to comply with the demands of the superior state. 
 
Although he may no longer have been a friend to the allies, St John remained an 
enemy of France.  He wanted to end the war quickly and with advantage, and was 
oblivious to the secret peace negotiations.  St John‘s loyalty to his Queen and his 
country cannot be questioned.  His desire for a successful Quebec expedition was 
evident:  
 
those who have the honour to serve her [Queen Anne] now are at least as much enemies to 
France, as those who went before them.  The true application of what I have said is this, that it 
is now high time to do something in particular for Britain, by which the enemy will receive as 
great and as essential a prejudice, as he has done by any of those operations the sole benefit 
whereof resulted to some of our confederates.
201
 
 
St John‘s motives were clear.  The revelation of the peace negotiations was 
perhaps a consequence of both the shift of the balance of power with the Emperor‘s 
death and the disclosure to Cabinet (in Harley‘s absence) a month before of the 
Queen‘s blessing for the dispatch of the Quebec expedition.  This was given on 25 
March at St James‘ Palace when the ‗Queen declared the design of the Canada 
expedition to the Lords and ordered St John to give them an account what 
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forwardness the preparations were in for that service‘.202  It is unclear how many 
Cabinet members actually knew about the expedition prior to this announcement.  It is 
likely that the expedition was organised in a secret Cabinet committee to avoid 
scrutiny by the usual committee.
203
  If this was the case, then its membership was 
unknown, with just a few exceptions.  Harley was not involved, his representative 
being Rochester and both secretaries of state were already busy organising the 
expedition.  It has been suggested that preparations were considered in committee on 
18 January 1711, but this is not certain.
204
   
Dudley‘s ninth instruction, in his orders for preparing the expedition, is 
enlightening as it revealed: ‗We [the Queen] have communicated our resolution [the 
expedition] only to two of our principal Secretaries of State, and from the necessity of 
concealing the same we are deprived of the information we might have had [from 
various departments].‘205  It is known that Dartmouth helped with the acquisition of 
ordnance stores and naval vessels and, from Dudley‘s instructions, it is apparent that 
he knew the details of St John‘s project.  What is unclear is whether he 
enthusiastically supported St John‘s efforts, especially as he was also aware of the 
negotiations with the French.  Dartmouth was a moderate Tory and ally of Harley.
206
  
He may have simply been involved because of the office he held and, as Harley did 
not actively oppose the expedition, he may have delegated responsibilities to 
Dartmouth.  He only prepared a proportionally small part of the expedition, and it 
seems his involvement ended in February, when St John‘s split with Harley was 
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becoming apparent.  In any case, Dartmouth was a rival to St John as he held a more 
prestigious office, which St John had coveted.  Additionally, St John later openly 
argued with him.
207
  St John had initially tried to secure Harley‘s support.  When this 
was not forthcoming, and when it was coupled with the revelation of the peace 
negotiations, this must have created the most obvious conditions for the schism 
between the moderation of Harley and Dartmouth on one hand and the High-Tory zeal 
of St John on the other.   
What is clear is that the Queen backed St John, allowing him the authority 
necessary to execute the expedition and the Cabinet was in no position to halt its 
progress.  It is probable that this was only made possible once St John suggested Hill 
be its commander, thus gaining the backing of Abigail Masham and consequently the 
influential support of the Queen.  This meant that Harley could not openly oppose the 
expedition without harming his own relations with Masham and therefore, his own 
influence over the sovereign.
208
 
 
III: Conclusion 
The 1711 expedition was the result of years of clamouring by the American colonists 
to secure British help in eradicating the threat of New France.  The colonials feared 
for their security, both at sea and on land, especially after the Deerfield raid.  With no 
help forthcoming from London, inspiration was taken from Phips‘ 1690 expedition for 
the colonists to take action themselves.  However, the Port Royal expeditions of 1704 
and 1707 only proved that the colonials required British assistance to neutralise the 
French threat.  However, until the dissemination of Canada Survey‟d in 1708, London 
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had shown little interest in doing so, believing that colonial affairs should be settled in 
the diplomatic sphere.   
Once Vetch had aroused interest, British North American strategy proved to 
be inconsistent and illogical – expeditions were hastily assembled then cancelled and 
targets would vary.  Newfoundland was the subject of possible expeditions in 1703 
and 1708;
209
 Quebec then became the target without the prior conquest of either 
Placentia or Port Royal.  The Whig ministry still accorded little importance to the 
Canadian theatre of war when expeditions to Quebec were cancelled in both 1709 and 
1710.  These only served to prepare New France for further attacks by improving the 
defences of Quebec.  The limited aid given by Britain in 1710 nevertheless conquered 
Acadia.  Port Royal‘s capture undoubtedly stirred up enthusiasm for a follow-up 
success and it was the enthusiasm of St John that ensured the dispatch of an 
expedition to Quebec in 1711.   
The war, however, was almost over.  Harley, in opening peace negotiations 
with the French, saw that such an expedition would be unnecessary and expensive 
when diplomatic efforts were about to begin.  Presumably, preparations for the 
expedition were initially allowed in order to provide an alternative course of action if 
the talks failed.  As time progressed and circumstances altered, Harley and Rochester 
clearly favoured abandoning the expedition.  There was not much the Cabinet could 
have done once Queen Anne had sided with St John, however.  Still, the deaths of the 
Dauphin and the Emperor potentially altered the balance of power in Europe, and 
changed the reasons for fighting.  As St John continued organising the expedition, the 
Cabinet may have hoped that an impending and advantageous peace would not be 
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threatened by his project and so revealed the peace talks to him.  Nevertheless, St 
John was adamant that the expedition would go ahead – he was far too close to 
fulfilling his ambitions to back down at this stage. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EXPEDITION’S COMMANDERS 
 
Besides Henry St John, there are two other characters that figure largely in the story 
of the Quebec expedition.  The operational element was dominated by Rear-Admiral 
of the White Sir Hovenden Walker as it proved to be a primarily maritime affair.  It is 
he who had the most impact upon the expedition and his experiences shall be 
examined in detail here.  St John had entrusted him with the safe convoy of the 
expedition and Walker has consequently received much of the blame for its failure.  
Whilst his suitability for the role and his competence has been brought into question 
since the disaster, it shall be demonstrated that he was more than qualified to 
command the squadron destined for North American waters.  He must, however, take 
full responsibility for the disaster that occurred in August 1711, although it is difficult 
to accept that complete blame should lie with him alone.   
General John Hill‘s leadership, as commander in chief of the land forces, has 
been the subject of some speculation given that his troops did not land at Quebec.  
However, he must accept a large part of the responsibility for the decision to return 
home without any further attempt upon Quebec, or indeed any other potential 
objective.  In addition, the quality of his subordinates shall also be considered to show 
that the force assembled for service in North America was a largely competent and 
effective one, if tainted by political favouritism. 
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I: Hovenden Walker 
Admiral Walker was a natural choice for this type of operation.  Parts of his history 
are somewhat sketchy and little is currently known about his early naval service.  
What is certain is that he was ideally suited to convoying vessels to the Americas, as 
this is what seems to have been his forte throughout his operational career.  Walker 
did not need to possess the fame or combat experience of some of the more famous 
admirals of his age.  What he had done on multiple occasions throughout the war was 
to take independent command of a naval squadron and convoy it safely across the 
Atlantic Ocean, sometimes accompanying numerous trading vessels.  Walker was 
especially familiar with the Caribbean.  In the early eighteenth century, the West 
Indies was viewed as being a part of a geographical whole that included continental 
North America and so, Walker would have been considered a suitable candidate to 
command.
1
  The Quebec expedition did not require its naval commander to be an 
experienced combat leader, especially as the French fleet was effectively dormant and 
holed up in its ports.
2
  Walker was required to be a good convoy commander, which 
he had proved to be.  If his squadron came within sight of privateers, then the French 
probably would not have risked battle.  Privateers sought an easy path to profit, 
involving the capture of straggling merchantmen.  Walker was not required to fight a 
major sea battle, but protect the transports in his squadron and convoy them up the St 
Lawrence River via Boston. 
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Walker‘s birth date is one of the many unknowns; sources even disagree on 
the year.  However, it is generally agreed that Elizabeth Walker, née Chamberlen, 
gave birth to him in either 1656 or 1666.  The later date is thought to be the more 
realistic given that he went to Trinity College, Dublin, in 1678.
3
  His first marriage 
entry, of 2 January 1692, stated that he lived in Westminster and was ‗about‘ thirty, 
which only adds ambiguity to his birth date.
4
  However, a contributor to the 
Gentleman‟s Magazine in 1824 asserts he was born in 1656, although he also gave an 
incorrect date of death.
5
  The author was responding to an enquiry about Walker‘s 
family history in a previous issue
6
 and claims to have had in his possession one of 
Walker‘s private journals, ‗which includes the whole of the year 1708‘, a source 
which now, unfortunately, appears to be lost.  The contributor further detailed how 
Walker received his unusual name.  His father, Colonel William Walker, married 
Mary Hovenden.  Mary‘s father possessed large estates around Tankardstown which 
were inherited from his ancestor, Giles Hovenden, who came to Ireland during Henry 
VIII‘s reign, ‗and thus was the surname Hovenden introduced to serve as a Christian 
name in the Walker family‘.  Hovenden Walker married twice during his lifetime but 
only produced one daughter, Margaret, from his second marriage, who died a spinster 
in 1777.
7
 
Walker had spent a lifetime in the naval and colonial sphere.  Presumably he 
joined the Royal Navy directly after leaving Trinity College, as there is a large gap in 
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his known biography until he appears on the island of Nevis in 1686.  Here, he 
volunteered for service on the Dartmouth, a fourth-rate vessel under Captain George 
St Lo.  The circumstances surrounding Walker‘s appearance on the island are 
uncertain, but show that he had over twenty-five years experience of transatlantic 
crossings by the time of the Quebec expedition in 1711.  St Lo had been on station 
since 1682, when he was first given command of the Dartmouth, for use by the 
Governor of the Leeward Islands for anti-piracy operations and to preserve the 
Governor‘s control over the disparate group of islands that made up the colony.8 
Found amongst the papers of Samuel Pepys is an account by Walker of the 
Dartmouth‟s mission to neutralise a particularly troublesome pirate who was causing 
great havoc in the vicinity of the Leeward Islands.
9
  The pirate was able to slip away 
and evade capture once his pillaging had ceased.  They ultimately discovered the 
culprit at Puerto Rico where they were harassed by the Spanish officials who endorsed 
piratical activity.  How Walker came to be at Nevis and why he volunteered for this 
particular service is unknown.  Presumably he was already serving in the navy, as an 
unemployed officer, or ‗volunteer‘, which was a position below midshipman and 
catered for gentlemen who wanted to serve at sea, but had little in the way of a role.
10
  
The Governor of Tortola, in the Virgin Islands, and other colonial officials also 
volunteered.  In any case, Walker was present on the Dartmouth, tasked with hunting 
down a pirate who had committed several outrages against English and Dutch 
shipping and territory.   
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Walker‘s account, which the following narrative is derived from, describes 
their departure from Nevis in April 1686 and sailing around the Caribbean to garner 
intelligence on the pirate‘s location.11  Acting upon the reports of various islanders, 
the Dartmouth sailed for Tortola where they found that many slaves and livestock had 
been stolen or killed, and that the Governor‘s wife had been ‗abused‘ and his son 
beaten.  The perpetrators reportedly consisted of ‗all sorts of rogues‘ including 
Spaniards, Mulattoes, English, French, Dutch and Irish.  St Lo proceeded west to the 
Spanish island of Puerto Rico where the Dartmouth searched fruitlessly in many bays 
along its coast, until arriving at the city of Puerto Rico (modern San Juan).  The pilot 
that came aboard was plied with ‗good liquor…which made him…much more frank 
in his conversation than otherwise he would have been‘ and consequently revealed 
that the pirate captain was based there. 
Some sailors from the Dartmouth, including Walker, ostensibly landed to 
water and trade.  However, St Lo had directed Lieutenant Ignatius Usher to ‗enquire 
privately after the pirate‘.12  Governor Martinos had denied any knowledge of the 
pirate‘s activities and instead invited the rest of the crew to enter the city.  This was 
refused by the landing party, suspicious of his intentions.  They then noticed Spanish 
‗cavaliers‘ edging around them until finally surrounding the party.  The English were 
consequently ‗beaten‘ by Spanish lances and swords, as their assailants shouted ―kill 
the heretic dogs!‖  Fortunately, none were killed but they were all imprisoned in the 
Governor‘s house.  Martinos‘ excuse for this treatment was the landing of arms – 
normal practice for a landing party – which was thought to be for another ‗design‘.   
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Meanwhile, the Governor insisted that the Dartmouth should not leave the 
harbour and pointed out that it was surrounded by five forts.  Martinos demanded to 
see St Lo‘s orders and commission, but would not board the Dartmouth.  The English 
threatened to answer ‗with the black mouths‘ of their guns and Lieutenant Usher said 
he ‗would rather die than lose the King‘s honour‘.  Nevertheless their orders were 
shown to Martinos to defuse the situation, which secured the release of the prisoners, 
including Walker who had previously offered to remain as a hostage.  Martinos would 
not permit the Dartmouth to leave harbour and instead insisted that St Lo proceed 
further into the bay.  Fearing this would result in his frigate being taken, St Lo 
refused.  After spotting military preparations at the various forts and a force of canoes 
assembling on the other side of the harbour, the Dartmouth weighed anchor and made 
a rush for the harbour exit.  Two crew members were killed and another two wounded 
when the frigate exchanged fire with a fort during its escape.  The crew of the 
Dartmouth were later informed that the pirate captain was the nephew of Governor 
Martinos and son of Puerto Rico‘s captain-general.13  This was possibly Walker‘s first 
taste of action and he displayed a keen intellect by sketching a map detailing their 
situation at Puerto Rico, of where the enemy forts were, along with the emplacements 
for 300 cannon, and the position of a sandbank that may have prevented their escape.   
This episode is indicative of the danger posed by naval operations, even during 
peacetime.  However, this behaviour was not confined to the opponents of England.  
Captain St Lo had been critical of his superior, the Acting Governor of the Leeward 
Islands, as he had profited from the sanctioning of piracy – which St Lo was tasked to 
combat.  There was great friction between naval commander and colonial governor – 
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a trend that would also haunt Walker‘s career.14  A naval song about these events was 
attributed, by Pepys, to the hand of Walker, cumbersomely entitled ‗The treachery of 
the Spaniards of Porto Rico to the Dartmouth frigate and her company‘.15  This was 
penned as the Dartmouth sailed on to Boston – 1711 was not the first time that 
Walker had visited Massachusetts.
16
  After this incident, little of Walker is known 
until he was promoted to post-captain. 
Walker‘s seniority was dated 17 February 1692, when he was made captain of 
the Vulture fireship.  It is curious to note that of the eight other officers achieving their 
seniority on that day, seven were in command of fireships.
17
  The nine newly 
promoted captains serve to illustrate the wide and varied characters that were selected 
to command naval vessels, when the professional Royal Navy was beginning to assert 
its position in Europe and the wider world.   
Captain Nathaniel Brown appeared to be the most privileged, as he was 
immediately appointed to command the fifth-rate frigate Falcon.  Unfortunately, after 
crossing the Atlantic, he died in the Caribbean in 1693.
18
  Captain Sir William Jumper 
quickly escaped fireship command and proceeded, after capturing many prizes, to 
make a long and successful career for himself.
19
  The perils of sea service were made 
apparent by Captain Thomas Killingworth who was present at the Battle of La Hogue, 
but was killed in 1694 when he was attacked by two privateers.
20
  Captain John 
Knapp, commanding the fourth-rate Africa, received acclaim when he fought off three 
privateers.  In 1703 he was dispatched to the West Indies under the then Commodore 
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Hovenden Walker.
21
  Edward Littleton‘s brief career as a captain ended, after various 
convoy duties, with his death aboard the third-rate Dorsetshire in 1696.
22
   
John Perry was the only one of the nine captains not to progress from 
command of a fireship.  First, the Owner‟s Love, until he was transferred, in the West 
Indies, to the Cygnet in 1693, where he surrendered his ship without a fight, owing to 
the capture of a frigate he was sailing with by two French privateers.  While he 
managed to avoid death from disease or action, unlike many of his contemporaries, 
the consequences of losing his ship were harsh.  Not only was he stripped of his 
command and rank, but he was also dismissed from the navy, fined and imprisoned.  
He was also the only one of the original nine to outlive Walker, dying in 1733.  A 
glance at his short and unimpressive command career reveals little about the man, 
however, he was one of the period‘s great marine engineers.  Even before these 
events, he had built a dry dock and pump at Portsmouth.  After his full pardon and 
early release from prison in 1697, where he wrote against naval impressment, he 
worked on a multitude of projects.  He laboured in England‘s major ports and on the 
Thames before serving Peter the Great of Russia in the development of canal systems.  
His bravery cannot be doubted either, as in 1690, when a lieutenant serving aboard the 
Montague, Perry remained at his station for an hour after losing his arm without 
seeking medical attention, when in action against a French privateer.
23
   
Captain James Stewart‘s command on the Flame fireship so impressed 
Admiral Cloudesley Shovell that he was transferred within a couple of years to 
command the Cambridge, a third-rate vessel of eighty-guns – a ship deemed too large 
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to sail up the St Lawrence river in 1711.  Stewart had secured the patronage of 
Shovell and went on to command greater ships of ninety-guns.
24
  Finally, Captain 
Robert Winn was present at the taking of Gibraltar and also served with distinction at 
the Battle of Malaga – the only fleet battle of the War of the Spanish Succession – 
along with Jumper (also at Gibraltar), Knapp and Stewart.
25
 
Captain Walker, on his first command in the Vulture, was present at the Battle 
of Barfleur, in the Red squadron.
26
  After a year‘s service aboard the fireship, his 
command was transferred to the fifty-gun Crown, of the fourth-rate, for less than a 
month.
27
  He then took command of the Sapphire, a fifth-rate frigate of twenty-eight-
guns.
28
  He was assigned to cruise on the Irish station, where he met some success in 
combating privateers.  After two days in command of the Coventry fifty-gun fourth-
rate, Walker was assigned the forty-eight-gunner Foresight of the same rate, and in 
April 1696, along with the thirty-two-gun Sheerness, he engaged two French ships of 
sixty- and seventy-guns respectively.  In doing so he successfully defended more than 
thirty merchant ships destined for the West Indies.
29
  In 1697, Walker received his 
first seventy-gun, third-rate, commands in the Kent; the Content Prize, serving under 
Admiral Sir George Rooke; and the Royal Oak.
30
  In 1698, he transferred, in the 
distinguished role of flag-captain, to the eighty-gun Boyne, a role in which he served 
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under Vice-Admiral Aylmer, visiting the Mediterranean to confirm the Treaty of 
Ryswick.
31
  Walker experienced a wide variety of commands during the Nine Years 
War, and he carried on his service into the peace, but not before sorting out his 
finances in the Court of Chancery in Ireland concerning a sum of £1,000.
32
  
Through a short analysis of Walker‘s contemporary captains, it can be seen 
that he progressed to become the most senior amongst them.  As has been noted, 
Captain Knapp, a commander with a distinguished combat record, was placed under 
the command of Walker when he was detached from Rooke‘s main battle fleet in 
1703.  If, compared with many of his contemporaries, Walker had few recorded 
combat encounters, he nevertheless possessed a considerable amount of transatlantic 
convoy experience which the others lacked.  It is this experience that allowed him to 
be promoted to flag rank and be given the responsibility for convoying the 1711 
expedition into uncharted waters.  Walker was also the only officer out of the original 
nine to continue in service without retiring from sea duties, or dying in their 
execution.   
During the Nine Years War, it was evident that fireships were the initial 
training vessels for new commanders.
33
  A quick glance at the seniority records shows 
that, during this period, the majority of new captains started out on these vessels, at a 
time when they were at their numerical peak in the naval inventory.  It is uncertain as 
to when the majority of these captains were first promoted to lieutenant, although 
Jumper and Wynn were commissioned as lieutenants in March and December 1688 
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respectively, whilst Brown received his lieutenancy in August 1689.
34
  It can be 
assumed, therefore, that a general trend of three or four years experience would be 
attained before receiving a recognised independent command.  However, at the height 
of a naval war, promotion may have been a speedier phenomenon.  Walker was made 
a second lieutenant on 30 October 1688 on the Saint David, a fourth-rate vessel.
35
   
This group of junior commanders must have been deemed acceptable by the 
new post-Revolution regime, at a time when the disaffected had the opportunity to 
rally to the Jacobite cause and its French allies.  The Williamite regime required a 
navy with the ability to defend revolutionary Britain from the threat posed by the old 
monarchy.  Ironically, Walker would later flee for being a suspected Jacobite upon the 
accession of George I; however, he would regain favour from the Crown towards the 
end of his life.  Still, his service during the Nine Years War put him in good stead to 
command in the next. 
Walker‘s responsibilities grew with the inevitable war which broke out as a 
result of the death of the Spanish King.  He may not have been an adventurous 
character to rival the likes of Shovell, nor was he to achieve any further promotion 
that would warrant his command of a fleet like Rooke.  He was, however, a competent 
officer with more experience than the average captain.  The fact that Walker was not 
present at any of the major battles during the War of the Spanish Succession is not 
unusual considering they were so few in number.  He was often given considerable 
responsibility, operating his own command throughout much of the war.  This new 
war would greatly expand Walker‘s naval experience, where he would operate in all 
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major naval theatres.  He would become more than a naval captain as well, for he 
would often assume the role of commodore to command squadrons.  Walker was 
entrusted with the protection of trade and convoys, defence of the monarchy in 1708, 
and placed in command of two amphibious expeditions in the Americas at a time 
when such operations were a rarity. 
In 1701, as Europe again prepared for war, Walker was given command of the 
formidable seventy-gun ship of the third-rate, Burford.
36
  He accompanied Rooke‘s 
fleet on the abortive Cadiz expedition in 1702, but was not present when the Admiral 
later took the famed treasure fleet at Vigo Bay on the journey back to England.  This 
was because Rooke had appointed Walker as commodore of a squadron detached 
from his fleet, to sail for the West Indies.  This command would illustrate how issues 
of authority and military-colonial relations could affect such expeditions.  Complaints 
were made against Walker by various governors, both in 1703 and in 1712.  However, 
this was indicative of the conflict of authority of many, if not the majority, of naval 
captains with colonial governors.
37
  This was a phenomenon Walker had already seen 
when serving under St Lo. 
Walker‘s detachment from the main fleet also reveals the difficulties posed by 
long sea journeys.  Due to appalling weather conditions, the squadron was unable to 
water at Madeira.  This made a diversion towards the Cape Verde Islands necessary, 
arriving on 24 October 1702, before progressing to St Vincent.  The squadron 
included six vessels of the third-rate and two of the fourth, along with 2,500 troops.
38
  
By the time the squadron reached Barbados on 5 December, the Burford had suffered 
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twenty men dead and 120 sick were sent ashore.  Even Walker himself had 
succumbed to illness.  Other vessels were listed as being sickly, but the Burford was 
singled out by Walker in January 1703 as ‗exceedingly weakened, not having above 
140 seamen aboard, buried above 100 since she parted from Sir George Rooke and 
above 100 being sick ashore‘.39  The normal complement of the Burford on the 
wartime establishment was approximately 450, indicating just how undermanned it 
was.
40
  The Commodore transferred to his old command, the Boyne, probably to 
evade the contagion.
41
  Such long voyages could be extremely detrimental to a ship‘s 
crew, and by extension, the squadron‘s effectiveness, whilst conditions in the West 
Indies also encouraged sickness amongst Europeans.   
Walker recognised the importance of trade protection and sent the Expedition 
to escort six East India vessels from Barbados.  However, his prime concern remained 
the state of his sailors, as sickness continued to spread amongst them:   
 
The fever and other distempers have raged amongst both the men-of-war and transports to that 
degree that if they do not abate there will not be left seamen enough to sail the ships…Here 
are eight sail of men-of-war at the Leeward Islands, which if well manned are sufficient alone 
to encounter all the naval force the French have in the West Indies; but if the men continue to 
die so fast, and no supply be had, they will become only useless hulks. 
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The soldiers fared better on land and many sailors deserted in an attempt to follow 
their example.  Walker was additionally alarmed by 
 
a kind of cartel settle[d] between Barbados and Martinique, vessels pass to and fro with flags 
of truce as they call them, and the French come into the road and anchor amongst the English 
ships, and the persons belonging to those vessels pass up and down the Island unmolested, as 
if there were no war at all between the two Crowns.  
 
This helps to explain why so often naval commanders did not enjoy cordial relations 
with their colonial government colleagues.  The laws of Europe always seemed to be 
diluted in the colonies.  Walker was worried that the French were gaining useful 
intelligence as a result of the locals profiting from their illegal trade.  To combat this, 
he despatched Captain Knapp (his fellow officer gaining seniority the same day) to 
seize a French vessel, whilst a colonel was ordered to arrest any ‗spies‘.  One 
Frenchman was consequently sentenced to be executed.
42
 
The slowness in communications at this point also hampered Walker‘s 
relations with the colonial governors.  Governor-General of the Leeward Islands 
Colonel Christopher Codrington was ambitious and well-connected, and planned to 
extend England‘s dominion over the West Indies by attacking Martinique.  The 
squadron‘s arrival at Barbados had not been communicated to Codrington as Walker 
had requested.
43
  The Barbadian authorities privately argued between themselves over 
who should pay for a boat to convey this message.  Codrington, meanwhile, oblivious 
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to Walker‘s arrival, was irritated by having to wait for the squadron, whilst the 
Commodore was unaware that his message had yet to be delivered.
44
   
This breakdown in communications was examined in 1704 when Codrington‘s 
complaints were investigated.
45
  In the investigation, the President and Council of 
Barbados acknowledged that they did not alert the Governor to Walker‘s presence.46  
When Walker finally headed towards the Leeward Islands, with orders to assist with 
Codrington‘s plans, the projected attack on Martinique was abandoned in favour of 
the weaker Guadeloupe due to the pitiful state of his sickly troops.  The arrogant 
Codrington was dismayed at the effectiveness of the forces, as only 1,000 of the 2,500 
soldiers that crossed the Atlantic had arrived in a fit condition.  Walker also conveyed 
the 2,000 men of the regiments already based at Barbados to make up the numbers to 
3,000 effectives in the attack on Guadeloupe.
47
  Codrington explained the pitiful 
situation in late February 1703, just after Walker‘s arrival at Antigua:  
 
abundance of the soldiers and seamen are dead and the rest so sickly they are scarce fit for 
service, many officers, and the best as I am told, are gone off, nor could better be expected 
from their long stay at Barbados, where the planters think the best way to make their strangers 
welcome is to [murder] them with drinking; the tenth part of that strong liquor which will 
scarce warm the blood of our West Indians, who have bodies like Egyptian mummies, must 
certainly dispatch a new-comer to the other world… the most I can now pretend to is to attack 
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Guadeloupe, and our great ships are so foul and unfit for service without any light frigates to 
attend them, that even this attempt will go on very awkwardly and heavily.
48
   
 
Walker had further orders to combine his squadron with Admiral Benbow‘s 
(later Admiral Graydon‘s, due to the former‘s death) and attack Placentia in 
Newfoundland once his West Indian service was completed – a prospect that was 
becoming increasingly unlikely.  The land forces were insufficiently prepared, as they 
lacked the essential tools needed for conducting a siege, whilst Walker was hindered 
by a lack of pilots, making the landings at Guadeloupe a difficult, but successful, 
operation.
49
  The land forces besieging the fort at Basse Terre were strong enough to 
see the defenders flee into the hills after three weeks.  However, as the summer drew 
near, with supplies running low and sickness spreading at sea and on land, and now 
including an indisposed Codrington, it was decided that they should withdraw, this 
taking place on 7 May.
50
  Codrington and Walker descended into the usual bickering, 
apportioning blame to each other, when it was really the fault of neither.   
The failure occurred due to three factors.  Firstly, there was too much wastage 
through disease which seriously depleted the fighting strength of the land force.  This 
was only exacerbated by the rising heat of the late (for the West Indies) season.  
Secondly, and to a lesser degree, there was a lack of suitable siege equipment as a 
proper attack of the fort at Basse Terre could have saved valuable time.  Along with 
the fact that the West Indian regiments had little ammunition and relied on Walker‘s 
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forces to provide much of this, the lack of equipment, and the consequent borrowing 
and hurried redistribution of the necessary tools, suggests a ridiculously unprepared 
situation.  Ultimately, poor communications were responsible for the withdrawal of 
what could have been a successful operation.  The period during the winter, whilst the 
squadron procrastinated in the sheltered waters of Barbados and when Codrington was 
unaware of Walker‘s proximity, significantly delayed the attack.  Consequently lives 
were claimed by sickness as time progressed and the consumption of a large 
proportion of supplies beforehand reduced the effectiveness of the fleet.   
Nevertheless, Walker had properly landed the regiments under difficult 
circumstances and Codrington had acted bravely.  If any party were to receive blame, 
it was the mismanagement of the Barbadian council in ensuring that Richard Downes, 
‗he being a man of a very ill life [according to Governor Sir Bevil Granville of 
Barbados],
51
 and I do believe will appear to have chiefly been the occasion of the not 
sending an advice-boat to General Codrington when Walker's fleet was here. He was 
at that time treasurer, and would not lay out the money‘.52 
It is clear, however, that Codrington blamed Walker for the failure.
53
  Issues of 
command had arisen, with debates over what extent the powers of Codrington as 
general of the land forces, and those of Walker as naval commander, actually were.  
Walker complained when land-only council of wars demanded naval services.  He 
suggested that general council of wars would be preferable in reaching such 
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conclusions.
54
  Codrington‘s criticism was unjust as he overly relied on Walker‘s 
naval stores, artillery and provisions, when the Commodore had orders to proceed 
north and also had to consider the security of his squadron.
55
  A committee of the 
Privy Council investigated Codrington‘s complaints about Walker‘s conduct.  No 
fault was found with his command and Walker was quickly exonerated.
56
  This type 
of operation would not be seen again in the West Indies during the war, as the 
persistent lack of success in the Caribbean failed to enthuse a ministry becoming 
increasingly obsessive over its European campaigns.  It was not only because of the 
failure at Guadeloupe.  Benbow, Whetstone, and Graydon all failed to make an impact 
in the Caribbean.  After 1703 only frigates would be sent to the area, which smacks of 
defensive posturing rather than showing any real desire to fight an aggressive blue-
water campaign.
57
   
Walker again transferred his command, this time to the eighty-gun third-rate 
Cumberland, before heading north where he proceeded to amalgamate his squadron 
with Vice-Admiral Graydon‘s.58  Unfortunately, success would not be found in 
Newfoundland either.  The task of operating in the West Indies and then proceeding to 
Newfoundland was almost identical to Admiral Wheler‘s 1693 venture.  Walker 
applied his signature to the council of war‘s decision to abandon an attack on 
Placentia in September 1703.  The reasons for returning to England were numerous.  
Their ships were in an appalling state and their crews too weak and sickly, as 
provisions were very low and rotten.  2,000 soldiers were said to have been required, 
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but the land forces had been reduced to only 1,305 (with the 500 New Englanders 
expected numbering only fifty).  Furthermore, intelligence suggested that the enemy 
were not inferior in number, whilst the stores for a siege were insufficient.  The 
impracticality of launching such an attack during that season of the year was also 
stated, as the weather was poor and the winter fast approaching.
59
  A return to a 
proper port in England was clearly the sensible option.  The supply situation was 
certainly critical.  With many of his men sick, Walker did not have enough to man the 
furnaces on board the Cumberland resulting in a lack of boiling water.  They had also 
consumed the entire stock of butter, cheese, peas and oatmeal.  Furthermore, with 
only bad water to drink, many men died and the squadron was battered by a storm 
causing its ships to disperse and find the nearest landfall.
60
  Walker may have had 
harrowing memories of this ordeal when he returned in 1711. 
Despite this lack of success, Walker had demonstrated that he was an able 
commander by convoying his squadron across the Atlantic – directly after a difficult 
operation at Cadiz, whilst his manpower slowly diminished.  He then coordinated the 
distribution of arms and supplies amongst the land forces at Guadeloupe, which he 
landed in enemy territory without the aid of pilots.  Additionally, Walker was issued 
orders that limited his time in the West Indies, as he was ordered to depart for 
Newfoundland in May when he was still in the Caribbean.  Walker was hampered by 
issues of command, delays beyond his control, an undermanned squadron and a lack 
of supplies, whilst his ships were in a poor state.  He was constrained by orders that, 
owing to slow communications, did not fully appreciate the situation in the West 
Indies and assumed he could operate effectively against Placentia.  Even so he 
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managed to sail to besiege Cadiz, take a squadron to the West Indies, attack 
Guadeloupe, sail for Newfoundland, and then return to England, over a period of 
almost fifteen months.  Much of this time was spent in independent command, in 
severely undermanned, poor-quality ships – which had not been properly equipped for 
such a long voyage – but none of which were lost.61 
On his return to England, Walker remained in command of the Cumberland, 
where it survived the great hurricane of 1703 intact whilst in the Bristol Channel.
62
  
This ship was Walker‘s longest command, which he apparently laid up in May 1704, 
only to take it on again that December.
63
  This vessel was an important eighty-gunner 
– the first third-rate, three-deck ship to be built for the Royal Navy.  Walker‘s first 
operation, during his second period in command of the Cumberland, was to patrol the 
English Channel and Bay of Biscay in 1705.
64
   
Barcelona had been taken by the allies the same year, but was soon besieged 
by a Franco-Spanish army.  Without the Anglo-Dutch fleet, which had departed the 
Mediterranean for the winter, the garrison was at considerable risk, especially due to 
their close proximity to the French naval base at Toulon.  Vice-Admiral Sir John 
Leake had been left with a small number of vessels at Lisbon so that he could return 
earlier during the next campaigning season to relieve Barcelona.  However, with the 
French fleet present under the Comte de Toulouse, Leake would have to wait for 
reinforcements under Vice-Admiral George Byng.
65
  Walker convoyed a small 
squadron of reinforcements to Leake, including some troop transports, to take part in 
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the relief of Barcelona.
66
  The mere presence of Leake‘s larger fleet, accompanied 
with fresh reinforcements of soldiers, ensured that the opposing French fleet, lacking 
confidence, returned to Toulon.  Without naval support, the besiegers also retreated.  
A strategic maritime victory for the French at this point would have ensured the loss 
of the army in Catalonia and Valencia, and a naval withdrawal from the 
Mediterranean.
67
  Walker had, therefore, contributed to a success which ensured 
British strategic dominance over the Mediterranean for the duration of the war.  
Walker‘s role may not have been a glamorous one, but it is precisely this sort of 
expertise that was required to win the war.  The safe conveyance of transports over 
such a distance enabled the English to control the Mediterranean without even firing a 
broadside.  After the relief, Walker again sailed to the West Indies, under Rear-
Admiral Sir John Jennings, in October 1706.  On the way, the squadron 
unsuccessfully attacked Santa Cruz in Tenerife in a manner similar to Nelson‘s failure 
in 1797.  After bolstering the defences of the English possessions in the Caribbean, 
the squadron returned to England in April 1707.
68
 
Upon his return, Walker sat on the court-martial of Captain Sir Thomas 
Hardy.
69
  Although he was eventually acquitted, Hardy‘s case is indicative of the 
difficulties facing an eighteenth-century naval officer when confronted with the wrath 
of the poorly informed, yet assertive, public.  He was in command of a small squadron 
tasked with convoying the Lisbon trade when French ships were sighted.  Hardy 
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decided not to pursue, but instead elected to protect the merchant ships, for which he 
was taken to court-martial.  This came at the height of the furore over the French 
privateers‘ success in taking merchant vessels and so he was also cross-examined in 
the House of Lords.  Both cases received widespread scrutiny and, fortunately, 
common sense prevailed with his acquittal.
70
 
Sitting upon a court-martial strengthened Walker‘s authority within the navy.  
Unfortunately, many details of Walker‘s career after the Hardy case are sketchy.  He 
gave up command of his trusty Cumberland in September 1707, never to see it again.  
The next month it was captured by the French while defending the Lisbon convoy off 
Lizard Point.
71
  Walker then served briefly in the sixty-gun, fourth-rate, Exeter.
72
  
Sources then differ for late 1707 and early 1708, as Leake apparently appointed 
Walker commander in chief of all ships in Portsmouth harbour
73
 whilst he assumed 
command of the third-rate, eighty-gunner, Royal Oak, in December 1707, and then the 
second-rate of ninety-six guns, Ramillies, in January 1708.
74
  He may have had 
temporary command of these ships, but it is certain that he was preparing to sail in the 
Exeter from Plymouth in February as commodore of the Channel cruisers.
75
 
                                                 
70
 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 177; Charnock, Biographia Navalis, II, p. 459; Laughton, J. 
K., and Davies, J. D. (rev.), ‗Hardy, Sir Thomas (1666–1732)‘, ODNB. 
71
 Owen, War at sea under Queen Anne, Chapter VII passim.  The Cumberland certainly had a 
colourful career.  It was later sold to the Genoese and then to Spain, where it served, as the Principe de 
Asturias, as a flagship in the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Cape Passaro (1718).  During the battle it 
was captured by the British but sold to Austria, Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, p. 70. 
72
 NMM, SER/136.  Unfortunately, this is as far as this valuable source, from Charles Sergison, clerk of 
the acts at the Admiralty Board, goes in detailing Walker‘s commands. 
73
 Charnock, Biographia Navalis, II, p. 459. 
74
 Laughton and Davies, ‗Walker, Sir Hovenden‘, ODNB; the Ramillies was in ‗ordinary‘ (paid off) at 
Portsmouth, having originally been the Royal Katherine.  It was due to be rebuilt, but it would never 
sail again, Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, pp. 36-37. 
75
 Owen, War at sea under Queen Anne, p. 242.  Sergison‘s papers, NMM, SER/136, indicate Walker‘s 
command of the Exeter ended in 1707 – the last year in this record, yet Walker must have taken up 
further command in that ship by February as some letters to Burchett are written addressed from the 
Exeter, 22 and 25 February 1708, British Library (hereafter cited as BL), Add MSS 61582, ff. 140, 170. 
 93 
The dramatic events of 1708, when the first Jacobite plot to reach fruition 
occurred, required the immediate services of Captain Walker in defence of the 
realm.
76
  The invasion crisis caused by the attempt of the Pretender, ‗James III‘, to 
land in Britain created considerable unease amongst the British establishment.  The 
Royal Navy descended into a frantic search for any enemy shipping to emerge from 
Dunkirk.  The French attempted to install the Pretender on the throne by landing him 
around the Firth of Forth during March 1708.  The squadron that accompanied the 
Pretender consisted of six ships-of-the-line, including the fifty-four-gun Le Mars, 
which carried James, five small frigates, a few privateers and a complement of twelve 
under-strength battalions of infantry – a total of approximately 5,000 men.  To 
transport such a quantity of troops, many of the vessels were manned with reduced 
crews and carried fewer cannon than was standard.
77
  Chef d‘Escadre Claude de 
Forbin was the squadron‘s naval commander, which he readied at Dunkirk – a port 
notoriously difficult to blockade effectively.
78
  His squadron slipped away on the 
night of 9 March.   
Admiral Byng, responsible for the naval defence of Britain, pursued the 
Pretender to Scotland.  Byng‘s mere presence there caused great apprehension 
amongst the French, who decided to return to Dunkirk.  Forbin managed this with the 
loss of only one ship, the Salisbury, a British prize captured in 1703 which, in one of 
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those amazing turns of fate that occurs during wartime, was itself recaptured by its 
namesake and replacement, the new British Salisbury.
79
 
Consternation had descended upon the British political establishment due to 
the invasion scare caused by the Pretender‘s presence at Dunkirk.  Upon discovery of 
the scheme, all available ships at Portsmouth, on the Thames, and the Medway, had 
been ordered to the Downs (off Kent).  This involved over thirty vessels.
80
  The 
agitated ministry dispatched the Duke of Marlborough to the continent, where he 
deployed ten battalions from Ostend across the Channel, to counter invasion.
81
  
Walker was at Plymouth, as Commodore of the Soundings squadron and was 
preparing to convoy the trade to Lisbon, which consisted of around 100 vessels.
82
  
This emphasises Walker‘s role as an important naval commander.  He had not yet 
attained flag rank, but nevertheless possessed greater responsibility than many of his 
contemporaries in the role he was entrusted with.  It lacked the glamour of sailing 
with the main battle fleet, but was a duty which was often as dangerous, due to the 
prevalence of privateers stalking the British trade routes.  It is notable that little is 
recorded of Walker when performing these duties and this would seem to imply that 
he was successful in their execution. 
Leake, as admiral of the fleet, was preparing to sail for the Mediterranean.  
Clearly the Pretender‘s threatened incursion into British territory was not enough of a 
threat to hold back the main fleet from this important naval arena.  In view of this, the 
Queen authorised Walker to abandon his convoy duties, which were transferred to 
Leake who would be sailing past Lisbon anyway, and instead join the effort to 
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intercept the Pretender.
83
  According to letters to Burchett, Walker commanded his 
squadron of nine warships in the Exeter.
84
  Inclement weather, unsurprisingly for the 
time of year, delayed Walker, Leake and Byng from sailing on time.
85
   
The Byng papers contain a great deal of the correspondence between the chief 
protagonists relating to this episode: Admiralty Secretary Burchett, Secretary of State 
Sunderland, Lord High Admiral Prince George, and patently Byng himself as the 
admiral responsible for intercepting the Pretender.
86
  Discussion about allocating 
Walker‘s convoy duties to Leake was followed by an order from the Lord High 
Admiral to Walker, on 18 February, to immediately sail for St Helens with any of his 
ships that were ready, whilst the rest were to follow.
87
  Walker did not receive this 
order until 21 February, but because of the weather conditions it took him some time 
to clear Plymouth.
88
  Walker‘s importance is summed up by the amount of 
correspondence sent between Prince George, Byng and Burchett, about his role in the 
operation to deter the Pretender.  Byng was then ordered to wait for Walker at the 
Downs.  Once joined, a council of war was to be called, where it would be decided 
upon the intelligence attained whether to proceed as one squadron or split into two.  If 
the latter, one squadron would patrol the Downs and the other the area between Rye 
and Calais.
89
  Further letters debated whether they should join Rear-Admiral Jennings 
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and, were the French to sail for Portsmouth, if Walker should instead join Vice-
Admiral Dursley.
90
 
Walker finally arrived at the Downs on 5 March, indicating the difficulty of 
positioning squadrons in this period.
91
  When no word had been heard from Walker by 
26 February, it emerged that he had been attempting to put to sea, but was forced back 
on the 24
th
 and again around the 27
th
 when he was held back by contrary winds.
92
  
Returning to Plymouth after losing this battle against the elements, Walker eventually 
set sail on a westerly and was ‗probably past St Helens‘ on 1 March, although it later 
emerged that Walker was still at St Helens on the 3
rd
.
93
  With the eventual arrival of 
Walker‘s squadron on 5 March, a council of war was called.  Byng deemed his 
squadron, which now consisted of twenty-six ships-of-the-line as well as some 
smaller frigates, strong enough to be split in two as suggested by his orders.
94
  Walker 
was last to arrive, although he did have the furthest to travel.  Dursley and Byng had 
set out from Portsmouth and reached the Downs a week earlier, on 26 February.  The 
weather had hampered all of their sailing efforts; however, the four admirals on 
station (Byng, Dursley, Jennings and Baker) had managed to make a quick 
reconnaissance of Dunkirk before Walker‘s arrival.  The council of war decided that 
the entire squadron should sail for Graveline Pits, then cruise off Dunkirk, before 
detaching a small squadron to patrol between Beachy Head and Dieppe as there were 
worries of French reinforcements from Brest.
95
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After Forbin‘s squadron slipped through the net and Byng‘s force gave chase 
to Scotland and back, Walker received orders from Prince George to sail for Deal and 
take command of a squadron organised by Captain Griffith, which was tasked with 
intercepting the Pretender on his return to Dunkirk.  To carry out these orders, Walker 
was allowed to hoist a ‗distinguishing pennant‘ on board any ship he deemed ‗most 
convenient‘.96  He hoisted his pennant on the seventy-gun, third-rate, Ipswich on 23 
March.  It is clear that Walker‘s status was significant as he remained a commodore 
and was entrusted with an important mission.  Part of Griffith‘s squadron under 
Captain Culliford was still at the Downs, despite orders to sail, because he was 
provided with inadequate pilots who clearly did not possess knowledge of Dunkirk.  
Culliford had described the pilot assigned to his ship as a ‗sot‘ and had him 
discharged.  Walker initially took command of this smaller squadron, but he also 
found the pilots to be unreliable.  These ships remained at the Downs as the Pretender 
returned to Dunkirk.
97
   
Captain Griffith, who was left to cover Dunkirk once the main force had 
proceeded north, faced the French squadron on 25 March.  The enemy had been 
sighted but their smaller frigates were faster and escaped.  For fear of being 
outnumbered, Griffith did not risk making a reconnaissance of Dunkirk and instead 
sailed for the Downs to rendezvous with Walker, who then proceeded to Dunkirk with 
this stronger force.
98
  Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral John Baker
99
 was sent to return 
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Marlborough‘s embarked troops to Ostend and then take command of the ships 
around Dunkirk.
100
   
Walker‘s conduct here was criticised for being slow in taking station off 
Dunkirk due to the problems with pilots.
101
  However, his opinions on the matter were 
backed by Culliford.  If his squadron had sailed, then perhaps they might have caught 
the Pretender, but it must not be forgotten that most of the British home fleet was 
chasing Forbin‘s squadron and failed.  The French frigates were speedy and Walker 
may not even have joined Griffiths in time.  Due to Walker and Culliford‘s inactivity, 
and the apparent uselessness of the other squadrons, rumours were spread that the 
Queen had secretly ordered the navy not to intercept the Pretender – her half-brother – 
now that the threat had dissipated with his return.
102
  Walker commanded the vessels 
cruising off Dunkirk in case of another break-out, until Baker returned.
103
  Walker had 
great responsibility here as he possessed a higher authority over other captains, as he 
was regularly used in the role of squadron commodore.  In this case he took command 
from another captain already stationed in the area, until he could hand over to an 
officer of flag rank. 
Walker is reported to have been appointed captain-resident at Plymouth to 
supervise improvements there.  Such a post assumed the role of commander in chief 
when an officer of flag rank was not in attendance.
104
  In 1709 Walker‘s assistance 
was needed in supplying a witness for a court-martial.  It was an interesting case, 
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having arisen out of the newly formed union of England with Scotland.  A sixth-rate, 
twenty-four-gun, frigate which had previously formed part of the old Scots Navy, the 
Dumbarton Castle, had been captured by an enemy privateer of forty-two-guns whilst 
on convoy duty in April 1708.
105
  The ship was taken to St Malo and its captain, 
Matthew Campbell, either escaped or was exchanged from his captivity at Dinan.  
Rear-Admiral Baker set up the process to try the loss of the ship in June 1709 when 
Captain Campbell was in England.  In June, Campbell wrote to the Admiralty 
Secretary urging him to find his former sailors, who were present at the capture of the 
Dumbarton Castle, to be brought forward as witnesses.  He asked for Quartermaster 
Joseph Ridge in particular.  A letter was dispatched to Plymouth detailing the 
following: ‗Captain Walker to order the Captain of the Diamond to send up Joseph 
Ridge and any two men that can best give an account of the loss of the Dumbarton, 
and to do it immediately‘.  Campbell was duly acquitted in July 1709.106   
Walker‘s authority in this situation may have been used in the capacity of 
captain-resident as he was certainly then at Plymouth.  Unfortunately details of 
Walker‘s career around this time are very much uncertain.  Some sources have stated 
that Walker became a flag officer in 1709 as rear-admiral of the blue.
107
  Although 
such a promotion seems feasible, this does not appear to be correct given that his 
commission to rear-admiral of the white in 1711 was addressed to ‗Captain‘ 
Walker.
108
  Detailed records of Walker next appear in 1711 when he led the Quebec 
expedition.  It could be assumed that Walker was captain-resident at Plymouth until 
                                                 
105
 Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, p. 205; Merriman, ‗Queen Anne‘s Navy‘, p. 362, n. 3. 
106
 Grant, James, (ed.), ‗The Old Scots Navy, 1689-1710‘, Navy Records Society, vol. XLIV, (1912), 
pp. 357, 385-386. 
107
 Syrett, and DiNardo, The Commissioned sea officers of the Royal Navy, p. 454; Charnock also 
mentions it, but seems unsure as to its validity as apparently Walker did not hold any command (he did 
not report the Plymouth posting), Biographia Navalis, II, p. 459. 
108
 TNA, ADM 1/4094/409, St John to Burchett, 16 March 1711; TNA, SP 44/213, St John to 
Admiralty, 16 March 1711 (second letter). 
 100
this later appointment, as he received an order to dispatch cruisers to the Channel 
Soundings and Ireland in March 1710.
109
  Nevertheless, the Admiralty was first made 
aware on 16 March 1711 that Walker would fill the rear-admiral of the white vacancy.  
Thomas Hardy
110
 was promoted rear-admiral of the blue at the same time.  Along with 
Walker‘s, it was to be considered ‗one promotion‘.111  However, from May 1712 to 
May 1713 Walker was receiving pay as both rear-admiral of the white and the blue, 
which only adds to the earlier confusion over his rank.
112
  Walker‘s ‗commission for 
commanding the squadron appointed upon a secret expedition‘ was dated 3 April 
1711 and he was awarded a knighthood on the 14
th
.
113
  Walker‘s further career shall 
be followed later, but first the composition of the Quebec expedition must be 
examined in detail and its land officers analysed. 
 
II: John Hill  
John (‗Jack‘) Hill was not a particularly noted military commander.  He owed his 
position, like so many of his contemporaries, including Marlborough, to patronage 
before ability.  Hill‘s year of birth is unknown, but, ironically through the influence of 
his cousin, the Duchess of Marlborough, he was sent to school in 1690 and was a page 
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to Prince George in 1692, before becoming a groom of the bedchamber in 1698 to the 
Duke of Gloucester – Princess Anne‘s only surviving son.114 
Although Hill was not present at any of the great battles fought by 
Marlborough, his service was not without interest.  Hill was commissioned into the 
Coldstream Guards as a captain in 1702.  It is not certain if he had any previous 
military service.
115
  In 1703, Hill was a colonel and was appointed adjutant-general of 
the army sent to Portugal, before taking on the colonelcy of a regiment (previously 
Stanhope‘s) in 1705.116  When Hill took command of this regiment back in England, 
many of its soldiers had just been exchanged after being captured at Portalegre.  He 
was commended for it being rapidly brought up to strength and trained.  This allowed 
the regiment to be selected to take part in a descent on the French coast in 1706, but 
bad weather so delayed the expedition that it was called off and sent to Portugal 
instead.  After a short time at Lisbon, it was transferred to Alicante by Admiral 
Shovell, where it served with the Earl of Galway‘s army and took part in several 
skirmishes.  Hill was one of the few regimental commanders actually present with his 
regiment in Spain.
117
 
In April 1707, the regiment met the enemy in combat when they formed up at 
Almansa after a long, hot march, opposite the more numerous Franco-Spanish.  Hill 
distinguished himself here, commanding a brigade of four regiments at the rear of the 
left-wing.  Commanding this reserve, Hill noted that the front line, which had up to 
this point performed well, was beginning to collapse.  He demonstrated courage and 
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leadership when he rushed two regiments forward to cover the retreat of the now 
crumbling allied army and momentarily checked the advance of the enemy.
118
  Hill‘s 
brigade enabled much of the rest of the army to retreat in good order, although he 
suffered heavy casualties.  Himself now retreating, Hill managed to link up with some 
Portuguese and Dutch units, but was consequently surrounded by the enemy and duly 
surrendered.
119
  When exchanged the following year, his regiment was again brought 
into a state of readiness very quickly and was sent to garrison Antwerp in the 
autumn.
120
 
Hill‘s relieved a regiment that suffered losses at Malplaquet and consequently 
took part in the siege at Mons in 1709.  Again, the regiment served with distinction as 
it fought off a brutal sortie by the enemy garrison after they opened the trenches there 
– an honour accorded to Hill‘s as it was the most senior regiment present.  However, 
Hill lost sixty killed and wounded and some, consumed with bloodlust, were taken 
prisoner when they chased the French back over the enemy‘s palisade.121  Hill was 
personally involved in this action and was also wounded when the French attacked.  
He continued to command his regiment in Flanders in 1710, when it was part of a 
column which pierced the French lines at Pont-à-Vendin.  Hill‘s then became 
embroiled in a campaign of manoeuvre as part of the army covering the multitude of 
sieges which Marlborough undertook that year.
122
  Towards the end of the campaign, 
Hill requested of Marlborough that he should be permitted to return to England, as he 
had heard that the army was going to be broken up after the siege (presumably of 
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Aire).  Hill had been in Brussels for the benefit of the waters, possibly to aid his 
recovery from his wound at Mons.
123
  This may have been a difficult request. 
Hill found himself to be the pawn in the political struggle between his sister, 
Abigail Masham, and his cousin, the Duchess of Marlborough.  It was surely through 
his connection with Masham that he was promoted to brigadier-general on 1 January 
1710.
124
  The catalyst for the schism between the Marlboroughs and the Queen 
occurred with the death, also in 1710, of the Whig Earl of Essex, a colonel of 
dragoons and constable of the Tower of London.  The decision of whom to appoint to 
these vacancies was particularly important, but it was Essex‘s dragoons – one of the 
most senior regiments in the army – which concerned Hill.  Until then, Marlborough, 
as captain-general, was able to appoint to all military positions, but as the Duchess of 
Marlborough began to fall out of favour with the Queen and was superseded by 
Masham, it would only be a matter of time before his authority was challenged.  The 
preference of the Queen, under the influence of Masham, was for Hill to take 
command of the dragoons.   
Marlborough did not support the case for Hill.
125
  Whilst it was true that there 
may have been many good and experienced officers more deserving of promotion, 
Marlborough‘s objection to Hill‘s selection as a candidate for the colonelcy was 
political, rather than based on any real assessment of his military ability.  After all, it 
was thanks to Marlborough‘s patronage that Hill was originally able to secure a 
regiment in the army.
126
  It was only after the rise of Masham‘s influence that 
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Marlborough raised any objections to his further advancement.  The Duchess of 
Marlborough reportedly stated that the Duke thought Hill to be ‗good for nothing‘.127  
However, his reasons are probably not because he doubted Hill‘s military capabilities 
as is generally offered in explanation.  The Duchess of Marlborough was particularly 
opposed to the growing influence of her two cousins, Masham and Harley, and this 
probably coloured her husband‘s judgment of Hill.128   
Marlborough‘s opposition to the appointment was more to do with the obvious 
challenge to his authority as captain-general and the effect it would have on 
disaffected officers within the army.  Even some of his Whig supporters thought such 
a power simply conferred patronage upon placemen rather than improved military 
efficiency.   Most importantly, Marlborough was worried about the loss of respect and 
discipline, both in the army and amongst politicians at home and abroad, if it was seen 
he did not have the support of the Queen.  Such a prospect was soon quelled with the 
establishment of the Board of General Officers in 1711.
129
  This body took real power 
over military discipline away from Marlborough, who had already overreached 
himself in 1709 by requesting the captain-generalcy for life, which raised fears of the 
creation of another Oliver Cromwell, or the crowning of King John II.
130
  Hill is said 
to have avoided further embarrassment for Marlborough and the Queen when he 
asked not to be appointed colonel of the dragoons, but Anne may also have given in to 
such open hostility from the Duke, particularly as she already managed to appoint her 
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candidate for constable of the Tower, Earl Rivers.
131
  Such open disagreements, 
occurring at the same time as Sachaverell‘s impeachment, helped to sweep the Tories 
to power later in the year, including Hill who became the member for Lostwithiel in 
Parliament, where Abigail apparently coaxed him to vote against the Whigs.
132
  It is 
unclear, however, whether Hill wanted advancement in the army to the extent that his 
sister‘s ambitions desired.   
Hill was made general and commander in chief of the forces raised for the 
expedition on 1 March 1711,
133
 the establishment of the staff officers being given 
three weeks later.
134
  Marlborough was first alerted to the possibility of Hill being 
commander of the expedition in late February, when some of his regiments were to be 
taken from him and he consequently tried to impede their transfer.  To stall St John, 
Marlborough was able to take advantage of Hill‘s seniority, or, rather, lack of it.  As 
the Duke had been asked to submit a list of his Flanders regiments to be sent on the 
expedition, St John had rejected three of those choices as Major-General Wynne, 
Brigadier Hamilton and Brigadier Sutton were all regimental colonels senior to Hill.  
This left only two Quebec regiments with colonels at their head ‗when your Grace 
[Marlborough] has several‘, implying that more senior regimental colonels were 
deliberately and mischievously slated by Marlborough for Hill‘s force.135  Clearly, 
Hill‘s command had to be unambiguous to provide authority and retain the Queen‘s 
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patronage.  The colonels eventually ordered to go upon the expedition to serve under 
him were all, nevertheless, very experienced. 
 
III: Hill’s Subordinates 
Seven infantry regiments were transported by Walker‘s fleet to North America.  
General Hill, as commander in chief, naturally brought his regiment.  The other 
regiments were Seymour‘s, Disney‘s, Kane‘s, Clayton‘s, Kirk‘s and Windress‘.  
Added to this was Colonel Churchill‘s regiment of marines, which in the early 
eighteenth century were regarded as being a part of the army, but allocated for sea-
service.   
William Seymour did not accompany the expedition.  Instead, Lieutenant-
Colonel Magnus Kempenfelt took his place at the head of the regiment.  He had 
joined the Coldstream Guards in 1685, and was an aide-de-camp in a marine regiment 
at Vigo in 1702.  That he commanded Seymour‘s for the expedition is confirmed by 
his timely promotion to lieutenant-colonel of the regiment on 1 May 1711.
136
  
Seymour‘s absence may have been due to issues over seniority as he outranked Hill as 
a lieutenant-general.
137
  Seymour was returned to Parliament, as member for Newport 
on the Isle of Wight, in the general election of 1710 and was a staunch Tory, having 
distanced himself from his former connection with Marlborough.  It has been 
suggested that Seymour was ill during 1711 and Jonathan Swift remarked that the 
Lieutenant-General had a particular dislike for hot weather, which has caused some 
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speculation about the illness.
138
  Seymour had been a major in the Coldstream Guards 
in 1692 and had served at Landen the following year,
139
 before commanding a brigade 
at Cadiz and being wounded at Vigo in 1702.
140
  Whilst Seymour was still in 
command of his regiment when in England, an unspecified dispute arose between 
himself and Colonel Charles Churchill (of the expedition‘s marines) over arms.141  
Churchill‘s unit was originally a foot regiment which had become a marine regiment 
by the end of 1709,
142
 yet, under the estimates made for the charges of regiments in 
1711, Seymour‘s was listed as being for sea service.143  Perhaps the origin of their 
dispute with their equipment was connected to this.  Churchill was a nephew of 
Marlborough and became an ensign in 1688, later serving as an aide-de-camp at 
Blenheim.
144
 
Colonel Richard Kane was to become quite a famous figure later in his life.  
He took command of his regiment after Lieutenant-General Macartney had to sell it 
(instead of receiving the usual punishment of death) after being convicted of raping a 
clergyman‘s widow.145  Incidentally, Macartney was earmarked to command the 
cancelled 1709 expedition to Quebec.
146
  Kane‘s regiment would likely have been 
cheap, as it had been decimated at Almansa in 1707.  The regiment was brought up to 
strength when one of its captains, William Fixhall, performed extremely well 
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recruiting in the High Peak area of Derbyshire in 1711.
147
  Kane had been given the 
task, probably by Marlborough, of transferring the Flanders regiments to Walker‘s 
fleet.  He has been well regarded by history, becoming commander in chief of 
Gibraltar on two occasions, as well as being twice lieutenant-governor of Minorca 
before becoming an effective governor in his own right.
148
  Kane had a long career 
before 1711, serving from at least 1692.  He was at Namur in 1695 and wounded at 
Blenheim in 1704 before commanding his regiment at Malplaquet in 1709.
149
  He also 
wrote about military discipline and published a history of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, which unfortunately does not include his experiences in North 
America.
150
  Eventually rising to the rank of brigadier-general, a nineteenth-century 
historian stated that Kane ‗was one of the best officers of his time, as well as a 
gentleman of the greatest humanity and generosity…his death was very generally 
lamented.  In a word a noble character‘.151 
Hill was already acquainted with at least two of his colonels – Clayton and 
Disney.  Jasper Clayton had served as lieutenant-colonel in Hill‘s regiment from 
1706
152
 and fought at Almansa.  He was lucky enough to escape with the survivors 
who were not captured there and went on to command the regiment in Hill‘s absence, 
until he was exchanged in 1708.
153
  Clayton was also wounded at Mons.
154
  His 
precise service length is unknown, but it appears he was commissioned in 1695 and is 
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said to have ‗acquired great celebrity as a gallant and meritorious officer‘.  Clayton‘s 
regiment was disbanded at the peace, but he gained a new one later in 1713.  He 
served under the Duke of Argyle during the Jacobite rebellion of 1715, commanding a 
brigade at Sheriffmuir.
155
  Clayton also became governor of Dunkirk and commander 
in chief of Gibraltar,
156
 where he served in the siege of 1727.
157
  He was promoted 
lieutenant-general before being killed at Dettingen in 1743.
158
  His death was even 
noted by an adjutant present at the battle – James Wolfe had received ‗the sad news of 
the death of as good and brave a man as any amongst us, General Clayton, who was 
killed by a musket ball‘.159  It can be surmised that Clayton, through his regimental 
connections, had a close relationship with the Hill family, as his Will bequeathed 
£100 to the sister of Abigail Masham and John Hill (both having died several years 
beforehand) to ‗buy her a ring‘.  The same was awarded to Baron Masham who was 
also his executor.
160
  Clayton‘s Will was indicative of his closeness to the Hill family, 
but also of the loyalty he owed such patronage.  His advancement, by both Whig and 
Tory administrations, indicates that he was a competent officer, which was reinforced 
by his service history and suggests that he was not overly political, despite his Tory 
patrons.  His service against the Jacobites confirms this at a time when many officers 
were losing their positions with the arrival of the Hanoverians.   
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Colonel Henry Disney, (sometimes Desaulnais), was a French Huguenot 
officer who had taken command of the Earl of Islay‘s regiment in 1710.161  He had 
served since 1694, most of that time being spent in the prestigious 1
st
 Foot Guards.
162
  
He served at Blenheim on the general staff as an aide-de-camp.  Disney also served as 
an intermediary between St John and Drummond to settle the former‘s accounts with 
the merchant.
163
  St John noted in a letter to Drummond that both Hill and Disney had 
arrived together in England in November 1710, implying an early connection between 
them.
164
  Disney also mediated between Harley and St John during the breakdown in 
their relationship.
165
   
Colonel Percy Kirk was wounded and captured at Almansa and died a 
lieutenant-general.
166
  He was the son of the more famous General Percy Kirk who 
served with distinction at Tangier, in Ireland and in Flanders.  Owing to this, the 
younger Percy was commissioned into the army when only a year old, but first saw 
action at Vigo and was later stationed at Gibraltar, like many of his contemporaries.
167
  
The little-known Colonel William Windress is thought to have served throughout the 
war.
168
   
The colonels also needed artillery support to fulfil their mission at Quebec.  
Colonel Richard King had been appointed to command the expedition‘s train of 
artillery, which was organised by the Board of Ordnance as the Royal Regiment of 
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Artillery had yet to be established.  He was a very experienced character having seen 
much action and held a great deal of responsibility during the war in Flanders.  King 
had been a captain in the Royal Scots Fusiliers but, having been trained as a gunner, 
his job consisted of many roles.  Other than being an infantry captain, he served 
occasionally with artillery units and became an ordnance stores officer.  He had 
served at Blenheim as an engineer under the famous Colonel Holcroft Blood
169
 and he 
became assistant-quartermaster-general to William Cadogan – Marlborough‘s capable 
quartermaster-general who organised his march on the Danube.  Later, at the siege of 
Menin, King wrote to an associate: ‗I have very little time to myself‘, as he was 
responsible for the victuals, guns and ammunition, whilst also serving in the trenches 
as an engineer and in the batteries as a gunner.  It is difficult to disagree with R. E. 
Scouller, that ‗few will doubt that he earned his promotion to colonel in 1710‘.170  
King later became clerk of the deliveries at the Board of Ordnance, in 1713.  He was 
swept from this office, along with many suspected Tories, in the widespread political 
upheaval caused by the succession of George I.
171
 
Clayton‘s and Kane‘s regiments did not survive the post-war cull of surplus 
units and were disbanded.
172
  Kane was also the only colonel to be put on the half-pay 
list after the death of Anne.
173
  These colonels would surely have all performed well at 
Quebec as long as they were subject to competent leadership.  Moreover, their 
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regiments were experienced and would have posed formidable opponents for any 
enemies that would have been encountered.   
  
IV: Conclusion 
Walker had proven himself as a competent commander.  His experiences were wide 
and varied and only lacked involvement in some of the more famous, but rare, naval 
engagements of the war.  The service of the captains achieving their seniority on the 
same day as Walker illustrate that he was entrusted with higher command during 
Whig rule even prior to his appointment to lead the Quebec squadron.  Walker‘s 
combat experience was not extensive, but the Guadeloupe expedition had shown his 
ability to independently command, for many months, a naval force thousands of miles 
from home port.  It was also indicative of the poor cooperation that was prevalent at 
the time between land and naval commanders in joint operations, which included 
Rooke and the Duke of Ormonde at Cadiz in 1702.
174
 
Walker‘s qualifications for command in 1711 were nevertheless considerable.  
His extensive experience of convoy command, particularly in the Atlantic, was 
exactly what was required.  Walker had been appointed commodore of a squadron on 
numerous occasions and he had held command of many important third-rate ships-of-
the-line – the backbone of the Royal Navy and the most important ships for trade 
protection.  He was also given important roles in being made a flag-captain, switching 
from convoy duty to commanding a squadron in defence of the realm in 1708, and 
being appointed captain-resident of Plymouth – all whilst the Whigs were in 
ministerial control.  His role in 1711 was to convoy transports to North America – a 
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role which did not require an officer of flag rank.  The Tories had given him a 
knighthood and further promotion, but this was surely a natural progression for such a 
career.  After all, Hill, the object of St John‘s authorisation, did not receive a 
knighthood.  Walker‘s history indicates that he was therefore a natural choice to lead 
the expedition at sea. 
Like Walker, Hill had experience of overseas operations and had understood 
the logistics of transporting troops by sea.  He had twice raised and trained his 
regiment after its ranks had been decimated in battle.  At the head of his regiment, 
Hill marched through the harsh terrain of Iberia and on the fertile plains of Flanders, 
where he fought in skirmish, battle and in siege, and also formed part of a garrison.  
This was all valuable experience for a Quebec expedition.  Compared to some other 
capable commanders, Hill may not have been the most ideal candidate to command in 
North America, but he was a suitable choice – a political appointee he may have been, 
but Hill was also an experienced soldier, knowledgeable in tactical command.  
Whether Hill would have been able to effectively command such a large force, in the 
challenging Canadian environment, remains open to speculation.  What cannot be 
questioned, however, is his bravery displayed both at Almansa and at Mons.  
Furthermore, he was backed by some very able regimental colonels.  At first glance, 
despite the political necessity of appointing him to command, Hill appears an odd 
nomination.  Yet his previous service, in conjunction with the expert advice his 
colonels could offer, suggests that he was an acceptable choice and he was only 
opposed by Marlborough because it challenged his authority and offended the 
tempestuous nature of his Duchess. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ORGANISING THE EXPEDITION 
 
Great preparations were required in Britain for the 1711 expedition, as her American 
colonies proved too weak to independently neutralise the threat posed by Quebec.  
With proper organisation and the necessary equipment and supplies, Britain could 
easily conquer the French North American colonies.  In doing so, the British would 
gain trade and resources, whilst providing security and expansionist potential to the 
New Englanders after years of Canadian incursions and molestation.   This was 
precisely what Samuel Vetch had envisioned, although Lieutenant-General Francis 
Nicholson
1
 would ultimately supplant him in organisational control of the colonial 
aspect of this venture.   
In order for such a campaign to succeed, Henry St John needed the forces to 
fight and hold a swathe of remote territory, half-way across the world, and for it to 
survive a possible counter-attack in the alien environment of a Canadian winter.  
Seasoned troops were thus required.  The veteran regiments chosen consisted of men 
who had already been numbed by the excesses of war and the monotony of a 
protracted campaign.  They would add the military professionalism which was not 
demonstrated by the excitable colonials in their limited operations.  In addition, it 
would be necessary to equip a strong train of artillery to overcome Quebec‘s defences.  
Colonial and Indian forces were essential for the overland expedition to Montreal as 
they knew how to operate in the difficult terrain.  Finally, a naval squadron had to be 
assembled to safely convoy the regiments across the Atlantic and up the St Lawrence 
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River.  The French Navy, suffering from neglect, was not a great threat, but French 
privateers were a feared and capable foe, and posed a particular menace to allied 
transports.  Unfortunately, St John did not have the right qualifications to assemble 
such an unprecedented force, despite his prior experience in the war office.
2
  His poor 
organisation was exacerbated by his obsession with secrecy which hampered the 
expedition from its very conception, as he could not garner the best advice for such an 
endeavour, and consequently left the fleet undersupplied. 
A blueprint for the operation had already been outlined in Vetch‘s Canada 
Survey‟d.  The force destined for Quebec was stronger than Vetch had proposed.  It 
comprised of seven infantry regiments; a battalion of marines; a train of artillery 
equipped with twenty cannon; two bomb ketches; several men-of-war and frigates; 
plus colonial militia and Indian allies from the Five Nations.  With such a fine and 
varied array of units the plan seemed simple enough for St John.  Preparations had 
begun in earnest in January 1711: the train was made ready, miscellaneous supplies 
were ordered and investigations into which regiments could be suitably employed had 
begun.  Yet this did not take place early enough and time was against them.  
Equipment orders took too long to be fulfilled; regiments had to be assembled from 
across Britain and Flanders; ships needed to be supplied with months of provisions 
and the entire logistical effort to bring together all elements of the force at Spithead, 
in time to operate in the short Canadian campaigning season, threatened the 
expedition‘s dispatch.  Preparation was the key to success and that, unfortunately, 
came far too late. 
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St John‘s objectives were clear.  To maximise the potential for personal glory 
and military success, most aspects of the expedition were shrouded in secrecy.
3
  To 
hide the objective from the French, St John even kept it a secret from the likes of the 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Board of Ordnance.  Owing to the 
expedition‘s sheer scale, however, it was obvious St John could not keep the 
preparations entirely secret, but he hoped its purpose would not be revealed.  After all, 
the Admiralty was required to attach a squadron of warships for escort, and the 
Ordnance had to be consulted over the creation of a new train of artillery and the 
supplying of sufficient arms for both the veteran regiments and the colonials.  Such 
preparations were noticed, especially with the withdrawal of the regiments from 
Flanders.  Huge quantities of new uniforms and equipment could not be masked from 
public curiosity either. 
Provisions were limited, on the orders of St John, to last three months in order 
to deflect suspicion away from a possible American expedition to one in Iberia.  This 
was a clever ploy as resources earmarked for the previous Quebec expeditions had 
been diverted to the latter theatre.  Also, the near-capitulation of the allies in the 
Peninsula during 1710 would indicate the need to reverse the defeats there.  St John‘s 
covert strategy compelled the expedition to take on additional provisions at Boston – 
delaying the expedition for an unreasonable amount of time.  To prepare the colonies, 
Nicholson had to cross the Atlantic before Rear-Admiral Walker and organise not 
only the stockpiling of victuals at Boston, but also the raising of the colonial militia.  
It was essential that the colonies began preparations as soon as possible.   
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St John‘s clandestine behaviour meant he was unable to make use of expert 
advice in his planning, and the execution of his project would take much longer given 
the need to resupply at Boston, when the expedition‘s objectives would become 
obvious to the Canadians.  Needless to say, such actions jeopardised the successful 
outcome of the expedition.   
 
I: Initial Preparations 
St John was solely in control of planning the expedition, although he was not such an 
unlikely character for this role as he had acquired great experience in the handling of 
armies in his role as secretary at war earlier in Anne‘s reign.4  He may have initiated 
preparations as early as December 1710 when he requested a summary of the state of 
the naval vessels
5
 and the foot regiments,
6
 and alerted the Admiralty that they should 
advise the Victualling Commissioners that ‗a larger quantity of victuals than has 
usually been provided‘ would soon be required and that the current seasonal produce 
should therefore be acquired without delay.
7
   
The Admiralty and Victualling Office needed further clarification.  St John 
only expanded with an opaque answer: ‗considerable embarkation of troops may in all 
probability be required for the service of the ensuing year, so that a larger quantity of 
victuals than is necessary for the 40,000 men, voted by Parliament ought to be 
provided‘.8  The details of what victuals needed ordering was deferred to them, 
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despite St John revealing no clue to the purpose or strength of these additional 
soldiers.  A further letter from the Admiralty ‗desiring to have a more particular 
information of the quantity of provisions which will be necessary‘ was met by a hazy 
and uncommitted reply two weeks later in January.  St John explained ‗that for many 
reasons it is as yet impossible to ascertain the exact number of men that will be made 
use of for Her Majesty‘s service‘.9    It was apparent that St John only had an aim and 
had yet to work out the detail.  Nevertheless, there were difficulties in securing such a 
quantity of victuals because the ‗flesh is very far advanced…especially pork‘.10 
Finally, after listing his excuses for his lack of clarity, St John gave an indication as to 
what the Admiralty should be planning for.  He estimated that there would have to be 
enough supplies for at least 5,000 men at six (later three) months‘ full allowance.  St 
John also alluded to a figure of 1,800 men for two months already given to the 
Admiralty, to be included in addition to the 5,000.
11
  This must refer to the colonial 
forces to be raised.  Considering the timing, the numbers involved and St John‘s 
evasive tone in his letters, this exchange was clearly in preparation for the Quebec 
expedition.  
 Another clue to St John‘s early preparations occurred when he invited 
Admiralty Secretary Josiah Burchett and Commissioner of the Transports Thomas 
Coleby to visit his house on German Street, at separate times, on 31 December 1710.  
This was all rather unusual, and no detail is laid out in the letter; however, they were 
two key intermediaries in the planning phase of the Quebec operation.
12
  Although it 
can be assumed that they aided St John in determining what would be required in 
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terms of naval support and transports at these meetings, it is almost certain that they 
were unaware of the expedition‘s destination. 
 
II: The Train of Artillery 
The specifics of organising the expedition began at the Board of Ordnance.  The effect 
of the expedition‘s artillery would have been significant in determining the outcome 
of an attack on a Quebec bristling with approximately seventy cannon.  The Board‘s 
correspondence about the expedition is indicative of the negative effects the secrecy 
caused as its officers were unaware of its purpose or destination.  These letters also 
demonstrate the haste in the planning and organisation of the equipment necessary to 
mount a siege.  The Duke of Marlborough was master-general of the ordnance, but 
much of the work done in his name was actually carried out by the principal officers 
of the Board.  These had a wealth of experience behind them and were responsible for 
all materials of war, including artillery, engineers, barracks, the manufacture of arms 
and the transport of its equipment.
13
 
Colonel King was doubtless the right man to take charge of the expedition‘s 
train.  He had already demonstrated that he understood the intricacies of siege 
warfare, knowing how to supply, engineer and conduct a siege.  He had enough 
experience in large-scale continental warfare to enable him to confidently command 
expeditionary artillery.  The only thing which he presumably did not have any 
experience of was bomb ketches.  Coordinating his artillery with these vessels would 
certainly give him more options at Quebec.  It is not clear whether he knew of his 
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mission before he sailed; he was appointed to command the train on 1 March – the 
same day that General Hill was made commander in chief.
14
 
  With an enormous amount of stores necessary to field an artillery train and to 
equip thousands of soldiers, the planning stage had to begin months in advance.  St 
John started only in January 1711, ordering 2,000 muskets, each with 500 rounds of 
ammunition, which were to be placed in storeships on the Thames.
15
  This was the 
first recorded example of direct preparations for the expedition.
16
  These muskets 
were intended to equip the colonial forces and were to be transported across the 
Atlantic with Nicholson on his mission to mobilise the colonies. 
The Earl of Dartmouth initially assisted in the preparations in his capacity as 
secretary of state for the southern department, his involvement possibly emanating 
from the fact that, strictly speaking, he should have possessed political control of 
colonial operations.
17
  Dartmouth began preparing the train in January 1711 by 
demanding the provision of twelve twenty-four-pounder cannon; eight twelve-
pounder cannon; 1,000 rounds of shot; three bomb ketches; 5,000 hand-grenades and 
harness for 500 men.  He added: ‗together with a suitable number of officers and 
whatever else your Grace shall judge proper for such a train
‘
.
18
  Evidently, the Board 
was asked for its opinion on the composition of a train of artillery without knowing all 
of the facts surrounding the expedition.  Furthermore, it is possible that the number of 
cannon ordered was an entirely arbitrary figure, unless King had been consulted.  One 
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version of Canada Survey‟d gave no indication of what artillery support may suffice, 
bar two bomb vessels, yet another stated the need for thirty cannon and three 
ketches.
19
  The artillery pieces and their stores were expected to be available by the 
end of February, leaving just over a month for them to be organised.   
Dartmouth also asked the Ordnance Board to provide three bomb ketches.  
These were, of course, naval vessels and the Board had no authority to provide them.  
Naval vessels came within the Admiralty‘s jurisdiction, but confusion may lie in the 
fact that the Ordnance was responsible for naval mortars and cannon.
20
  Dartmouth‘s 
mistake was duly pointed out to him
21
 and he rectified his error the same day, sending 
his request to the Admiralty.
22
  The Ordnance, nevertheless, had to liaise with the 
Admiralty regarding the provision of their mortars.
23
  The Basilisk bomb ketch was 
immediately made ready, but the Admiralty noted that out of the three in home 
waters, the other two bomb vessels were in a state of disrepair.
24
  A month after being 
ordered, the requirement for bomb vessels was reduced to two.
25
  St John instead 
ordered four land mortars in place of the third ketch.
26
  His reasons were unspecified 
but the lack of availability due to poor seaworthiness can only be compounded by the 
fact that there were relatively few of these vessels surviving in the navy at this time.  
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St John also wanted ‗four of the smallest brass-field-pieces‘ and twenty coehorn 
mortars, but it is not known if they were ever delivered.
27
 
After compiling a list of possible stores for King‘s train, the Board‘s ignorance 
of the expedition‘s purpose was exposed when they referred the matter to 
Marlborough.  The letter they sent concluded by admitting that they were unaware as 
to the purpose these stores were required for:  
 
We being perfect strangers to the nature of the service intended, may…have omitted 
particulars very necessary, and may have inserted other species not so proper, but, that we 
submit to the judgement of these who are acquainted with the design…they may be of 
opinion, that the charge of some of the officers, as well as of the stores, and, freight, may be 
saved…All which is nevertheless humbly submitted to your Grace‘s better judgement.28 
 
This clearly illustrates the folly of the secrecy enveloping the preparations, where the 
organisers had to guess what the expedition might need without knowing the 
necessary details.   
In response to Dartmouth‘s request for cannon and equipment, the Board drew 
up an exhaustive inventory with estimated costs amounting to over £26,000, including 
transport, freight, salaries and the bomb vessels.  With such huge costs, the Board 
became wary as this was ‗considerable a sum of money, for which at present nothing 
is given by Parliament‘.  This unorthodox method of organising the train caused the 
Board to ask Marlborough to intercede with the Queen in order to secure the 
necessary funds.
29
  The money may have been easily found as the Master-General of 
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the Ordnance was uniquely allowed to spend money not allocated by Parliament, in 
the case of emergencies and other unforeseen circumstances.
30
  Even so, Marlborough 
was clearly powerless to hinder these preparations in the new political climate in 
which he found himself. 
The twenty cannon were also prepared for close-quarters combat as each gun 
was allocated ten rounds of ‗tin cases filled with musket shot‘.  The artillery pieces 
were not listed in the expenses estimates for the train, presumably as they were on 
loan and were expected to be returned after the completion of the expedition.  
However, if successful, the cannon may have been needed to defend Quebec from a 
counter-assault if the French guns had been spiked.  In addition to this material, 106 
soldiers of the Ordnance were allocated to man King‘s train.31   
The Ordnance records evidently show that they had expert officers, along with 
an able administrative staff to keep track of their varied and expensive equipment.  
Despite lacking the knowledge of the expedition‘s objectives, the office compiled a 
list of stores, the number of officers and men to attend and even the names of those 
officers appointed, only four days after receiving Dartmouth‘s original letter.  The 
expedition‘s expenses were already beginning to accumulate as Commissary Hawys, 
the train‘s paymaster, was ordered to commence paying the chosen officers from 1 
February.
32
     
To comply with his desire to send a professional force, a particular engineer 
had been specifically requested by St John.  Captain de Bauff of Hartop‘s Walloon 
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regiment was offered a ‗handsome reward‘ if he would attend the expedition.33  The 
reason for poaching a foreigner may be explained by the fact that the British often did 
not possess sufficient knowledge or expertise in siegecraft and often relied upon 
Dutch engineers.
34
  St John was ultimately disappointed, as he could ‗hardly believe 
[de Bauff‘s]…circumstances to be so good as to incline him to refuse going‘.35  De 
Bauff‘s reputation must have been exceptional as St John then implored the Earl of 
Orrery
36
 to make a bargain with him.  George Vane and James Moore were sent as 
engineers in his place, under King.
37
 
St John took complete control of the coordination of the artillery supplies in 
February during Dartmouth‘s ‗indisposition‘.  It is to be suspected that this may be 
due to the beginning of St John‘s rift with Harley and his creation of a new faction in 
Parliament to which Dartmouth was opposed.  St John immediately requested that the 
Board provide further stores for the train including extra grenades, 1,000 muskets and 
four petards – clearly with the intention of dealing with gates and fortifications.38  
Various adjustments were consequently made to the Ordnance‘s accounts for these 
extra stores.  They reported back that this caused a significant increase in costs of 
thirty and thirty-five per cent for the stores and pay of extra officers respectively, and 
appealed to Marlborough to ask the Treasury to provide the funds for these stores.
39
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The Northern Secretary also informed Marlborough that King had ‗proposed some 
small alterations to be made in the list of officers and attendants for the train‘.  As 
master-general, Marlborough had complete control over appointments in the 
Ordnance, but the Tory principles of St John and King may have found some Whig 
officers objectionable.  It can also be inferred that King may have been privy to the 
details of the expedition at this point.  This item of correspondence also announced 
that only three months‘ provisions should be placed on board the vessels for the 
members of the train, which necessitated the acquisition of further stores at Boston.
40
   
The Commissioners of Victualling were ordered in mid-February to provide 
those three months‘ provisions for the men of the train.41  St John‘s lack of 
organisational knowledge may have been exposed when he had originally informed 
the Ordnance that three months‘ provisions would be required for their men – 
something which their department had no influence over.  Defending himself, St John 
stated ‗I was very far from being ignorant that it was not in your province to furnish 
the said provisions, but thought…to let you know‘.42  This was hardly considerate of 
him, as the Board was still oblivious of the purpose of its men and materiel.  
However, this does not necessarily imply that St John was ignorant – it may have 
been a clumsy effort to disseminate disinformation, the Board thus being allowed to 
guess that his expedition would be heading for Mediterranean waters. 
The officers of the Board worked as swiftly as promised with all of the 
demands placed upon them and reported on 24
 February that ‗we have lost no time in 
putting aboard transport ships a train of artillery, with stores, for an intended 
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expedition, which we hope will be ready by the latter end of the next week‘.43  They 
were therefore able to meet their 1 March deadline.  For reasons unknown, St John 
declared that items previously ordered, including ‗the spades, shovels, 
pickaxes…need not be provided‘.44  This was unusual, as St John asked a fortnight 
later to be quickly provided with an almost identical list: ‗the iron-work of 1,500 pick-
axes, 2,000 spades, 2,500 shovels, 1,000 bill hooks ready fitted‘, indicating a lack of 
control over part of the ordering process.
45
 
Difficulties in recruiting were encountered as the only other aspect of the train 
that was not predicted to be ready by 1 March was the requirement for forty matrosses 
(gunners‘ assistants).46  The Board suggested they could be taken from regiments that 
were to remain in England, ‗which will be an advantage and encouragement to the 
said men, the pay being twelve pence per diem‘.47  Eight transports were allocated to 
convey the train to North America.
48
  The five vessels carrying the stores and 
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ammunition were ready to sail on 2 March and only required an escort before their 
departure from the Thames to the rendezvous at Spithead.
49
   
Little difficulty, therefore, was encountered by the Ordnance in organising this 
train, bar a shortfall in relatively unskilled manpower.  It had taken a little under two 
months to meet St John‘s demands.  The armies of Europe still had a number of 
months left in winter quarters, so the Board may have been able to concentrate 
effectively on this task and all was prepared a month before Rear-Admiral Walker‘s 
installation as commander.  The train under Colonel King appears to have been a very 
effective and competent force.
50
  St John‘s insistence that they be provided with only 
three months‘ provisions let down its efficient mobilisation.  Nevertheless, the speed 
and efficiency with which the Ordnance responded to both Dartmouth‘s and St John‘s 
demands, despite their ignorance as to their purpose, was impressive.  Unfortunately, 
chaotic organisation elsewhere would ultimately render the Board‘s 1 March deadline 
irrelevant. 
 
III: Nicholson’s Dispatch 
It was imperative that Nicholson quickly arrived in North America to begin 
preparations there, but the colonies also needed a supply of arms.  James Blake was a 
London merchant who had been personally contracted by St John to provide supplies 
for the expedition.  On 5 January an order was signed for various arms, accoutrements 
and clothing amounting to almost £3,000 in value.  These goods were to complement 
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the 2,000 muskets provided by the Ordnance – St John‘s initial preparation described 
earlier.
51
  The equipment provided by both the Ordnance and Blake for Nicholson 
were evenly divided and loaded onto the transports, Joseph and Neptune, in early 
February.
52
  St John again shared little information with the Commissioners of 
Transports.  He told them simply that the transports were required ‗for the greater 
security and better performance of the service‘ and should be readied immediately so 
that they could be convoyed to Portsmouth.
53
  Nicholson needed to sail to raise the 
colonial militia and procure extra supplies far in advance of Walker‘s arrival.  The 
vastness of the American colonies meant that this would take a long time once he was 
there. 
Admiralty assistance was needed to convoy these important stores across the 
Atlantic.  The tasking of two frigates
54
  to escort the transports, initially to 
Portsmouth, met with delay that could not be afforded, as it was imperative that 
Nicholson transmitted the Queen‘s orders to begin preparations to the unwitting 
colonial governors.
55
  St John therefore pressed for the two frigates to be readied 
without delay and demanded constant updates on their progress.
56
  The transports and 
their escorts were scheduled to have departed in January with three months‘ victuals.57  
However, only one frigate was available as most were needed to escort Marlborough 
who was setting out to the continent for his final campaign.
58
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Whilst maintaining secrecy around his plans, St John was not very clear about 
his requirements for the escorts.  So that the Lords of the Admiralty could give orders 
to the two frigates ‗with more clearness‘, they were informed that two transports59  
with stores were to be convoyed by the Sapphire to Portsmouth, where they would be 
joined by the Leopard for their onward voyage.  St John further informed the 
Admiralty that they were to comply with Coleby‘s directions as to the furnishing of 
the frigates.
60
  The extent of control that St John had over the expedition was absolute, 
and allowed him to bully various institutions without being held accountable to 
Parliament.  Bypassing the Admiralty, he demanded a direct interview with Captain 
Cook, of the Leopard.
61
  The ships were ready to receive the ordnance stores on 18 
January
62
 and Coleby was informed that he should immediately begin loading, 
although additional stores had yet to be delivered.
63
 
The secrecy of this mission extended to Captains Cockburn and Cook, of the 
Sapphire and Leopard frigates respectively, assigned to convoy Nicholson and the 
transports.  They were instructed to open their orders only once they had passed forty 
degrees of latitude.
64
  St John‘s deception was again evident, as this parallel runs from 
New York to the middle of the Iberian Peninsula, thus prolonging uncertainty as to 
their destination and implying a southern European objective.  As these vessels were 
to accompany Nicholson and the instructions for the colonial governors for the 
preparing of the colonies for the expedition (to be thrown overboard if met by an 
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enemy ship), all haste was required.
65
  St John communicated his worries, and also his 
optimism, to Nicholson, saying that: 
 
very many people guess the true intention of the preparations…the dispatching you away, give 
but too good grounds for busy and inquisitive people to dive into the secret…we shall find [a] 
way of beating them off from the true scent… [by] making them believe that the arms, stores 
and sergeants sent with you, are the whole assistance designed this year for North America, 
and that consequently the second embarkation is destined to another part.
66
   
 
This was logical enough, but if this was the case, then hiding their destination to the 
escorting frigate captains was unnecessary.  
However, the Leopard lacked sufficient quantities of victuals as no bread or 
pork was available, so stores were scavenged from the holds of other ships.
67
  As late 
as March, the Sapphire had sprung a leak sailing from the Downs
68
 and St John 
hastily alerted Burchett to transfer its stores to another frigate to accompany 
Nicholson as soon as was possible.
69
  After harassing the Admiralty, and debating 
whether to put the stores onto the Mary Galley, it was decided, upon the advice of 
Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Whitaker, that it would be quicker to repair the Sapphire 
despite predicting that this would take at least ten days.
70
    It was now approaching 
mid-March and it was essential that Nicholson should sail immediately.  Of course the 
delay with the Sapphire could not be helped, although St John was very agitated as it 
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became increasingly likely that Nicholson would not arrive in North America much 
before Walker.  He wrongly predicted on 15 March that the main force would sail in 
only three weeks, whilst Nicholson was still awaiting his vessels at Portsmouth, 
though again St John reiterated his optimism regarding his security precautions, 
hoping that people would guess the destination of the main force as being France or 
Spain.
71
   
St John later alerted the Admiralty to the possibility of the fitting out of a 
French squadron to recover Annapolis Royal and suggested they hasten Nicholson so 
he could assist in preventing such an attack.
72
  This was a convenient ploy by the 
Secretary of State to deceive the Admiralty about his intentions for Nicholson and to 
take control over their assets in North American waters, as St John also requested 
details of shipping in North America that could be used for its defence.  He sent a 
letter to Nicholson on that very same day, but did not write about the danger to 
Annapolis Royal that he was so concerned about in his dealings with the Admiralty.  
Instead, St John told Nicholson that he should transfer some of Annapolis Royal‘s 
marines, mortars, stores and engineers from the fort so that they could be used on the 
expedition, and suggested they could be replaced by some colonial volunteers.
73
  This 
was obviously not the likely preparation for an attack by a French squadron.  The ploy 
was confirmed when St John later informed Walker ‗under the pretence of Nicholson, 
and defending Port Royal, some of the Newfoundland ships will join you‘.74  On 10 
April, the Admiralty placed the Newfoundland squadron under the orders of 
Nicholson and Dudley, for the ‗defence‘ of Port Royal.  This included the use of a 
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possible sixteen extra ships over a period of one year.
75
  Walker later received orders 
in June to this effect, enabling him to take command of any of the thirteen ships then 
located around North America that he might need.
76
   
Nicholson was clearly an integral part in organising the expedition, yet his 
own instructions for doing so were not issued until 21 February, under authority of his 
commission from the previous year to undertake the Port Royal expedition.
77
  
Harley‘s indisposition after his assassination attempt also impeded Nicholson as he 
was unable to receive payment of his bills.
78
  Nicholson had been ready to leave on 16 
March, but his sailing was hindered by the ongoing repairs to the Sapphire.
79
  
Although he eventually managed to leave Portsmouth, high westerly winds forced 
him into Plymouth.
80
  Nicholson finally departed around 7 April after enduring weeks 
of bad weather.
81
  He had been so delayed that St John ordered him to procure canoes 
for the Montreal expedition when he arrived in New England, rather than take the 
time to build them.
82
  St John had hoped that Nicholson would have already arrived in 
America before Nicholson‘s departure.  Many weeks had been wasted and the 
mobilisation of the colonies would be frantic.  A long delay at Boston was already 
inevitable.  The prospects for the expedition were not promising.  
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IV: Promotions 
The matrosses taken from foot regiments stationed in Britain were not the only 
soldiers to be given an incentive to join the expedition.  Nicholson‘s convoy carried 
another important cargo: ‗thirty men‘.  These soldiers were even more lavishly 
rewarded for their services to the expedition.  Due to St John‘s obsessive and vain 
desire to keep the whole expedition secret, he had to decide, with little specific advice, 
what the force should consist of.  He had an obvious desire for a successful outcome 
and therefore St John wanted the very best.  Of course, in an age of patronage, 
General Hill was appointed for the expedition to proceed with the Queen‘s authority 
and other officers were sympathetic to the Tories.  Nevertheless, St John identified the 
need for competency for it to succeed, even if he was overly hasty and secretive in his 
planning.  That is why he demanded five veteran regiments from Flanders to embark 
upon the expedition and was unconcerned if it served to weaken Marlborough‘s army. 
The Royal Navy was already largely meritocratic.  The ability to sail a vastly 
expensive, state-owned vessel required skill and talent that was not necessarily 
prevalent amongst the upper echelons of society in the required quantity.
83
  
Conversely, in the British Army an officer‘s rank depended on how much money he 
was willing to pay for it, for promotion was based on a system of purchase.  As 
regiments were mostly the property of their respective colonels, then the state risked 
less in losing a regiment of despised soldiers, as opposed to a ship that represented the 
fine ‗wooden walls‘ of England.  The Army provided rich young men with 
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opportunity and advancement, as ability and talent were not necessary prerequisites 
for obtaining the Queen‘s commission.   
This is what makes the Quebec expedition so unique.  Although it was 
unfortunate that it was not able to prove itself, the force sent was surprisingly capable, 
in part due to a specific request made by St John.  He knew that at a distant 3,000 
miles from home, Quebec would prove to be an unpopular posting for many officers 
who had heard about the harsh climate and living conditions; of Indians, who gloried 
in bloodthirsty scalping; and of penetrating winters and fearsome diseases.  Postings 
to the West Indies, and even to the Iberian Peninsula, often saw many absentee 
officers remain at home.  St John suspected that a ‗secret expedition‘ would likewise 
deter many officers when they were unaware of where they would end up.  This fear 
was illustrated by St John‘s desire, already described, to recruit Captain de Bauff, the 
talented engineer who was offered great rewards if he were to sail with the expedition.  
Through St John‘s instigation, the Earl of Orrery‘s harassment of de Bauff caused him 
to eventually decline the appointment.  St John later rebuked Orrery: ‗I wish your 
lordship did not frighten him by naming the West Indies to him‘.84  North America 
was tainted by the reputation of the West Indies as Europeans generally regarded the 
two as one geographical area.
85
  It represented an unpopular posting to many land 
officers who, given the choice, would opt to remain in Europe and face the dangers of 
warfare there, rather than serve in an alien, uncivilised and disease-ridden 
environment. 
Already many officers were absent from their regiments in the field, especially 
as many were also members of Parliament, or simply rich and enjoying the profits that 
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a regiment presented in government contracts.
86
  In order to ensure that he had 
experience on his side, St John, in what was almost certainly an unprecedented move, 
promoted thirty men from the ranks at a stroke.  All had been sergeants and were 
promoted to lieutenant, albeit on ensign‘s pay.  Secrecy prevailed in these promotions 
as their purpose was stated as being for ‗a particular service abroad‘ and the reason for 
their commissions was simply explained ‗for their encouragement‘.87 
Promotion from the ranks had previously occurred in the New Model Army 
for bravery.  This practise ceased upon the Restoration and was unknown until the 
outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, because of the unprecedented 
commitment of manpower to a European conflict.
88
  To commission a sergeant in the 
field to urgently fill a vacancy may have been relatively common during the 
eighteenth century, but to promote thirty men at the same time was quite unusual.
89
  
To put this in perspective, during the nine years of the War of the Austrian Succession 
(1740-1748), 200 sergeants became officers and perhaps as many again were 
promoted during the Seven Years War.
90
  Although such promotions were fairly 
common during wartime, and certainly rare during peacetime, it was generally utilised 
in the necessary and essential task of filling vacancies that were created through 
combat and disease.
91
  Whilst the Spanish Succession War was no exception, the fact 
that thirty were promoted in one instance, to serve together on a particular task, was 
certainly unique.  Indeed, during the Seven Years War there may have been four non-
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commissioned officers at most who had been simultaneously commissioned into any 
one regiment.
92
  During the wars of the mid-century, many regiments had a small 
number of ex-sergeant subalterns, but they were generally appointed on an individual 
basis and were much valued for their wealth of experience, along with their 
familiarity with discipline and training.  These ex-sergeants were typically older in 
years and would have given at least fifteen years of service before rising to the officer 
class.
93
  
Thirty was a significant number as that was enough to furnish three regiments 
of foot with their lieutenants, as a regiment generally had around ten to twelve 
companies, each having one lieutenant and one ensign.  At the peak of the war there 
were only seventy-two foot regiments, illustrating the relative scale of this measure.
94
   
It was even more remarkable when it is considered that most of these regiments would 
not have been at full strength.  This mass promotion was an exceptional occurrence 
when compared to later wars, when there were perhaps three rankers on average in a 
regiment and six in an exceptional one, all of whom were only promoted when there 
was a vacancy that could not be filled by the purchase system.
95
  The thirty therefore 
represent just over four per cent of the established figure for foot lieutenants.  Of 
course, they were a special case and did not go on to serve with a regular established 
regiment.  Instead, they were specially selected to join the expedition and were more 
akin to an expert, hand-picked group to serve on one of the first special operations of 
the eighteenth century. 
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St John originally enquired about these sergeants on 5 January, with the War 
Office and from ‗officers [who] will give a good recommendation‘.96  In response, 
thirty commanding officers gave recommendations for thirty-seven sergeants.
97
  They 
were put on the establishment from 1 January (despite Nicholson not sailing until 
April, although it was assumed that his departure was imminent) to 22 December 
1711 on ensigns‘ pay.98  That is one shilling a day less than a lieutenant would 
receive, effectively making them brevet lieutenants under the British establishment.  
Nevertheless, their ensigns‘ pay was double that to which they were accustomed as 
sergeants.
99
  However, they were not entirely neglected in this respect as the 
remainder of their full lieutenant‘s pay was to be paid by the colonies.100  Such a 
significant rise in pay may have been an attractive proposition for a veteran sergeant 
of the Flanders theatre.  When the sergeants were added to the establishment list they 
were described as ‗thirty sergeants of our army whose experience in military affairs 
hath inclined us to employ them in our service on the foot of ensigns pay‘.101  
Although this warrant was made and the sergeants put on the establishment, given 
their covert nature Parliament did not have the opportunity to approve it.
102
   
St John delegated the appointment of the sergeants to Secretary at War George 
Granville.
103
  The names of the initial thirty, a task given to Lieutenant-General Erle 
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of the Ordnance,
104
 were drawn up by late January.
105
  St John ordered two months‘ 
pay to be withdrawn from the Treasury and to embark the newly promoted lieutenants 
on the two transports, along with the supplies for the colonies.
106
  The lieutenants, 
many of whom were in Flanders, were quickly assembled and were expected to 
embark on 1 February, but their transports were delayed.  These vessels could not 
escape the Nore (the mouth of the Thames) during the first week of February as they 
had been beaten back by contrary winds.
107
  St John became very agitated as he 
expected the lieutenants to have arrived at Portsmouth by mid-February, but had 
instead heard nothing of their progress. The fact that St John wrote at least nine letters 
on this subject, in such a short space of time, is indicative of the importance placed by 
him on the need to have these men, along with Nicholson and the arms, sent to the 
colonies.
108
 
One of the transports allocated did not meet with expectations.  The 
lieutenants on the Neptune complained of the lack of ‗conveniences‘ on board, 
compared with the Joseph.  A further delay was encountered in early February when 
the transports were waiting to depart as three lieutenants had yet to embark.
109
  It 
transpired that two of them declined to serve, although after taking their commissions 
and their advance money – the two months‘ pay withdrawn from the Treasury.  
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Replacements were immediately sought.
110
  Despite vast increases in pay and 
authority, they were probably wary as to the intentions of their masters, or felt 
uncomfortable crossing the huge social divide that would have separated them from 
their comrades.  Both came well recommended.  The first sergeant, John Parrot, was 
suggested by Lieutenant-General Farrington, and Sergeant John Mackullough was 
proposed by Colonel Pocock.  For the remaining twenty-eight, such an attractive 
proposition probably compelled them to serve.  
Often during the army‘s history many rankers asked to be returned to the ranks 
because of the prejudicial nature of the purchase system and the lack of acceptance 
due to the prevalence of class distinctions.
111
  Fortunately, this probably would not 
have been the case in 1711, owing to the promotions occurring on such a large scale 
and without the arrogant officer-class mentality taking root in the colonies.  Indeed, 
there were soon replacements for Sergeants Parrot and Mackullogh, as an Alexander 
Balackhal and Andrew Nickel filled their places almost immediately.  The Earl of 
Orkney and Lord Hartford had sent for them from Flanders.  One letter referred to 
Blackhal and Nickel as ‗the two new lieutenants‘, whilst their predecessors were 
simply called ‗the other two‘.  Parrot and Mackullough‘s old colonels had been 
‗acquainted…with Her Majesties pleasure concerning them‘, perhaps indicating that 
the Secretary at War was not pleased by their refusals.
112
  They were most likely sent 
back to their respective regiments as Granville had written on the same day to their 
colonels to say that the Queen ‗expects that the money, which was advanced to [them] 
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be forthwith repaid into the Pay office and that the [men] should be produced‘.113  
This was transmitted by St John to Granville, who also mentioned that Blackhall and 
Nickel had received their commissions on that afternoon and were ready to set out for 
Portsmouth.
114
  The two new lieutenants were ready on 10 March to embark at 
Portsmouth, however, Nicholson‘s convoy was ordered to St Helens instead.  The 
escorting Leopard frigate was tasked to transfer them.
115
  Thomas Cook from the 1
st
 
Foot Guards was excused from service as he had to give evidence for a military case 
before the House of Commons.
116
  St John, before knowing the facts, initially wanted 
him convicted as a deserter.
117
  He was replaced, as were three others for reasons 
unknown.
118
 
The final thirty new lieutenants eventually sailed across the Atlantic with 
Nicholson.  No other British regulars for the expedition were posted at their 
destination in New York and they were clearly not intended to accompany any of the 
regiments to Quebec.  Instead, they were to be attached to the overland expedition to 
Montreal and provide the colonials with their military discipline, experience and 
leadership.  If the expedition had continued as planned, then perhaps this would have 
been the perfect marriage between the resilient colonials, who knew the country and 
did not possess the old world bigotry of the English officer class, and the new 
lieutenants, who had many years experience of warfare and proven combat skills 
without the arrogance of a privileged social background.  As this was their mission, it 
can be seen why many established officers would not be keen on such employment, 
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having to march with provincials and Indians over hundreds of miles of wilderness 
and difficult terrain, through disease-infested swamp and marshlands.  The 
lieutenants‘ purpose was confirmed in the official instructions to Governor Robert 
Hunter of New York, which Nicholson was entrusted with delivering.  With respect to 
the second article of these orders, concerning the raising of 2,000 colonial militiamen 
for the Montreal expedition, it stated that the thirty lieutenants were to be placed in 
this ‗corps‘.119  Drawing pay from both Britain and New York must have caused 
considerable confusion.
120
  Hunter‘s precise instructions are further evidence of the 
extent to which St John had control over the expedition, despite not accompanying it. 
The lieutenants, the stores from Blake and the Ordnance, and the governors‘ 
orders eventually arrived at New York in compliance with Nicholson‘s orders.121  
Again, the Victualling Board was asked to supply the lieutenants with only three 
months‘ provisions.122  This was of little consequence as that quantity of supplies 
would be sufficient to cross the Atlantic (however, St John initially asked for only two 
months‘ provisions which would have left little contingency in an emergency)123 and 
it was no secret that Nicholson was heading for America, especially as he now had 
official cover in the form of defending Annapolis Royal.   
What eventually happened to most of these rankers is unknown.  What is 
certain is that twenty-eight of the thirty were still at New York in December 1712, 
fourteen months after their comrades in Walker‘s fleet had returned to England.  As 
for the missing two, Lieutenant Selwyn was paid until October 1711, whilst 
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Lieutenant Corbet continued to draw pay until April 1712, with disease or desertion 
being the most likely culprits for their disappearance.  There are documents claiming 
that the lieutenants had been paid too much at New York and so the difference came 
out of their half-pay, which most of them were drawing in 1713.  Governor Hunter 
sent a letter as late as June 1715 concerning problems with bills associated with 
them.
124
  He mentioned that some money had been paid directly to their wives in 
England instead.  These problems must undoubtedly have arisen from the confusing 
situation of drawing pay from two treasuries 3,000 miles apart.  At least four of the 
lieutenants were leading independent companies in the colonies well after the war had 
ended.  One had even managed to further his career, as Martin Groundman became a 
captain in a marine regiment and was later governor of Cowes Castle on the Isle of 
Wight.
125
  The details of the conclusion of this episode are for the most part sketchy, 
however, as all trace of the majority of these lieutenants disappears from the historical 
record.  One wonders if Sergeants Parrot and Mackullogh were actually more 
contented by refusing to serve as officers in the colonies, considering most of their 
colleagues may have been abandoned overseas. 
The expedition nevertheless served to demonstrate that social mobility within 
the early British Army was more fluid than is widely imagined.  St John, as the 
primary military coordinator, identified the need for experience and competence that 
could not be willingly provided by incumbent officers in sufficient numbers, in what 
was considered an unpopular posting.  The promotion of sergeants would continue 
despite the purchase system.  However, most of these new officers could not hope for 
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further promotion because of their social background.
126
  Unfortunately, the thirty 
lieutenants mobilised for the attack on Montreal were unable to prove their worth in 
combat.  Nevertheless, a precedent had been set that would see future regiments 
benefit from the practical value that many of these rankers could offer. 
 
V: The Foot Regiments 
Despite St John‘s urgency, the various regiments destined for the Americas were not 
assembled until April 1711.  Secretary at War Granville had been delegated the task 
of tackling the minutiae of detail associated with assembling the regular regiments 
assigned to make up the bulk of the land forces under Hill.  Communications, it must 
be remembered, were as fast as a letter could be delivered – it could take up to two 
days in London to receive a reply from Portsmouth, but when contacting the continent 
the formidable barriers of the English Channel and the North Sea meant that it would 
take at least a week to receive a response.  Catering for such logistics was therefore a 
difficult task, especially as the regiments were not all together in one place.  Three 
were stationed at disparate locations around Britain.  These were Disney‘s, Kirk‘s and 
Seymour‘s regiments.  A further five were located in Flanders – part of 
Marlborough‘s army for his final campaign.   
Marlborough was powerless to prevent their use.  Only occasionally was he 
informed of the proceedings at the War Office with respect to the requisitioning of 
these regiments.
127
  It can only have been frustrating for Marlborough to be deprived 
of a sizeable element of his force, especially as they were withdrawn from the 
continent as late as April, just as his own operations were commencing.  St John‘s lax 
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organisation had not even managed to collect the English-based regiments at the 
Portsmouth rendezvous by this time.  Even though he had requested a summary of 
regimental strengths in the final days of 1710, in order to recruit sufficient numbers to 
make up the battalions, these months were seemingly wasted.
128
   
A great deal of effort was needed to assemble the regiments and load them on 
transports with their provisions.  Those in England had to march from all parts of the 
country.  Whilst Seymour‘s regiment had a relatively short march from Plymouth to 
Portsmouth, Kirk‘s and Disney‘s faced a much longer journey, marching from the far 
north of the country to the Thames to be transported onwards by sea.  Kirk‘s had 
received orders in January to march ‗out of the north southwards‘.129  On 3 March it 
was at Leicester when Kirk was ordered to proceed with haste to Ware, before 
receiving further orders to head for Tilbury fort where the regiment would embark on 
transports.
130
  Both Seymour‘s and Kirk‘s required advanced subsistence money to 
accomplish their marches pursuant to their orders.
131
   
Six companies of Seymour‘s regiment were still on the march in mid-
February,
132
 two of which were then ordered onwards to the Isle of Wight
133
 to 
perform various garrison duties before embarking on the transports.
134
  There was no 
rush to load these troops, as it would take several weeks before the other regiments, 
along with sufficient stores, rendezvoused at Portsmouth for embarkation.  
Furthermore, the health and morale of embarked soldiers soon dissipates and would 
often be accompanied by outbreaks of sickness.  Boarding was therefore often 
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conducted as late as possible.
135
  Meanwhile, new recruits for some regiments were 
ordered into the barracks at the Tower of London, rather than being quartered aboard 
the waiting transports.
136
  It was likely they were being prepared to go to Quebec as 
Granville ‗detained‘ a hospital ship on the Thames until it took on some new recruits 
and other stores, before it set sail for Portsmouth.
137
   
Hill‘s, Clayton‘s, Kane‘s, Kirk‘s and Seymour‘s were identified for service on 
the expedition fairly early, or at least before Grant‘s, Windress‘ and Disney‘s.  On 10 
March, Hill‘s, Clayton‘s and Kane‘s were mentioned in the War Office records 
because the commanders wanted forage and wagon money owed to them, which 
would be paid upon their return to England.  This letter stated that they were intended 
to be employed on ‗service elsewhere‘.  However, as Granville‘s letter also stated that 
these regiments were due to serve ‗in company with two more [regiments] to be 
brought from Flanders‘, implies, as was the case, that another two regiments had not 
been identified by this time.
138
  St John‘s letter to Marlborough three days later 
indicated the Queen‘s ‗desire…that two other battalions might be ordered, whose 
colonels had not so high a rank as Mr Hill, of which there are several in your Grace‘s 
army‘.  Brigadiers Hamilton and Sutton were colonels of the other two regiments 
mischievously allocated by Marlborough to join the expedition.  St John took matters 
into his own hands and forcefully informed Marlborough in a letter of 13 March that, 
besides Hill‘s, Clayton‘s and Kane‘s, the regiments of Grant and Windress were to be 
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quickly made ready for the expedition.
139
  As these last two regiments had been 
identified, they were told to abandon their horses and return to England, whilst 
financial measures were taken to cater for their service under Hill.
140
   
Some of the expeditionary colonels were asked for an account of their 
absentee officers and when they could be expected to return to duty – ironically, 
Windress was already absent from his regiment which was in Flanders.
141
  A list was 
drawn up concerning them and sent to St John.
142
  Owing to slow communications, it 
was as late as 23 March that Kane arrived at The Hague with the order for the final 
regiments to be sent to England.  Marlborough had no option but to send Kane to 
Ghent to stop the march of various detachments of English regiments who were to 
garrison there, so that they could be speedily dispatched to Ostend for embarkation.  
Although he did not know which regiments would be taken, elements of Hill‘s, 
Clayton‘s, Kane‘s and Grant‘s regiments were included in this detachment.143  
Marlborough, left with a weakened garrison at Ghent, had not been privy to all of the 
details and discovered as late as 31 March, when St John‘s letter of the 13th arrived, 
which regiments he would lose.  It is evident he did not expect to lose Windress‘ and 
ordered for the regiment‘s detachments to amalgamate and march for Ostend with all 
haste.
144
 French intelligence was quite aware of the withdrawal of these regiments.
145
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In fact, much of the population of Britain also knew of their movements as, 
extraordinarily, these regiments were reported in the British Mercury as being 
intended for a ‗secret expedition‘.146  There was only so much St John could do to 
hide their true purpose. 
St John had passed on detailed instructions to Granville concerning how the 
force should be assembled, including what regiments were required; where they 
would embark; where their stores would be collated; the duties of Colonel Clayton to 
ensure that the transports were suitable; the embarkation of the stores and regiments 
on the Thames; Colonel Kane‘s role of overseeing the embarkation of the Flanders‘ 
regiments; and Colonel King‘s appointment, being responsible for all matters 
pertaining to the artillery.
147
  Kirk‘s regiment was at Tilbury upon the Thames as late 
as 18 March.  However, their distance from the rendezvous was insignificant 
compared to the companies of Disney‘s, whose march had originated in Berwick-
upon-Tweed and were that night camped near York.  They were ordered to march 
with all haste.
148
  Kirk‘s troops at Tilbury fort were then mustered before being 
embarked
149
 whilst recruits for the regiments remained lodged at the Tower.
150
  Legal 
issues had begun to cloud the preparations at this time, when Kempenfelt, 
commanding Seymour‘s, alerted Granville that some of his soldiers refused service 
abroad as they had completed their three years voluntary service in accordance with 
the law.
151
     
                                                 
146
 British Mercury, 28-30 March 1711, issue 159. 
147
 TNA, SP 44/213, St John to Granville, 13 March 1711. 
148
 TNA, SP 41/3/266 and WO 4/10, Granville to St John, 18 March 1711.  
149
 TNA, WO 4/10, Granville to Commissary General, 19 March 1711. 
150
 Ibid., Granville to Earl Rivers, 19 March 1711. 
151
 Ibid., Granville to Attorney General, 17 March 1711.  Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, pp. 113, 
115-117. 
 148
As Disney‘s, Kirk‘s and Seymour‘s were already on the march in Britain, it 
remained for the other five regiments in Flanders to begin to be organised.  They had 
been ordered to dispose of their horses and stores in mid-March.
152
  Granville 
consulted with Coleby about the readiness of transports for ‗4,200 men, 300 men and 
800 men‘.153  The 4,200 men in question were the five regiments in Flanders, plus 
Kirk‘s at Tilbury, the 300 were the new recruits at the Tower, and the 800 were 
Disney‘s regiment still in the north.154  Seymour‘s was not a worry as they did not 
require transport for their march from Plymouth.  Granville also began to process the 
pay and subsistence of these eight regiments.
155
   
Clayton had met with Granville and Coleby whilst in London where they 
discussed how to transport the Flanders regiments to Portsmouth.
156
  These five 
regiments would assemble at Ostend in transports able to carry 3,500 men.  Transports 
sufficient to carry 4,200 men were already lying in the Hope (in the Thames Estuary).  
To save time, it was determined that after embarking Kirk‘s regiment at Tilbury, they 
would sail to Ostend to pick up the Flanders regiments, under naval convoy.  The 300 
recruits,
157
 along with the transports for the ‗800 men‘, would await Disney‘s arrival 
on the Thames.  Coleby was wary about the state of provisions in several of the ships, 
however.  It was agreed that all of the transports would rendezvous at Spithead, where 
Seymour‘s could then embark, having already arrived at Portsmouth.  Granville‘s 
orders to the Commissioners of Transports were issued after the meeting, stating that 
Kane would direct the embarkation at Ostend, and Clayton likewise at Tilbury fort, as 
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stipulated in St John‘s instructions.158  Granville desired nothing financial should be 
wanting for the regiments, communicating this to the paymasters, Howe and Brydges, 
who were responsible for the regiments based in England and Flanders 
respectively.
159
 
The potential effectiveness of the expedition slowly waned with the 
progression of time.  On 27
 March the transports were still awaiting Disney‘s 
regiment and some clothing.
160
  On the same day, Hill was put on the pay of a 
commander in chief,
161
 and the recruits in the Tower embarked for Portsmouth, along 
with supplies, under the direction of Clayton.
162
  It was obvious by this point that it 
would be late April at the earliest before the fleet could reasonably be expected to sail.  
The Commissioners of Transports informed Granville that the transports set to take 
Disney to Portsmouth still required victualling, which would take place ‗Friday [30 
March] or Saturday [31] the soonest‘.  Once this was completed, they then had to sail 
to pick up the regiment and onto Portsmouth; whilst on 26 March the Ostend 
transports had yet to leave England.
163
   
After the petitions made by Granville for the advanced pay of the regiments, 
the Treasury had yet to acquiesce to these demands to honour the payments.  St John  
was aware of the ‗indispensable necessity‘ of ensuring that this was done, but then 
increased the sum asked for by £5,000-6,000 in specie to be placed aboard the fleet, as 
‗this has always been done when expeditions of this kind are ordered‘.164  This sum 
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would be needed to procure further supplies at Boston.  Granville forwarded this to 
the Treasury, adding the suggestion that a paymaster should be sent along with the 
expedition, a position which had not been included upon the expedition‘s 
establishment.
165
  Such an omission was a glaring failure on behalf of St John.  He 
continually pressed for the pay of these regiments to be arranged and had intended for 
this to have been resolved during the previous month of February.
166
  The lack of an 
appointed paymaster provides an example of the oversights caused by his organisation 
and the hasty manner in which these problems were supposedly solved.  In contrast, a 
paymaster was appointed to the train of artillery in January.
167
  The position of deputy 
paymaster was to be appointed by Hill himself.
168
  Hill and his staff officers had also 
requested a three months‘ advance on their pay, ‗to equip themselves for their 
voyage…as has been usual in the like cases‘.169  Offering the example of precedents 
as justification for requesting money may have caused much speculation about the 
expedition‘s destination amongst the British establishment. 
In any case, such was the rush to send the expedition on its way, that the debts 
held by Kirk‘s regiment were asked to be deferred.  The regiment had accumulated 
debts to the Ordnance for arms drawn whilst it was in Spain.
170
  Likewise, Disney‘s 
regiment held debts in similar circumstances due to the need to raise a new regiment 
after their losses at the battle of Almansa.
171
  Kirk‘s and Kane‘s regiments were 
similarly affected by the procrastinating Treasury, as the subsistence pay of some of 
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their soldiers was still owing due to some having been prisoners in France.
172
  This 
was despite St John‘s promise to Marlborough a month earlier that, ‗they [the 
regiments] shall not fail to have their subsistence advanced to them‘.173  However, it 
does appear that St John had only informed the Treasury almost three weeks later that 
advances were needed.
174
 
Escorts for all of the transports were sent to the Downs on 1 March, ready to 
convoy them to their respective destinations.
175
  Some of the warships had only been 
detailed to escort the transports to Spithead on 21 March.
176
  The Ostend escorts also 
received orders to convoy the remaining transports on this date.
177
  A few days later, 
some transports still had not sailed from the Thames, as stores had not yet arrived.
178
  
On 31 March, St John could wait no longer and ordered these transports to take on 
Disney‘s regiment, where they were waiting further down the Thames at the Nore.179  
Money, despite lacking proper authorisation by Parliament, did not seem to be an 
important obstacle for St John.  It was determined that those clothing stores that 
Disney‘s transports were awaiting would instead be sent by ‗land-carriage‘ to 
Portsmouth.
180
  Both convoys were delayed by contrary winds, but those sailing for 
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Ostend were further hampered by a lack of pilots.
181
  Whilst Portsmouth awaited the 
veterans from Flanders, some new recruits were assembling at the port to make up 
numbers in the regiments.  Three sergeants and forty recruits for Windress‘ regiment 
were expected in early April to march into the Portsmouth garrison and await the 
transports.
182
   
The poor weather having abated and pilots acquired, the transports had finally 
arrived at Ostend on 31 March.  They had sailed into harbour with the Milford frigate, 
the larger escorts anchoring outside the port.
183
  When the five regiments had 
embarked under the supervision of Kane, the Colonel had been told by St John, in 
order to preserve the secret, that ‗[I] desire you to insinuate with an air of confidence, 
where you think the secret will least be kept, that this preparation is intended for the 
coast of south France‘.184  This would deceive the Dutch as much as the French, 
which would not pose a problem for St John considering his negative attitude towards 
them.  This deception may have been to avert public dismay from the weakening of 
the army in Flanders.
185
  It is, however, more likely that it was simply to cloak their 
true destination, as it was common knowledge that five regiments were being 
withdrawn – a fact that could not be hidden.  Britain‘s Austrian and Dutch allies were 
angered when they found out about the expedition and they reportedly assumed it was 
to be sent against Peru.
186
  The regiments had arrived at Ostend after the transports on 
2 April, so their delay in sailing from England was not detrimental after all.  The 
transports started loading the regiments on 4 April, departed the port of Ostend the 
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next day and sailed for Spithead with their escorts on the 6
th
.
187
  The Flanders 
regiments arrived at Portsmouth on 11 April and so, finally, progress was being made, 
although the regiments‘ presence was reported in the papers.188   
Seymour‘s, having been waiting in garrisons around the south coast since the 
end of February, was ordered to embark on the transports shortly after their arrival, as 
soon as Coleby declared them ready.
189
  Although Seymour did not accompany them, 
his role of colonel of the regiment was still in effect whilst they remained in England.  
It was 14 April when all land officers, along with their naval comrades,
 190
 were to be 
present at Portsmouth, upon pain of being cashiered.  St John even recommended to 
Granville that this order should be placed in the Gazette of the next day, and other 
measures taken so ‗that no officer may have room to pretend ignorance of them‘.191  
The final transports from the Thames arrived at Portsmouth on 17 April.
192
 
Seymour‘s regiment finally embarked on 22 April, as Hill had to respond to St 
John‘s impatience by explaining that heavy winds had temporarily halted the boarding 
of Seymour‘s men.  The procedure continued after a window of opportunity was 
offered when the winds abated.
193
  Various weather conditions proved to be a great 
hindrance to the expedition and was, of course, one element not within St John‘s 
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control.  Seymour‘s troops, along with the marines, were the last element of the 
expedition to embark, the other regiments having sailed from the Nore and Ostend, 
and were already aboard transports.  At least 500 marines had been requested for the 
expedition in March, ‗the best that can be chosen‘.194  This number was later 
increased to 600, offered by Colonel Churchill, as there were more marines available 
than was originally supposed.
195
  This figure represents only half of the planned total, 
however.  In January, Dartmouth had notified the Admiralty that 1,200 marines above 
those already at sea would be needed within six weeks ‗and must be kept secret‘.196  
Final appointments were still being made in April as an adjutant and quartermaster 
had yet to be appointed to the marines.
197
  St John made a final appointment on 24 
April for a Mr Gordon to accompany the expedition as provost-marshal and stipulated 
that he should not ‗suffer…in respect of his employment of provost-marshal of 
Barbados‘.198 
Eight complete regiments of foot would not, however, form part of the 
expedition.  The composition of Hill‘s force was clarified to the General in mid-April 
when he was told that the men of Grant‘s regiment were to be divided into the other 
regiments to make up numbers.
199
  Disney‘s undermanned regiment was specifically 
identified to be augmented by this order, so that it would consist of thirteen companies 
of fifty-six men ‗including servants‘.200  There was thus a clear effort to send full-
strength regiments to Quebec.  With the majority of Grant‘s having escaped the 
arduous Atlantic voyage, its colonel may have regarded the fragmentation of his 
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regiment as a blessing, as his officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, 
along with a number of reduced companies, were able to remain in Britain away from 
danger whether in Canada or Flanders.  As a summer of recruiting instead lay ahead 
of them, orders were received from Granville for Grant to march to Reading.
201
   
Granville later ordered, in more insistent terms, that Grant should detach a 
captain, a lieutenant and an ensign to join Disney‘s regiment, which was so weak that 
its thirteenth company had been completely transferred from Grant‘s, exclusive of its 
officers.  Hill had wanted this officer deficit rectified and informed Granville of these 
circumstances.
202
  Other than those officers that had to be transferred later, the 
company transferred to Disney‘s consisted of three sergeants, three corporals, two 
drummers and fifty-six men, and six men from each of Grant‘s other twelve 
companies were to be distributed throughout the regiment.
203
  This would have been 
troubling for Grant, as the regiment was, of course, his property.  It also exemplifies 
how poor the planning had actually been, despite St John asking for such details much 
earlier.  The varying strengths of the regiments were unforeseen and this necessitated 
the breaking-up of Grant‘s in order to bring the other regiments, particularly Disney‘s, 
up to strength.  Why Grant‘s was chosen is not known, but it can be inferred that it 
was possibly even weaker than Disney‘s.   
In any case, Grant could not have led his regiment in Canada, for he was on 
parole, as was his lieutenant-colonel.
204
  Grant had sailed back to Britain in the 
autumn of 1710 to contest, successfully, a seat in Elginshire at the general election.  
On this voyage he had been captured by a privateer and, as an officer, was released on 
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parole – a constraint that he was not released from until December 1711.205  Grant‘s 
remaining companies proceeded to ‗North Britain‘ to spend their time recruiting 
around Stirling and Dundee.
206
  The clothing and arms of the regiment had been left 
behind at Portsmouth and Granville ordered the Admiralty to forward them on to the 
regiment via Leith on the next available transport heading that way.
207
  This lack of 
forward planning and corresponding inefficiency is a consequence of the hastiness 
with which St John tried to get such a complicated project organised and dispatched in 
so little time.  This has further consequences.  As Seymour‘s regiment left Portsmouth 
with the expedition, the garrison there was significantly weakened and invalid 
companies had to be hastily assigned to this duty.
208
   
Again, only three months‘ worth of provisions was provided for the regiments 
to conceal their true objective in North America, as this quantity of stores was ‗the 
usual…allowed in transporting land forces into the Mediterranean‘.209  In some 
circumstances, the delays incurred by the loading of some of the stores, or the 
organising of some regiments and their late arrival, could be forgiven due to the 
unpredictability of the weather and other unforeseen events, which would have 
inevitably hampered any sort of organisation on this scale.  However, the fact that 
appointments were still being made in late April – along with the belatedness with 
which regiments were determined for service, some supplies requested and marching 
orders issued – indicates a serious lack of preparedness.  Why the regiments were not 
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identified when the train of artillery was being prepared in January defies explanation, 
given that St John had started to examine options in December 1710.
210
  Of course, 
issues over authorisation may have been at fault, but St John should have been more 
cautious about the expedition‘s prospects and reconsidered its dispatch given how 
delayed Nicholson had been. 
 
VI: Procuring Supplies 
Procuring general supplies for the infantry lacked the efficiency of the Board of 
Ordnance and would take much longer to assemble and deliver.  The supply of 
Nicholson‘s stores was not the only contract Blake had in connection with the 
expedition.  St John had drawn up an agreement with him for the supply of the 
regiments as late as 2 March 1711.  The regulars needed to be provided with huge 
quantities of clothing and equipment.  8,000 uniforms were required for the private 
soldiers (including colonials), 300 for sergeants and 226 for officers.
211
  Blake was 
also contracted for a wide variety of stores, including swords, accoutrements, 
devotional books, medicine, surgeons‘ instruments and 778 tents. 212    Charging over 
£25,000, Blake was ironically the sort of new-money merchant the Tory 
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propagandists loathed, as he was no doubt profiting from the continuation of the war.  
Blake‘s order was scheduled to be fulfilled by the end of March.213  
The contract was not explicit about what all of this equipment was to be used 
for, given St John‘s insistence on secrecy; however, it was certainly to equip the 
Quebec expedition and was later used as evidence in the Earl of Oxford‘s 
impeachment.
214
  Uniforms for Marlborough‘s army in Flanders had already crossed 
the Channel and were in place by March.  These contracts had, of course, passed 
through official channels and were authorised by Parliament.
215
  This was in stark 
contrast to the expedition‘s uniforms, which had only just been ordered.  It was 
unlikely that St John himself would normally negotiate this sort of contract when 
there was an army of bureaucrats to handle this kind of detail.
216
  However, if it were 
to pass through Parliament at that moment, his secret would be revealed.   
The signing of Blake‘s contract was witnessed by John Netmaker, who was 
appointed commissary of the stores for the expedition.  His commission, dated only 
the day before the contract was signed, makes his role explicit as ‗commissary of the 
stores of war and provisions…upon the…present intended expedition… under… 
Brigadier-General John Hill‘.  This leaves no doubt as to what the purpose of these 
stores was.  There was one unusual addition to the supplies ordered.  Each officer 
would receive a tomahawk, with a further 2,500 ordered for the ranks.
217
  The 
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inclusion of tomahawks, which were regularly issued to soldiers fighting in 
eighteenth-century North America, was highly suggestive as to the expedition‘s 
objective and demonstrates a flaw in St John‘s ‗secret‘.  The contract asked for the 
stores to be ‗speedily‘ transferred to boats waiting upon the Thames by the end of 
March.  This was clearly an unrealistic proposition given the limited timescale.  The 
fleet should ideally have been sailing by this point to take advantage of the summer 
months.  As these stores were yet to be acquired, the expedition could not hope to sail 
to Boston until April at the earliest, as the sheer quantity and variety of stores required 
would take weeks to accumulate and transport to Spithead.   
At such a late stage, delays in Britain continued as men loading stores aboard 
the transports were impressed into naval service and masters of some of these vessels 
had not received orders to take on more supplies, nor to provision the ‗800 men‘ of 
Disney‘s regiment that they would be carrying.218  The masters‘ refusal to load items 
was simply due to the fact their vessels were not of sufficient tonnage to take on that 
quantity of stores, therefore St John had to acquire more transports for the job.  His 
secrecy had impeded the preparations as the masters had not recognised the authority 
which desired the use of their transports.  Learning his lesson, St John dispatched a 
surveyor to oversee the necessary preparations.
219
  Commissioning these new 
transports meant that they would sail only once the original convoy had already left, 
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so St John approached the Admiralty asking for yet another frigate for an escort for 
his scheme that they had so little knowledge of.
220
   
Granville had also directed that a hospital ship on the Thames, the Reward, 
receive some clothing and medical supplies and that a tender be prepared for the 
officers‘ baggage, but supplies were still found wanting at the end of March.221  Like 
many of the other components of the expedition, the Reward was provided with only 
three months‘ provisions.222  Obstructions in procuring supplies caused St John some 
distress as he demanded news of their progress.
223
  It was 9 April when the stores 
were at last loaded, other than the unessential ‗officers‘ things‘, which St John ordered 
not to wait for to hasten their arrival at the Spithead rendezvous.
224
   
When all of the transports finally sailed for Spithead, Coleby was sent to 
Portsmouth to oversee the final loading of regiments and stores there.
225
  St John, 
having little patience after the delays on the Thames, was eager for the stores to be 
distributed amongst the ships, Coleby being ordered ‗you will not fail to transmit to 
me very frequent accounts of what progress shall be made‘.226  The clothing on the 
Reward, which made up the bulk of Blake‘s order, was distributed by Hill amongst 
the regiments as late as 18 April.
227
  St John expressed his hope that the loading of 
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men and stores would be well on its way when Hill arrived at Portsmouth; however, it 
is evident that it was not.
228
   
Parts of Blake‘s order had been duplicated.  Presumably the regiments already 
had a clothing order as was standard at the beginning of a campaign.
229
  Additional 
medical supplies were secured when Granville wrote to the Apothecary-General 
asking to assign each of the regiments a ‗chest of good and wholesome medicine as 
well internal as external‘ despite these being included in Blake‘s order.230  Whilst 
Colonel Clayton was in London he was asked to inform the expedition‘s physician, Dr 
Denoon, and his regimental surgeons, to inspect the delivered medicine chests for 
their quality before they were packed up.
231
  Granville further informed the Admiralty 
Secretary that the navy need not furnish surgeons or medical supplies for their 
hospital ship, as he had already sent these medicine chests to the regiments.
232
  
Denoon‘s reputation must have been great.  He was physician-general to the army of 
Portugal so it was understandable that his commander had to be consoled when he 
was reassigned.  Denoon‘s replacement, Dr John Paterson, was ‗well recommended 
on account of his ability in that profession‘.233  Having switched establishments, 
Denoon was concerned about his pay given the notoriously poor efficiency of military 
bureaucracy.  He requested to be paid until the end of April on the Portuguese 
establishment and sent a member of his staff to Portugal to take care of his accounts 
there.
234
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It was not only the Portuguese establishment that suffered.  Despite Colonel 
Grant‘s regiment remaining in Britain, supplies, uniforms and transports had been 
requested for eight regiments.  Consequently, the medicine chests of one cavalry and 
two dragoon regiments were withheld to furnish the regiments bound for Canada.
235
  
The Royal Regiment of Horse Guards, and Carpenter‘s and Temple‘s Dragoons were 
preparing in Britain for service in Flanders, but were then prevented from going so 
that much needed uniforms and horses could be sent in their place.
236
  These were the 
same regiments offered to Marlborough as compensation for St John‘s withdrawal of 
five of his infantry battalions.
237
  As St John callously remarked in January, ‗I think 
after that [Marlborough] cannot grumble if we take five battalions for our attempt on 
Quebec‘.238  The Duke now had a legitimate reason to ‗grumble‘.  The Tory ministry, 
muscling in on war strategy, was certainly denting Marlborough‘s authority.   
St John also asked the Ordnance to provide tents for the marines, again, items 
which he contracted for privately from Blake for the other regiments.
239
  
Unsurprisingly, St John‘s lack of expertise was again evident in this order.  The 
Ordnance duly replied to say that ‗this office never did furnish the marines with tents, 
nor have we any money given by Parliament‘.240  St John then effectively informed 
the Admiralty that providing the tents was their problem.
241
  It seems that St John 
eventually triumphed as the Ordnance relented and provided the tents, but only 
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because Colonel Churchill paid for them, who consequently sought reimbursement 
from the Admiralty.
242
   
Commissary Netmaker‘s orders for the expedition were dated 16 April and 
made him responsible for all of the fleet‘s supplies.  To preserve secrecy, Netmaker 
was instructed to open his further orders only once he passed forty degrees latitude.  
His instructions specified that Boston was his destination and that he should keep 
good accounts of the stores there.
243
  Hill was required to guarantee this secrecy and 
give out the necessary details once the fleet had crossed the specified latitude.
244
   
Granville noted that only St John could answer for the ordnance stores and the 
expedition‘s supplies, thus emphasising the controlling grip of the Northern 
Secretary.
245
  Blake had honoured his order on 10 April, illustrating how late these 
essential supplies were actually delivered, especially as they then had to be loaded on 
transports and sent to Portsmouth.
246
  It was not until 19 May that St John asked for 
Blake‘s charges to be applied to the Treasury because ‗the privacy with which this 
service was performed, [obliged] me to sign the contracts, [Blake] applies to me for 
payment‘,247 although St John later asked for it not to be made public ‗yet‘.248  Blake 
was supposed to have received this sum in two instalments after delivery, which 
theoretically was to have been by the end of March.
249
  In June, St John wrote to 
Paymaster-General Brydges, to say that he felt sorry for Blake not having been paid 
yet as ‗the preparations…went almost singly through my hands, so it fell to me 
                                                 
242
 Ibid., St John to Admiralty, 5 April 1711; TNA, SP 44/111 and SP 44/213, St John to Ordnance, 5 
April 1711. 
243
 TNA, SP 44/213, Instructions and Secret Instructions to Netmaker, 16 April 1711. 
244
 Ibid., St John to Hill, 17 April 1711. 
245
 TNA, WO 4/10, Granville to Commissioners of Transports, 19 March 1711. 
246
 TNA, SP 44/213, St John to Brydges, 19 May 1711. 
247
 Ibid., St John to Brydges, 19 May 1711. 
248
 Ibid., St John to Lord High Treasurer [?], 6 June 1711. 
249
 TNA, T1/132, ‗Articles of Agreement…‘ [between St John and James Blake], 2 March 1710 [1711]. 
 164
therefore to contract on this occasion by the Queen‘s command‘.250  Whether the 
stores provided by Blake were adequate is another matter – the uniforms did not differ 
all that much from what soldiers wore when in Flanders.
251
  It is odd that much of his 
order was also sought from elsewhere.  However, as the contract was placed privately 
between St John and the merchant, rather than being administered through the 
Treasury, the contract was questionable and resulted in later investigations when the 
Whigs returned to power.   
 
VII: Naval Vessels 
The composition of the naval squadron would change and adapt as the expedition 
progressed, but it initially consisted of eight vessels of sixty-eighty guns, plus the two 
bomb ketches.
252
  The naval vessels employed to escort the transports from the 
Thames and Ostend were earmarked to be those commanded by Walker to convoy the 
expedition to Boston.  Dartmouth notified the Admiralty on 13 January that he would 
require eight men-of-war of third- and fourth-rate vessels for ‗foreign service‘, to be 
equipped with three months‘ victuals for 5,000 men, by the end of February.253  
Problems with supply also extended to the fleet and ships in home ports were put on 
short allowance so that victuals could be diverted for the expedition‘s use.254  All of 
the warships were ready for sea on the last day of February, but four of the vessels 
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lacked provisions.  They were ordered to take on victuals at the Downs, where they 
would join the other four warships that were on the Thames.
255
  The Admiralty 
condemned Walker in April for not having secured fresh provisions; however, the 
Admiral was then in London receiving instructions from the person who had real 
control over such matters – St John.256 
The Admiralty had to enquire whether a flag officer would be needed to lead 
this squadron.
257
  Evidently such a question stirred the establishment into appointing a 
new admiral.  Walker was promoted rear-admiral on 16 March.
258
  On the same date it 
was requested that the warships were to convoy the transports to Ostend and then on 
to Spithead, where Walker would assume command of them.
259
  Four were sent to 
convoy the Flanders force, whilst the rest escorted those remaining in the Thames.  
They would then have to convoy transports to Spithead, as mentioned above.
260
  It 
was not until 6 April that Walker received his commission to command the Quebec 
squadron.
261
  However, discussions were still taking place over the use of additional 
ships two weeks later.
262
  Walker‘s orders for the expedition were given to him on 11 
April.  He also received, on the same day, a series of instructions about the mustering, 
embarkation and disposition of the marines amongst the squadron, even though they 
had already begun to be organised by Colonel Churchill.
263
  Upon receiving his 
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orders, Walker began to prepare his squadron and attempted to send a vessel to 
Plymouth to take on board some marines.  However, he found he could not do so as 
the captains in his squadron had not yet been informed that they were under his 
command.
264
   
St John‘s prior experience as secretary at war did not extend to expertise in 
Admiralty affairs and he admitted that he despaired at the ‗tedious forms of our 
marine management‘.265  Ignoring current naval requirements, St John wanted the 
Admiralty to reinforce Walker‘s squadron with any ships ready at the time of his 
sailing, arguing ‗if these ships are victualled and fitted for Channel service it will be 
sufficient‘.266  Adding to the strength of the squadron was thought necessary after an 
alarm caused by a French squadron fitting out at Brest.  The Admiralty replied that 
only two eighty-gun third-rates were available to reinforce Walker‘s squadron.267  It 
was also determined that the small squadron being sent to bolster the Leeward Islands 
could set out from England at the same time for collective security.
268
 
St John‘s efforts at maintaining secrecy were further evident when he decided 
to send the eighty-gun vessels along with the expedition, but used their supplies to 
continue his deception against the Admiralty to mask their real purpose: 
 
since the Admiralty imagine that the Humber and the Devonshire are to proceed the whole 
expedition along with you, those ships having but three months‘ provision on board them, they 
will be led into the error we desire, and may very naturally think that whatever service was at 
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first intended, when eight months stores and provisions were ordered, yet the design they now 
go upon is to be executed nearer home and but requires three months, whereas if these two 
ships were made up to the proportion of the others, there would be an end of this blind.
269
 
 
These ships would sail to the mouth of the St Lawrence with Walker.  Unfortunately, 
it was only the seamen on some of the core naval vessels of Walker‘s squadron who 
would benefit from the necessary quantity of provisions, although these ships were 
only actually supplied with six months‘ worth and even these stores would have to be 
shared out later.
270
 
Walker‘s instructions were entirely composed by St John and whilst they were 
fairly well structured, the Admiralty had not been consulted at all.  Burchett, the 
Admiralty secretary, was particularly scathing about this.
271
  The value of Admiralty 
advice was evident, but it is thought that they were not informed of such details not 
only to hide the squadron‘s purpose, but also so that they could not openly oppose St 
John and side with a Cabinet already convinced that the expedition should be 
terminated.
272
  Although with Harley‘s absence and the backing of the Queen and 
Abigail Masham, the project‘s continuation was assured.  However, the Admiralty‘s 
ignorance preserved its reputation as it was later able to disclaim all responsibility for 
the disaster on the St Lawrence.
273
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VIII: Conclusion 
Walker and Hill had little involvement in the actual planning and organisation of the 
expedition.  Furthermore, it is clear that St John maintained an iron grip over most 
processes, even when delegating tasks.  Obstacles occurred in almost every aspect of 
the expedition‘s organisation, the secrecy of which was highly detrimental.  This 
secrecy did not possess any sort of cohesion, simply the hope that it would be guessed 
that the fleet would sail to France, Spain or to the Mediterranean in general.  To fuel 
this suspicion, three months‘ provisions were supplied to the transports despite being 
insufficient for the expedition‘s task.  This ensured the fleet would meet unnecessary 
delay at Boston, meaning it would be precariously late in the season before Quebec 
could be invested.  The policy of secrecy also meant that offices, including the 
Admiralty, Ordnance, Transports and Victualling, could not be properly consulted.  
Such ineffective organisation illustrates that Walker‘s fate was half-determined before 
he even received his orders. 
St John‘s frustration was evident in some of his letters, but he had only 
himself to blame for the late departure of the expedition.  Burchett, Coleby and 
Granville simply assisted in assembling the forces and were unaware of what they 
were for.  Dartmouth‘s involvement is curious, as he was aware of the secret peace 
negotiations, but was only involved with some of the earlier processes in securing the 
train and dealing with some of the naval affairs.  Nevertheless, his involvement ceased 
in February when St John became more politically assertive.  Of course, those in the 
Cabinet who were involved with this process were also aware of St John‘s project.  
However, royal authority must have determined that they, along with Marlborough, 
should comply with whatever organisation St John thought necessary.  Despite 
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ignoring the correct procedures, the Northern Secretary was able to spend a lot of 
money, and secure men and materiel with little in the way of explanation.   
St John originally intended Walker‘s squadron to be present at Boston towards 
the end of April.
274
  He needed to have inaugurated all of the preparations much 
earlier to allow the expedition a fighting chance of success in reaching Boston early 
enough.  Even if St John‘s intentions were revealed to the enemy, as long as 
preparations were completed on time, the fleet sailed early enough, and the forces 
properly provisioned, then this expedition stood a reasonable chance of success.  The 
artillery stores were ready even before the commanders were appointed, but this was 
let down by the other elements of the expedition coming together so slowly.  The 
expedition should have been ready to sail at the beginning of March.  That tents and 
uniforms were not tendered before then seems preposterous.  Nevertheless, this does 
not adequately explain the late assemblage of the regiments.  Hill‘s force was a strong 
one, but the fact that important preparations were still being made in April 1711 
created an unacceptable impediment.  Timing was everything when concerning 
Canadian operations and St John‘s planning did not take that into proper 
consideration.  Whilst he would often complain about the slippage of deadlines, this 
fault could not fall upon any other‘s shoulders.   
Perhaps the greatest flaw was Nicholson‘s late departure, combined with the 
insufficient victuals provided, which ensured that additional supplies would not be 
ready when the fleet arrived at Boston.  He should not have had to wait for ordnance 
stores or lieutenants, which should not have been a priority, but sailed with the earliest 
available communications vessel to present the colonial governors with their orders 
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and begin vital preparations there.  The stores could follow as it was well known that 
it could take many days for a ship to clear the Thames and reach the sea if conditions 
were not right.
275
  However, such delays that were encountered in provisioning 
various transports must have been partially caused by a financial crisis at the 
Victualling Board which was the reason why there was so little pork available.
276
   
Despite it being very late to dispatch the expedition and against the advice of 
the Cabinet in April, St John pressed for it to continue.  Had the purpose of St John‘s 
organisation instead been to attack the coast of France or Spain as he dissimulated, 
then this would have been an impressive feat, but his planning and organisation was 
simply not good enough when the expedition‘s objective was to take Quebec and 
conquer New France.  St John did not organise the forces through the correct 
protocols, nor had he envisaged delays in acquiring stores, mustering troops or 
repairing ships, and he most certainly did not foresee what problems the weather 
could inflict in an age that heavily relied upon a maritime logistics network.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE QUEBEC EXPEDITION 
 
The expedition was fully prepared and ready to sail by the beginning of May.  Despite 
not being suitably provisioned, nor having the benefit of constructive advice from 
various departments that were not privy to the secret, the expedition‘s various units 
were nevertheless assembled and equipped in an impressive amount of time – a little 
under four months.  Although this came far too late in the year for a force that was 
meant to be campaigning in Canada, there was still a chance of success if Boston was 
ready to load sufficient victuals upon the fleet‘s arrival, although this was dubious 
considering Lieutenant-General Francis Nicholson‘s delayed departure.  It was time 
for Secretary of State Henry St John to release his project into the care of the 
expedition commanders, Rear-Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker and General John Hill.  
St John, nevertheless, maintained a degree of control through the orders he had 
devised for them, authorised by the Queen.  Walker‘s concern, then, was to convoy 
his numerous transports across the Atlantic and evade the French threat that was 
posed by the forming of a privateer squadron at Brest.  Nicholson had to convey 
orders to the colonial governors to mobilise provincial troops in America.  Both he 
and Hill would finally have to coordinate their attack on New France.  Inclement 
weather proved to be an obstacle to both Nicholson and Walker by postponing their 
sailing westward.  Further problems were encountered at Boston which clearly could 
not cater for the expedition‘s needs and only created more obstacles to the fleet‘s 
timely sailing for Quebec.  Ultimately, the expedition would fail after a calamity on 
the dreaded St Lawrence River forced the commanders to rethink their options. 
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I: St John’s Instructions 
After consulting personally with St John, both Hill and Walker received their orders 
for the expedition directly from Queen Anne at St James‘s Palace, on 11 April 1711.1  
The newspapers reported their appointments: Walker was ‗commander in chief of the 
squadron for the intended expedition‘2 and ‗Brigadier Hill…is to command the 
intended expedition‘.3  Naturally it would be difficult to completely hide the fitting 
out and manning of such a large force, but it is evident the general public were aware 
of the organisation of a large expedition.   
The instructions sent to Admiral Walker and General Hill illustrate how 
responsibilities were divided yet do not make clear, as was the norm in that period, 
who had overall command of the expedition.  It was clearly a joint operation and 
command was simply structured in a manner in which Walker commanded the naval 
vessels and Hill the land forces, whilst important decisions were eventually taken by 
councils of war, which was not exactly specified in their orders.
4
  Command issues 
were significant, as they were often unclear and later led to a false apportioning of 
blame.
5
  Walker‘s instructions were not confined to matters pertaining to Quebec.6  It 
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had been determined to replace the marines, stationed at Annapolis Royal since its 
conquest the previous year, with New Englanders.
7
  After the attempt upon Quebec, 
Placentia in Newfoundland was also to be attacked if conditions were suitable.
8
  
Otherwise, Walker‘s instructions left little to initiative.  His task was to gather his 
fleet at Spithead to sail for Boston, whilst detaching storeships to New York, and then 
sail up the St Lawrence to Quebec.  The sixth instruction specifically required that 
Hill be consulted upon how to approach and attack Quebec.  The next ensured that 
Walker would assist Hill in every way he could whilst at Quebec – that his marines be 
placed under his sole command and that the General be provided with whatever 
stores, ammunition and artillery he desired.   
Whilst Walker‘s orders consisted of a total of eleven instructions, plus two 
‗additional‘ instructions (which asked to replace stores and recruit colonials to replace 
any losses incurred on the transatlantic voyage), Hill‘s orders comprised twenty-eight 
instructions including supplementary orders.
9
  The supplementary instructions 
assigned to the commanders suggest a hastiness and lack of thought when drawing up 
the originals.  Hill‘s operational authority over Walker was also apparent in his 
twentieth instruction which, in consultation with the Admiral, directed that he could 
decide if some of Walker‘s ships should remain in the St Lawrence after the departure 
of the squadron.  This was despite Hill‘s eleventh instruction, which called for the 
‗speedy reducing‘ of Quebec, so that the whole country could be taken in time to 
allow the ‗seasonable return of our squadron out of that river‘.  Hill was given the 
authority to negotiate terms with Governor-General Vaudreuil at Quebec.  He was 
also entrusted with the power to appoint a new governor, and both spiritual and 
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temporal positions in the region, and to distribute wealth.
10
  It is worth noting that Hill 
was encouraged to preserve the buildings of Quebec and ‗strictly‘ ordered not to allow 
‗outrages and indecencies‘ to occur, particularly in connection to any religious 
(Catholic) establishments or personages, as it ‗must create hatred and contempt as 
well in the French as Indians professing the Christian religion‘.11   
Perhaps the most important instructions – received by both men – were given 
due to prior experience of similar expeditions which had met failure owing to 
argument at the most senior levels of command.  Number eleven of Walker‘s, and 
twenty-three of Hill‘s, instructions commanded them both to cooperate and assist each 
other in all that they required for the good of the expedition.  Whilst council of wars 
were not specified, this divided authority would result in much consultation between 
the commanders, which would logically extend to their subordinates.  Such pooling of 
authority could be a handicap to the effective execution of a joint operation, which 
lacked clear leadership in some respects, however, Hill‘s instructions indicated that he 
was superior to Walker in many operational aspects of the expedition.
12
  Orders to 
cooperate would become standard over the coming century, as similar instructions 
were issued to Boscawen and Amherst, Vernon and Cathcart and Hawke and 
Mordaunt, in both the Austrian Succession and Seven Years Wars.
13
   
Almost as an afterthought, Hill‘s first ‗additional‘ instruction was to attempt to 
create an alliance with the Indian nations which gave the French a great advantage in 
North America.  The last additional instruction related to the lands of the Hudson‘s 
Bay Company which had been taken by the French; Marlborough, a former governor 
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of the company, retained an interest in its operations.
14
  The instruction directed that 
the area should be recaptured and returned to the British.
15
  Securing the bay relied on 
the provision of effective security against the French and would create huge financial 
rewards for Britain.  This afterthought may have been an example of an emerging 
British strategic vision.  The commanders‘ instructions allowed St John to maintain 
control over the expedition even after its dispatch.
16
 
The orders for the various colonial governors were even more problematical.  
Nicholson was first ordered to New York to deliver instructions to Governor Robert 
Hunter of New York and New Jersey, who would then pass on instructions to 
Governor Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire, despite most of 
the strain being placed upon Massachusetts.  No doubt the reasoning behind this was 
to prepare the forces that would serve under Nicholson; however, the delay faced by 
him in crossing the Atlantic meant that the supplies for the fleet could not be gathered 
in time for Walker‘s arrival.  Dudley‘s instructions chiefly concerned the raising of at 
least 1,000 men to accompany the expedition, ‗which may arrive… [at the] end of 
April‘.17  They also demanded that pilots and flat-bottomed boats be provided, and 
detailed intelligence on Quebec garnered.
18
  The ninth instruction emphasised the 
need for secrecy, but is enlightening as it confessed that due to ‗the necessity of 
concealing the same we are deprived of the information we might have had in order to 
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have given you more particular instructions‘.  This glaring admission of 
organisational incompetence then led to a request that the governors organise a 
strategy themselves, as they were more knowledgeable about the geography of the 
area of operations.  The thirteenth and final instruction to Dudley went further – it 
prohibited all packet boats from sailing to Europe so that the preparations would be 
kept secret.  In any event, the lateness with which the news and the fleet arrived 
virtually negated the importance of this instruction as there was only a limited 
window of opportunity for the expedition to succeed.   
Hunter‘s instructions were likewise concerned with the raising of men – a total 
of 2,000 for the overland expedition to Montreal.
19
   His additional instructions 
stressed the importance of Nicholson as the prime organiser of this force.
20
  It called 
for all of the colonial governors, as well as Nicholson and his deputy, Schuyler, to 
meet in Connecticut (owing to its central location), for them to work out a suitable 
strategy for attacking Canada.  Nicholson was to have the casting vote in this council 
of war.
21
  The governors of Connecticut, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 
and Pennsylvania, merely had supporting roles in the expedition – their instructions, 
almost an afterthought, essentially being to provide all assistance they could to 
Nicholson.
22
  St John lacked the authority to launch the expedition when he 
formulated Hunter‘s orders, although he had confidence as he guaranteed to Hunter 
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that there would be no disappointment like that of 1710, when the promised force 
failed to appear.
23
  
Nicholson had arrived at Boston, rather than New York as explicitly stated in 
his orders, around 8 June – around a fortnight before Walker himself.24  The Joseph 
and Neptune transports, sent with Nicholson, were also at Boston where their escorts 
were careening.   Again the ‗secret‘ was well advertised as colonial Judge Samuel 
Sewall was informed that Nicholson‘s arrival was in preparation for an expedition to 
Canada.
25
  The meeting of the colonial governors was held at New London on 21 
June, where they discussed the raising of forces for Nicholson, as well as the problem 
of the two transports Nicholson left immobile at Boston.
26
  The vast organisation 
necessary could only begin when the governors had returned to their respective 
colonies.   
 
II: The Transatlantic Voyage 
Walker arrived at Portsmouth to take command of his squadron on 16 April.  
Unfortunately his captains, along with Vice-Admiral Whitaker, the superior officer at 
the port, had not been notified of this and so it was another three days before written 
confirmation was received of Walker‘s authority.  Upon his arrival, Walker had 
assumed command in the seventy-gun Edgar, rather than a more prestigious eighty-
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gun vessel, owing to this confusion.
27
  St John was initially unconcerned by the fact 
that the fleet had yet to sail: ‗Nicholson‘s departure indeed, makes your [Walker‘s] 
stay at Spithead not so much to be regretted as otherwise it would be‘.28  As the last 
soldiers embarked on 22
 
April, Walker informed St John of his hopes to sail the fleet 
to St Helens the next day and date the expedition from then, ‗being the [anniversary] 
of Her Majesty‘s coronation‘.29  Unfortunately, the weather hampered the fleet, as 
Walker‘s journal noted the ‗turbulent‘ weather prevented the boarding of transports 
and the placing of the mortars onto the ships.
30
  Walker kept his promise, however, 
and sailed with his naval squadron to St Helens, leaving the transports behind, as 
some masters were ‗alleging‘ they were still awaiting the loading of their provisions.31  
The violence of the weather was extreme, as two of Walker‘s warships, the 
Devonshire and the Swiftsure, both lost their masts.  The latter had attempted to return 
to the mainland to pick up some marines, but was forced back to St Helens by the 
strong winds.
32
  Strangely, Walker accused some of the masters of the transports of 
being negligent in not getting to St Helens.  This may have been because there was a 
clear spell before the winds stirred.  
Just as progress was beginning to be made after swift repairs to these ships, the 
tide and the winds were blowing the departing fleet eastwards, forcing them to again 
seek shelter at St Helens.
33
  After the various setbacks Walker encountered he finally 
managed to weigh anchor and set sail on 29 April.  However, he was further detained 
as the Diamond, which was part of the Leeward Islands convoy that was to sail with 
                                                 
27
 Walker, ‗Journal‘, pp. 92-93, 16-19 and 24 April 1711. 
28
 Ibid., appendix, p. 171, St John to Walker, 20 April 1711. 
29
 TNA, SP 42/68, Walker to St John, 22 April 1711. 
30
 Walker, ‗Journal‘, p. 93, 23 April 1711. 
31
 TNA,SP 42/68, Walker to St John, 24 April 1711; Walker, ‗Journal‘, p. 93, 24 April 1711. 
32
 TNA,SP 42/68, Walker to St John, 24 April 1711; Walker, ‗Journal‘, p. 93, 25 April 1711. 
33
 TNA, SP 42/68, King to St John, 2 May 1711. 
 179 
them for security,
34
 and the Devonshire did not follow.  Not only was the General on 
this latter ship, but it was also loaded with Hill‘s money for provisions and regimental 
pay, and with mortars for one of the bomb vessels – ordnance that was essential for 
the mission.  Walker was therefore forced to wait.  Finally, on 30 April, his 
magnificent flotilla of sixty-three vessels cleared Bembridge Ledge off the Isle of 
Wight.
35
   
They were not clear of British waters yet, however.  St John was already 
resigned to the fact that the fleet would have to put in again at Torbay or Plymouth 
because of the contrary winds.
36
  This Walker did, entering Plymouth on 2 May owing 
to the ‗dirty weather‘.37  Here, the straggling Diamond joined the squadron, reporting 
to Walker the close proximity of a small squadron of French ships, which the Admiral 
correctly suspected were actually British.
38
  Continuing bad weather worried St John 
greatly and he suggested that Walker restock at Plymouth, but pressed him to sail as 
soon as was feasible.
39
  Owing to the previous obstacles to sailing, Walker duly took 
this opportunity to replenish his stores in case the voyage across the Atlantic took 
longer than anticipated.  Abiding by St John‘s wishes to keep their objective hidden, 
stores for six months were placed on the escorts, but only three months‘ worth were 
placed on the transports.
40
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Walker may as well have ignored his orders and furnished the ships with full 
provisions, not only because delays saw the rapid consumption of these stores, but 
secrecy was of little consequence as he became aware it had been potentially 
compromised.  A French sailor in British service approached the Admiral at Plymouth 
because he had heard that the expedition was bound for Canada and, as he allegedly 
knew the St Lawrence well, wanted to serve as a pilot.  Walker brushed off the 
rumour and attempted to maintain the secret: ‗I asked him, why he imagined we were 
going there: to which he replied, that he had heard people talk so.  I told him he was 
mistaken: but that if he were well acquainted with the Bay of Biscay, and the coasts 
about Nantes, he should go with me.‘41  The Frenchman who spoke ‗not one word of 
English‘ had known of the expedition‘s purpose.  He also informed Walker that the 
French were strengthening the defences at Quebec, that it was strong to the seaward 
but weak to the landward and exaggerated the number of cannon there, saying there 
were about 150 guns emplaced.
42
   
Walker had previously told those suspecting he was going to Canada that he 
may not even depart the Channel and that the only reinforcement sent to North 
America was Nicholson, thus continuing St John‘s deception that he was sent to 
defend Annapolis Royal.
43
  Others had guessed that Walker was heading for Cadiz.
44
  
Contemporary newspapers included wide coverage of maritime affairs, particularly 
ship movements.  In an age when merchants relied on the sea for their profits and 
trade, news of the successful completion of cargo voyages was invaluable.  Their 
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naval escorts were also often reported, which made the secrecy surrounding the 
expedition unnecessary.  Given such details of the status of shipping, French spies had 
their information confirmed only a few days after the vessels were sighted.   
With the fleet still at Plymouth, Colonel King‘s anxiety mirrored St John‘s.  
This was demonstrated when he described to the Northern Secretary how the weather 
constantly prevented the fleet‘s departure: ‗the perverseness of the winds… heartily 
afflict me‘.  His political sympathies were also revealed when he continued: ‗I am 
sensible of the great concern it must give you, both as you are a good patriot and that 
this expedition is such an offspring of your own, what must prove in all humane 
appearance a more solid advantage to England, than all those glaring battles and 
sieges which have made of late years such a mighty figure in the gazettes.‘45  He had 
not long to wait.  Walker shifted his flag to the eighty-gun Humber whilst at Plymouth 
and departed on 4 May, with sixty-four sail, including merchantmen for the Leeward 
Islands and their three escorts.
46
  He also commandeered four more naval vessels to 
convoy him through the dangerous hunting grounds of the French privateers.
47
   
Walker parted from these escorts and the Leeward Islands trade, when over 
300 miles from British waters.  The Torbay was also sent with them and he would 
have also sent the Swiftsure back too, as its captain reported it was in a poor 
condition, if it were not for the fact that it carried a substantial number of marines.
48
  
This was reported in the newspapers almost two weeks later, when the cruisers 
entered Plymouth and announced they had separated from Walker‘s fleet 150 leagues 
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west of the Isles of Scilly.
49
  Two weeks later, the Kingston parted from the fleet to 
escort the Mary storeship to New York, where it would gather much needed victuals 
to reduce the burden on Boston.
50
  Eight warships, aside from the bomb ketches, 
remained with Walker.
51
 
The problems of transoceanic navigation are perceptible in Walker‘s journal as 
true longitude had yet to be accurately measured.  Lines of latitude could be 
determined, however, allowing the navigators of the age to fix a rough position for 
their vessels.  Still, this could leave a considerable margin of error.
52
  Walker‘s course 
in the mid-Atlantic followed a corridor between forty-three and forty-seven degrees 
north.  This followed a normal course set by eighteenth-century sailors to Canada, to 
take advantage of the westward currents.  This may be surprising as it goes against the 
prevailing westerly winds of the North Atlantic.
53
  It could offer the quickest route if 
the winds were favourable, as to take the easterlies further to the south would offer a 
voyage of equal length under normal conditions by extending the distance travelled.
54
  
From Walker‘s journal, it appears that the fleet suffered relatively little trouble from 
its westward progress, apart from between 10-19
 
May, when the winds pushed them 
southwards.
55
  The fleet did suffer from storms and fogs which scattered its ships 
during June and they often sighted ‗islands of ice…which rendered the weather very 
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cold‘.56  The Montague was detailed to patrol near Cape Sable to await these 
stragglers.
57
  It was at this point, near to their arrival at Boston, that those in the fleet 
were informed of their mission.
58
   
According to various newspapers printed in July 1711, it appears that St John 
had provided enough disinformation to cause uncertainty amongst the French and 
Spanish of Walker‘s intended destination.  The British Mercury reported that the 
French Brest squadron sailed to the coast of Portugal, ‗though some are of the opinion 
that they are gone after Admiral Walker‘.59  The same newspaper later reported that 
the British squadron present at Lisbon on 7 June was actually Walker‘s.60  The British 
Mercury and The Daily Courant also repeated news from the Paris Gazette of 20 June 
that the defences of Galicia and Andalusia had been reinforced with both militia and 
regulars upon news of the fitting out of Walker‘s squadron.61  If so, this was a 
surprising and beneficial result of the expedition.  St John, meanwhile, was desperate 
for news of Nicholson‘s progress.  Having heard that a Boston vessel had arrived at 
Greenock, he sent for news by way of the Mayor of Glasgow.
62
  St John gained 
confidence from this, as he realised that the ‗great fleet‘ which had been spotted could 
be none other than Walker‘s and readily informed Queen Anne.63  However, all 
French illusions would have vanished with the publication of a Daily Courant report 
on 31 July, which disclosed that the captain of the merchant vessel Rose had sighted 
Walker on his voyage from North America and divulged that the fleet was then at 
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New England preparing to proceed to Canada.
64
  The purpose of the expedition was 
now public knowledge and this dispatch resulted in some spurious propaganda which 
claimed Walker had already taken several ships and towns.
65
  Fortunately, Walker had 
arrived at Boston at the end of June without being harassed by privateers.  Whilst they 
had provided a fleeting moment of concern for St John, it was Portuguese interests, 
not British, which would ultimately suffer from their attention. 
 
III: The French Squadron 
The French Navy had, by 1711, virtually abandoned the Atlantic, leaving the fighting 
in this theatre to state-sponsored privateers.
66
  One such squadron had been fitting out 
in the French Atlantic ports, financed through private rather than state means.  News 
of these preparations caused quite a stir in London.  There had been rumours of 
another attempt by the Pretender to land in Britain.  St John had other fears – the 
interception of Walker or the reinforcement of Canada.  These worries later proved to 
be unfounded, although they reveal some interesting insights into Walker‘s 
expedition. 
An impressive intelligence-gathering operation ensued when the Earl of 
Dartmouth began to periodically send frigates to reconnoitre Brest.
67
  Orders were 
given to a spy to proceed to Dunkirk, St Malo, Rochefort, Port Louis (Lorient) and 
Brest, via Dover, Ostend and Flanders, to covertly acquire all possible information 
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regarding shipping preparations, military strengths and merchant ambitions.  The spy 
was requested to find information about the former governor of Port Royal, 
Subercase, and whether he was planning a recovery of Annapolis Royal and what the 
French hopes were in the region, how they were supporting New France, and if they 
wanted to strike at the British colonies in America.
68
  Concrete intelligence of the 
preparation of a French squadron, privately funded ‗to go a cruising, for an affair of 
commerce‘, was received in March 1711.  It warned of seven ships fitting out – four 
at Brest, two at Port Louis and one at Rochefort; and René Duguay-Trouin had been 
correctly identified as the commander.
69
   
The financial aspect of the preparations was later confirmed in Paris, out of 
Minister of Marine Pontchartrain‘s office, as the clerks there stated that the ‗court has 
no share in the squadron‘.  Included in the same report was Jean Baptiste Du Casse‘s 
intention of sailing with three vessels to America once the winds had eased.
70
  
Information about these preparations had even been discussed in Cabinet in March 
when the Admiralty was ordered to keep abreast of the French Atlantic preparations 
and, after consultation, ordered Admiral Leake‘s Channel squadron to cruise off Brest 
and intercept any attempted breakout.
71
  The Admiralty had even complained that 
Walker had taken three cruisers with him that should have been on patrol in the 
Downs.
72
  Walker was only following St John‘s directions because of the threat in 
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Brittany.
73
  The Admiralty‘s attitude may be explained by their earlier description of 
the Brest squadron as ‗not only a danger to [Walker] – but to the nation‘.74   
Intelligence was also passed on by Dutch privateers through the capture of 
French fishing vessels.
75
  A further report detailed news from Paris that the warships 
at Brest would join those at Rochefort and Port Louis, and were to embark troops ‗to 
make some enterprise in America‘.76  St John appeared to be unconcerned by theories 
of an emerging Jacobite threat from the French ports.  He did not deny the 
intelligence, but instead saw it as mischief-making by the French and could not see 
the execution of such a threat when Walker had already sailed.
77
  Meanwhile, 
Duguay-Trouin was actually planning a raid of profit and vengeance against the 
Portuguese colony of Rio de Janeiro, after a similar French attempt the year before, 
under Jean-François Du Clerc, turned into a farcical expedition resulting in the 
imprisonment of its survivors.
78
 
Spies in Paris continued to busy themselves in acquiring information about the 
squadron being assembled in Brittany.  They had determined that 3,000 soldiers were 
earmarked for service with that flotilla and, whilst their task was still uncertain, it had 
been hinted they were destined for ‗Spanish America, in order to secure some 
important post and bring back great riches‘.79  The likely (and as it turns out, precise) 
destination of Duguay-Trouin‘s squadron was identified as Rio de Janeiro.  This did 
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not worry the spies compiling this intelligence, as they were aware of Leake‘s 
squadron in the Channel which would ‗easily match that from Brest to avoid any 
surprises‘.80  Further reports detailed various naval preparations in the Atlantic ports, 
but also alluded to the English and Dutch colonies as being the French targets, 
although Brazil was again suspected.  The squadron was provisioned for eight months 
and was predicted to sail in mid-June.
81
   
Further details were received from across France.  Intelligence from Paris 
revealed that the Comte de Toulouse, commander of the French fleet at Malaga, gave 
100,000 livres for the expedition; from Dunkirk, that the Mars would complement 
Duguay-Trouin‘s squadron; from La Rochelle, that the Brest squadron was definitely 
destined for Brazil; and from Rotterdam, where a known Jacobite suggested that the 
Pretender would sail either from Brest or Dunkirk and already had funding to do so.
82
  
A comprehensive account of the French preparations was sent from La Rochelle.  It 
detailed that the squadron consisted of nineteen vessels and 3,000 troops, that it 
intended to strike at Rio de Janeiro and also that Duguay-Trouin was concerned about 
departing Brest after hearing that Admiral Leake was intent on intercepting his 
squadron.
83
  It was also communicated that a new French intendant for Quebec, 
Begon, was about to sail from La Rochelle.
84
  Given the wealth of intelligence 
available to the ministry in London, it was likely that French spies were equally 
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competent and were possibly themselves sending warning of Walker‘s squadron with 
Begot.   
Whilst St John had initially been unconcerned about the fitting out of such a 
squadron in Brest, he must have suddenly feared the worst by the imminent sailing of 
the French.  Such was the scare that he finally decided to reveal to the Admiralty the 
purpose of his expedition.  On 7 June, St John informed them that Walker was 
destined for Quebec and discussed how best to respond to the threat in relation to the 
expedition‘s security.85  The Admiralty thought that they could not prescribe what 
action to take without consulting Leake himself.  Three days later, orders were sent to 
Leake to ready five ships to reinforce Walker in the event that Duguay-Trouin had 
sailed for Canada.  The Admiralty was of the ‗opinion that two ships of seventy, two 
of sixty and one of fifty guns will be a sufficient number to dispute with the French‘.86  
It was later determined that those ships would not be needed, as Walker was thought 
strong enough to counter Duguay-Trouin with his own squadron.  Nevertheless, a 
frigate was sent to Walker with this news, whilst Leake had yet to arrive off Brest.
87
  
Eventually, Leake was ordered in to water after it became obvious that he had missed 
Duguay-Trouin‘s departure.88  This was unfortunate, as Duguay-Trouin was so 
concerned by the possibility of Leake‘s presence that he altered the squadron‘s 
rendezvous from Brest to La Rochelle – avoiding Leake by only two days.89  The 
French commander‘s worries were confirmed in an intelligence dispatch to the 
Cabinet, which stated that Duguay-Trouin had feared he would never depart France if 
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Leake appeared off La Rochelle.  This dispatch also confirmed that Brazil was his 
target and specifically mentioned that the French had no clue as to where Walker was 
headed.
90
   
The information gathered was mostly accurate and useful, but used to little 
effect.  Leake was finally ordered away from the French coast on 29 June as it was 
clear that Duguay-Trouin had successfully evaded the Channel squadron.
91
  Despite 
the secrecy surrounding French intentions, the British were aware that Rio de Janeiro 
was its target, and – owing to a lack of Portuguese vessels available – a British packet 
boat was dispatched by Leake to warn Brazil.  The Portuguese garrison was still taken 
by surprise despite the British message arriving before Duguay-Trouin‘s squadron.  
Due to a mixture of complacency and incompetence, the Portuguese wasted their 
opportunity to prepare an effective defence.
92
  The French were able to land on Cobra 
Island, adjacent to the city, from where they engaged the forts.  Being ill-prepared and 
poorly led, the Portuguese were unable to repel the French when they landed and so 
agreed to pay a ransom for their city.
93
 
It is perhaps ironic, that with all of the preparations made by St John, his 
project ultimately failed to capture the capital of an American empire, whereas the 
French, through private enterprise sanctioned by the state, were at the same time able 
to capture the capital of another American empire, albeit briefly.  This should not be 
compared operationally with Walker‘s failure, however.  The aims of the British and 
French expeditions completely differed, necessitating distinct approaches to their 
tasks.  For Walker and Hill, Quebec would not just be captured – it would be 
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conquered, resulting in New France being administered by the British indefinitely 
unless the peace treaty dictated otherwise.  Duguay-Trouin was merely concerned 
with profit, plunder and revenge, which was achieved.  However, Lisbon realised that 
if it had lost Rio de Janeiro then it was in no position to retake it without the aid of its 
allies.  This would, in effect, have handed the colony to the maritime powers.
94
  The 
attack on Brazil was thus more an act of state-sanctioned piracy than global strategy.  
Also, Duguay-Trouin had an easier navigational task ahead of him, as the captain of 
the Magnanime had previously visited Rio de Janeiro (although it should be 
acknowledged that they showed excellent seamanship in taking such a precise course 
into its harbour).
95
   
Nevertheless, the motives of such a raid should not be used to denigrate the 
scale of the French achievement in Brazil.  The French had to withdraw before 
reinforcements (and better commanders) were brought up from Minas Gerais – 
Duguay-Trouin had no intention of repeating the mistakes Du Clerc made in 1710.
96
  
In the event Duguay-Trouin avenged Du Clerc, made a decent profit and restored a 
little French honour, but also suffered in a similar fashion to Walker.  On his 
homeward voyage he lost two ships near the Azores in a storm, including Duguay-
Trouin‘s most heavily armed ship, the seventy-four-gun Magnanime,97 along with 
much of his booty.
98
  Despite the efforts of Leake to provide warning to Rio de 
Janeiro, the British unfairly received Portuguese protestations about their commitment 
to the protection of Brazil, perhaps concerned about British imperial expansion as 
seen at Gibraltar and Port Mahon.  In 1712 the Cabinet had to reassure the Portuguese 
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envoy that they would do everything within their power to protect the dominions of 
King Pedro.
99
 
 
IV: At Boston 
The fleet arrived at Boston in fairly good time.  Fast packet boat voyages could take 
between four and thirteen weeks to make the journey from London to Boston.  The 
average from 1711 to 1739 was seven and a half weeks.
100
  French vessels usually 
took around seven weeks to reach Acadia, indicating that Walker could expect the 
journey to take the best part of two months, which it did.
101
  The majority of Walker‘s 
fleet arrived at Nantasket Bay, just outside Boston, on 25 June and it was decided that 
to keep the troops in good condition they should disembark and camp on Noddles 
Island opposite the town.  They found that the important matter of victualling was far 
behind schedule, however, as Governor Dudley was absent because he was still 
travelling back from the meeting of the governors at New London.
102
  Upon Dudley‘s 
arrival two days later, Walker got into his stride and started ordering ships to be 
repaired and initiated the acquisition of supplies, setting up a system of credit to be 
used for that purpose.  He was dismayed to find that the Joseph and Neptune 
transports, which had accompanied Nicholson, had not sailed on to New York and 
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ordered their immediate dispatch.
103
  After escorting these storeships, cruisers were to 
patrol Placentia for intelligence.   
One transport was missing from the flotilla that sailed into Boston.  The Mary 
(not to be confused with the Mary earlier detached to New York with the Kingston), 
carrying two companies of Disney‘s, along with clothing, had been lost around the 
Scilly Isles.
104
   It later transpired that the transport had gone to Ireland after losing the 
fleet.
105
  A frigate was ordered to convoy the Mary to Cork before sailing on to 
Boston.  St John, ever mindful of secrecy, ordered that instructions sent to the frigate 
captain were not to be opened until they were 100 leagues west of Ireland.
106
  These 
orders, however, had not been passed on and the Mary was laid up in Ireland for 
another three months.
107
  This enraged St John, who could only guess as to the reasons 
why the master did not sail to Boston: ‗his ignorance, his stupidity or his 
unwillingness to go the voyage‘.108  The Mary was consequently ordered to continue 
to Boston with the Adventure escort of forty-two guns, although the troops were 
eventually sent aboard the frigate, with the Mary discharged and sent to England.
109
   
This was not all.  The clothing for Disney‘s regiment, which was now missing, 
had to be made up by that provided by Blake.  These clothes ‗were found not only 
extremely bad…but wholly unfit for the men‘s wearing in so cold a climate as 
Canada‘.110  The colonels had complained of the quality and that it should be ‗laid 
                                                 
103
 TNA, SP 42/68, Walker to Burchett, 14 August 1711; Walker, ‗Journal‘, introduction, p. 84; Walker 
to Dudley, 14 July 1711, Walker, ‗Journal‘, appendix, p. 202, Walker to Dudley, 14 July 1711; Walker, 
‗Journal‘,  pp. 100, 104, 25 and 28 June 1711. 
104
 TNA, SP 42/68, Hill to St John, 31 July 1711. 
105
 TNA, SP 44/213, St John to Admiralty, 28 May 1711 and report from Dublin, 22 May 1711. 
106
 Ibid., St John to Burchett and ‗Instructions to commander of such ship‘, 29 May 1711. 
107
 Ibid., St John to Admiralty, 20 July 1711. 
108
 Ibid., St John to Hill, 7 August 1711. 
109
 TNA, SP 44/213, Wade to Transports, 29 July 1711; Transports to St John, 9 August 1711; St John 
to Admiralty, 10 August 1711.   
110
 TNA, SP 42/68, Hill to St John, 11 August 1711. 
 193 
before…St John, to show how he and the government have been imposed on [by] the 
[suppliers]‘.111  Incidentally, the quality of uniforms remained poor for the North 
American garrisons in 1713.
112
  The colonels also had concerns about ‗the great 
confusion‘ with pay and mustering as was normally the case with expeditions to the 
‗West Indies‘.113  These issues may have caused grievances down the chain of 
command in what was an already unpopular posting. 
The British military presence at Boston had set a precedent: ‗The force which 
Her Majesty sends is by much the largest that ever appeared in that part of the 
world‘.114  Neither the British nor French colonies had ever seen such a large military 
force.  The sight that would have greeted Bostonians in late June 1711 must have been 
awesome.  The population of Boston exceeded that of New York, yet the Bostonians 
then found themselves heavily outnumbered by soldiers and sailors.  Its population 
consisted of only 6,700 in 1700, rising to a mere 12,000 by 1720.
115
  At least 10,000 
men had just arrived from the Old World, making for an interesting time for the 
locals.  As much of the force was supplied with only three months‘ provisions in an 
effort to deceive the French as to their intended objective, Boston was to make up for 
this deficit.  Due to the comparatively small population of what was then the largest 
city in the British colonies, this part of St John‘s strategy put great strain upon New 
England.  The port itself had to quickly adapt to its visitors.  Visiting vessels usually 
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averaged fifty tons yet Walker‘s flagship, the Humber, rated at almost 1,300.116  This 
was evident by the reaction of visiting Mohawks, who were ‗surprised and amazed, as 
well as pleased, at the bigness of the ship and the number of men and guns which they 
saw‘.117   
To cope with feeding and victualling such a large force, the local breeding 
stock had to be slaughtered, whilst the entire New England market could not meet the 
demand for salted foodstuffs.
118
  The problems were multiplied as Boston was already 
short of food and Walker was not provided with enough money to cover the purchases 
in a market short on supply.  Consequently, bills of credit had to be drawn up.
119
  
During these summer months, fruit and vegetables were only just becoming available, 
whilst the winter‘s salt provisions had mostly been consumed.  Indeed, the city 
usually relied upon other colonies to maintain sufficient food reserves.
120
  Also, 
excess bread, meat and vegetables were sent to the West Indies before the fleet‘s 
arrival.  This could have been prevented if Nicholson had arrived earlier.
121
  Providing 
adequately for the fleet was simply beyond New England‘s capability.  Livestock, 
fruit and vegetables were to be sent to Boston on a daily basis, where they would be 
paid for and sent to the thousands of men occupying Noddles Island.
122
   
Boston could barely afford to feed these new neighbours, let alone amass a 
further supply to feed themselves over the coming months.  The religious zeal of 
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Massachusetts was revealed in Governor Dudley‘s declaration that a fast, on no less 
than three occasions, all Thursdays, would be held to better the prospects of the 
expedition.
123
  Another reason might have been to stretch the supplies of the colony as 
far as possible without overly annoying the local populace.  Problems with equipping 
the fleet with victuals were so acute that, only a week after Walker‘s arrival, an order 
from Dudley demanded that all provisions stored privately should be made available 
to the British, particularly salted provisions.  The aptly named Commissary-General 
Belcher was also ordered to commandeer any such victuals that arrived in port; and 
the Basilisk bomb ketch was employed to stop and search vessels suspected of 
covertly carrying surplus provisions.
124
  The people of Boston would suffer for the 
assistance provided to the expedition as food from Ireland had to be delivered to 
Boston to replace that given to the fleet.
125
  Such problems would add to Walker‘s 
misery when the Whigs returned to power.   
With respect to secrecy, Dudley‘s proclamation of a general fast also referred 
to the three commanders and their responsibilities: General Hill – ‗commander in 
chief of the said forces‘, Sir Hovenden Walker – ‗admiral on the sea part‘, and 
Lieutenant-General Nicholson – ‗on the inland part‘.126  The strategy was thus laid out 
for all to see as the two-pronged assault on Canada was now advertised.  Quebec was 
beginning to look vulnerable.  The French at Quebec were also aware of the British 
visitors.  An English prisoner, perhaps Major Livingston, had informed them that he 
expected the British to strike at Montreal and the rest of Canada.  French ships and 
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spies had passed on intelligence of the arrival of both Nicholson and the fleet, giving a 
fairly accurate description of its composition.  Also, 200 bateaux were described as 
being ready, with another 100 on their way, whilst the Iroquois had been consulted by 
Hunter about their providing a contribution to the expedition.
127
  The Quebecois 
would have been aware of the general clamour in the neighbouring colonies even 
without Dudley‘s proclamations. 
The British regiments faced significant difficulties with desertion at Boston.  
This vexed Hill, as indicated in a number of entries in his journal, and it also affected 
Walker‘s sailors.  5,303 soldiers reportedly sailed with the transports from Plymouth 
and 3,500 effective men were reviewed at Boston, but that is not to suggest that 
almost 2,000 deserted there.
128
  A soldier in Hill‘s, named Carrol, earned the 
distinction of being the first to desert – in England.  He was caught and sentenced to 
prison, but the judge was ordered by Granville to deliver the man back to his 
regiment.
129
  Hill commented that the troops arriving at Boston ‗landed in much better 
condition than we expected, after a voyage of eight weeks‘, but the local populace 
soon encouraged the men to desert to provide labour.  Boredom and the opportunity 
for a better life probably motivated the soldiers and sailors, who idly waited on 
Noddles Island which separated them from the main population of Boston and the 
enticement of better pay.  The commanders attempted to tackle the loss in manpower.  
Those that were caught and not acquitted suffered a variety of punishments, including 
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whipping and death by hanging or firing squad.
130
  A partial solution to the problem 
presented itself in the form of local volunteers.  Many senior officers were glad to fill 
the holes in their ranks and allowed such men to join their regiments.  When Hill 
discovered this he immediately discharged them as the volunteers were black.
131
  
Perhaps this was the first time black men had, albeit fleetingly, served in veteran 
European regiments not permanently stationed in the colonies.
132
   
King, already worried by the weak under-manning of the regiments and 
warships, stated that over 250 men had deserted after a month at Boston.
133
  Such 
problems forced Dudley to issue a proclamation against the harbouring of deserters.  
Those found doing so were penalised, whilst twenty shillings per head would be 
rewarded for the capture of any such soldier or sailor.
134
  Local military companies 
were raised to guard roads and harbours to prevent the leakage of manpower from 
Noddles Island.
135
  Furthermore, an Act of the Massachusetts Assembly was amended 
to punish those harbouring deserters.  Those prosecuted would face a £50 fine or 
twelve months‘ imprisonment.136  The original Act had come into effect on 30 May; 
suggesting there was some forewarning of British intentions before the arrival of 
Nicholson.  Originally, it stated that the punishment for such offences should amount 
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to no more than a £20 fine or six months‘ imprisonment.137  The deserters themselves, 
however, were to avoid punishment, if they so chose, by returning to their units.  Hill 
and Walker issued this declaration out of sheer necessity due to the lack of available 
and experienced manpower.
138
  Later, when the fleet had departed Boston, Dudley 
issued a final proclamation calling for the arrest of any deserters found, as they were 
then clearly unable to provide any service with the expedition.  It is interesting to note 
that this proclamation also stated quite openly that: ‗Her Majesty‘s fleet and forces 
being sailed this day on the designed expedition against Canada‘.139   The secret was 
not just public knowledge, but actively advertised by government proclamation in 
direct contravention to Dudley‘s ninth instruction, which emphasised the importance 
of secrecy.  Another proclamation had stated that the expedition was a response to 
French ‗insults‘ in North America.140  Obviously, it was too late for the French to 
prevent the expedition from reaching Quebec, but it would provide those forces that 
were in Canada with confirmation, allowing them to concentrate on improving their 
defences and organising their troops. 
Conversely, Walker was pleased to hear that a blow against New France had 
been struck.  The Chester, which he earlier sent to patrol Placentia, had captured a 
French ten-gun sloop, the Neptune (not to be confused with the transport of the same 
name), which was transporting thirty extra soldiers for the Quebec garrison.
141
  
However, this news could not make ammends for the constant desertion of seamen.  
Total numbers of deserters are sketchy, but at the fleet‘s sailing at least eighty-eight 
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sailors had not returned to their posts on the warships alone.  Those that had deserted 
from the transports were not included in this figure, although Walker stated that 
several of these vessels would not sail because of this exodus.  Indeed, the Admiral 
echoed the concern of the master of the Rebecca transport whose crew had absconded 
with his boat.
142
  Other masters had also referred the desertion of their men to Walker 
with the Samuel and Anne and Queen Anne losing four and ten men respectively.
143
  
This posed a great hindrance as transports were in great demand to take on the 
additional provincial troops from New England and extra stores.  Their crews would 
number from as little as eight men to around thirty for the larger vessels.
144
  Losing 
even a small number of men, therefore, could represent up to half a ship‘s crew.  This 
further strained British-colonial relations, as Walker complained to Dudley that not 
enough was being done to prevent desertion – actively encouraged by the Bostonians 
– or to promote the recruitment of sailors to man the expedition‘s auxiliary vessels.   
In order to emphasise the seriousness of the situation, Walker declared, for the 
sake of argument, that if he were to meet Duguay-Trouin (as intelligence captured 
from the Neptune conveniently indicated that Boston may be the privateer‘s target), he 
would not be able to face him, being so weakly manned and that he could only blame 
the colony for this.  In response the Massachusetts Council pointed out that they had 
raised 1,160 troops for the expedition – 160 above their quota – along with 160 sailors 
and several equipped vessels.  The Council pointed out that if the French were to 
arrive at Boston, such forces would be needed to repel them there as the remaining 
manpower would be needed to bring in the harvest – the need for which had been 
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exacerbated by the strain in providing for the expedition.  Nevertheless, despite these 
concerns, Hill was allowed these colonial troops as the example of the threat to 
Boston was considered to be minimal and only employed in the argument to counter 
Walker‘s criticism.145  The Admiral concluded this spat by ungratefully suggesting 
that the expedition would be better served if the additional 160 Massachusetts troops 
were sailors instead.
146
  The information from the Neptune offered various other 
suggestions for Duguay-Trouin‘s objective and Walker did not regard him as a threat, 
but he, nevertheless, prepared to sail as soon as was feasible.
147
   
These manpower shortages were also exacerbated by sickness, as was often 
the case with long voyages.  Remarkably, the vast majority of the men had arrived in 
good health, although some ‗booths‘ were erected on islands near Boston for the 
reception of the sick.
148
  Disease afflicted some of the seamen at Boston, but to what 
extent is unknown; whilst 100 soldiers were in hospital, but all were making a good 
recovery.
149
  Rumours of smallpox on Noddles Island proved unfounded and Hill was 
relieved to see that provisions were more forthcoming, flooding into camp because of 
this rumour, which stopped the soldiers visiting Boston: ‗Consequently they had not 
so many opportunities of drinking rum to excess, which had thrown several of them 
into violent fevers that were now the only distempers which appeared to be in the 
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hospital.‘150  For an early eighteenth-century operation in the Americas, it was a 
miracle that disease did not have a greater effect.
151
 
Enforcing discipline was not only a problem for Noddle‘s Island.  Walker held 
a court-martial upon his arrival to deal with the indiscipline of two of his captains on 
the voyage from England.  It was necessary for such a large fleet to be kept intact on a 
transatlantic passage, so the warships were directed to repeat signals given by Walker 
in the Humber for the benefit of the transports.  The tempting sighting of a small 
French bark on 29 May instigated both Captain Butler of the Dunkirk and Captain 
Soanes of the Edgar to ignore their orders to keep formation to engage in the thrill of 
the chase.  This was only a few days before the journey was blighted by fog, which 
broke up part of the fleet – a period when it was essential for signals to be repeated by 
the cannon of the warships.  The Edgar returned the day after parting and before the 
fleet was immersed in fog.  Soanes was consequently fined three months‘ pay at 
Boston.  Butler, on the other hand did not return to the fleet and was dismissed from 
his command and discharged from the navy.  Ironically the Dunkirk arrived at Boston 
before Walker, although this was obviously because Butler had abandoned the slower 
transports lost in the fog.
152
  In contrast to the strictness shown to deserters and these 
captains, further courts martial were held in response to overzealous practitioners of 
discipline.  Lieutenant Done of the Sunderland received a ‗severe and public 
reprimand‘ for striking a gunner who was disrespectful towards him, whilst 
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Lieutenant Cole of the Monmouth was acquitted for punishing, by whipping, the 
negligent Midshipman Swanton without notifying his captain.
153
 
Whilst some regulars were running away, colonials were being raised.  A 
proclamation was issued on 12 June that an expedition was to take place, so the 
militia was called out and further troops recruited.
154
   The response of Massachusetts 
was impressive as nearly a quarter of its able men volunteered.
155
  Together, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island raised two regiments between 
them.  Samuel Vetch commanded the Massachusetts men, whilst Colonel Walton took 
charge of the joint New Hampshire-Rhode Island regiment.
156
  New Hampshire may 
have struggled to provide men as half of its militia was guarding its border from 
Indian raids.
157
 1,160 New England troops joined Hill‘s battalions for service at 
Quebec.
158
  Despite being the instigator of the strategy and his close involvement with 
previous operations, Vetch, as governor of Annapolis Royal, was oblivious to the 
existence of an expedition until June when Walker‘s fleet arrived at Boston.159  He 
hoped that his project, first laid down in 1708, would bear fruit.   
Significantly, the Bostonians themselves were eyed with the greatest suspicion 
by the expedition‘s officers.  Apart from encouraging desertion, they refused to work 
on Sundays and many were unwilling to offer services for credit.  This served to give 
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an impression that they were deliberately impeding the expedition.  The colonial 
instinct to make a profit narrowed the exchange rate of sterling with Massachusetts 
bills.  The problems of supply and demand led to prices rising fifteen per cent in less 
than a month, a devalued currency and an urgent requirement for Walker to raise cash 
so that the expedition could have even the slightest hope of sailing to Quebec.
160
  
Walker threatened to go elsewhere rather than be charged at such a rate and Belcher 
resigned from his difficult task.
161
  These financial woes caused further delay as the 
colonial authorities with the power to resolve such issues were not scheduled to meet 
until 18 July.  When a council did meet it reversed the exchange rate which furnished 
Walker with greater purchasing power, although prices had risen anyway owing to 
demand (and the deliberate hoarding of goods by the colonials to induce this).
162
   
The Bostonians seemed more concerned about profit than security, but it must 
be reiterated how they had been let down by politicians in London over the years on 
numerous occasions and at great expense to themselves.  Walker and Hill were 
understandably infuriated by the entire situation, although it is fair to say that Dudley 
and other high-ranking colonial officials did try their utmost to help.  Walker seemed 
exasperated by the efforts he needed to take at Boston.  Referring to his time there 
when he served under Captain St Lo, he thought the slowness with which the 
Bostonians worked unjustified, especially given that ‗when at London, [I] represented 
the people of this country with all the advantage I thought due to them, from the 
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knowledge I had of them, when here about twenty-five years since‘.163  A once 
favourable impression had significantly altered.  The expedition‘s presence only 
demonstrated the growing divide between motherland and colony.  
 
V: Pilots 
For such an ambitious task, suitable pilots were needed to navigate the St Lawrence 
effectively – a river that the Royal Navy had never before encountered, let alone 
charted.  Walker‘s best available chart was The English Pilot published in 1706.164  It 
did not describe the passage of the St Lawrence and it positioned Quebec incorrectly 
as it appeared two degrees further south than it actually is.
165
  Captain Cyprian 
Southack was commonly regarded to be the best pilot in New England.  He was not 
utilised upon the expedition, however.  The charts that he produced were also 
inaccurate, as evidenced by his near contemporaries.  John Green commented on 
Southack‘s New England Coasting Pilot: ‗this is the first time perhaps that ever a 
person bred to the sea undertook to make a chart of so great an extent of coast, 
without ever taking a single latitude; and for the honour of navigators, as well as 
safety of navigation, I hope it may be the last.‘  William Douglas echoed Green‘s 
sentiments, but was even more scathing: ‗[Southack‘s] large chart of the coast of 
Nova Scotia and New England being one continued error, and a random performance, 
may be of pernicious consequence in trade and navigation; therefore it ought to be 
publicly advertised as such and destroyed wherever it is found amongst sea charts.‘166  
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More recently, Southack has been described as one who ‗mentions successes and 
omits failures‘.167  Therefore, if Southack had been allowed to take prime 
responsibility for the navigation of the St Lawrence, then the fleet certainly could not 
be guaranteed respite from its dangers.  Southack did not chart the river until 1714 in 
any case.
168
   
Walker lodged at Southack‘s house whilst at Boston, having been advised that 
he was the best pilot and because he also commanded Massachusetts‘s guardship, the 
ten-gun Province Galley.  Southack had actually protested at his own suitability for 
service on the expedition, stating that he had never sailed beyond Sept-Iles in the 
mouth of the St Lawrence.
169
   He also asserted, after meeting him, that Walker‘s 
French pilot from Plymouth was the best man for the job.
170
  Additionally, Southack 
drew up a list of thirteen potential pilots for Nicholson, who were directed to meet 
with Walker.  He had also been tasked with accumulating all available charts and 
plates of the St Lawrence for Walker to study.  Fifty copies of some charts were 
printed for distribution amongst the fleet.
171
  Southack was given huge responsibility, 
receiving his orders even before the arrival of Walker.
172
   
Eight of the thirteen pilots were asked to attend Walker, but they were less 
than enthusiastic about the prospect of sailing to Quebec.
173
  There was some 
difficulty in tracing several of them.  Abraham Miller, for example, could not be 
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found by the constable of Charlestown.  Such news was concerning to Walker as time 
was passing and he needed to leave Boston as soon as he could.
174
  The qualifications 
of these pilots were not impressive.  Impressed into service on the expedition, they 
were picked because they were deemed to be ‗skilful mariners‘.  In fact, owing to the 
dearth of experience of the St Lawrence, the only qualification required was that they 
must have sailed up and down the river ‗at least once‘.  Captain Gilbert was required 
to serve because he had commanded a ship which had sailed with Phips in 1690 – 
twenty-one years previously.  Captain Harris was master of the same ship, whilst 
pilots Carlisle and Jenkins had also been present in 1690.  Jeffrey Bedgood was 
master of a sloop involved with the exchange of prisoners at Quebec in 1705, whilst 
John Bonner undertook a similar mission in 1706.  Hence Bonner was allocated to 
pilot Walker‘s ship as his experience was the most recent.175  Opportunities for New 
Englanders to sail up the St Lawrence were scarce.  Only Phips‘ expedition and 
prisoner exchanges afforded the chance as, Vetch aside, trade was not conducted with 
New France even during peacetime.
176
  Evidently most of these pilots had only 
experienced the river on one occasion, mostly in fairly small vessels.  Even those who 
had sailed with Phips did not face the same challenge as Walker, as he brought 
significantly larger and more numerous vessels into the river.  Indeed, those present 
on Phips‘ expedition suffered at the hands of the weather, when their fleet was 
scattered on their return with some ships lost. 
The use of French navigational knowledge was not much better either, as even 
their many years of experience did not really amount to a working knowledge of the 
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river.
177
  The French used inaccurate Dutch maps of the Atlantic that were generally 
disposed of once the St Lawrence was reached, replaced by charts drawn up by local 
pilots.
178
  Nevertheless, Walker took into his employ the French sailor he had 
encountered in Plymouth who had subsequently impressed Southack.  Vetch took the 
opposite opinion of the Frenchman, however, when he complained that he was ‗an 
ignorant, pretending, idle, drunken fellow‘.179  Walker replied that he ‗never intended 
to trust him any farther than [he] could throw him‘.180  Another Frenchman, the 
captain of the captured Neptune, was bribed to guide the fleet.  He was sent by Hill to 
accompany Walker as he was deemed competent and knowledgeable of the navigation 
of the St Lawrence.
181
  Rumours of his duplicity and involvement in delaying the 
fleet‘s progress are thought to be unfounded, but if, as is believed, the identity of this 
pilot is a Captain Paradis, then he himself had been wrecked upon the St Lawrence in 
1704.
182
 
Walker was also concerned with the viability of operating in the St Lawrence 
in the latter stages of the year when the river freezes.  Ice becomes a problem in the 
autumn.  During the nineteenth century, the river was closed, on average, from late 
November to late April, whilst in May the navigation remained hazardous due to the 
break-up of ice.
183
  The fog that can descend upon the St Lawrence at any time is 
often accompanied by rain and easterly winds, which turns into thick snow in October 
and November.  The fog is at its thickest when it is calm and can often lie just above 
the water, concealing the danger of rocks, whilst a clear view from the vessel can 
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engender a sense of complacency.  Gales and storms are also frequent.
184
  The French 
in 1711 had only recently lost some transport ships on the St Lawrence which were 
destined for Placentia.  Furthermore, Paradis claimed that eight ships were lost on the 
river in 1710, with many lost each year.
185
 
There was not much more that Walker could have done to ensure that he 
possessed the best navigational picture of the St Lawrence.  The preparations for 
creating a suitable pool of experienced pilots had even commenced before his arrival.  
Governor Dudley had the foresight to secure the services of Captain Southack for the 
expedition and lodged Walker in his quarters, so that the Admiral was as well 
prepared for the St Lawrence as possible.  Whilst this was a sensible course to take, 
assembling the pilots was a lengthy process and, given their unenthusiastic response 
to aiding the fleet, it did not help the speedy dispatch of the expedition.  Indeed, 
Walker was still concerned by mid-July that pilots were not forthcoming.  Mindful of 
the need to acquire local expertise, Walker knew that he could not rely upon those 
pilots compelled to serve given their sheer inexperience for the task ahead. 
 
VI: Sailing for Quebec 
It was decided not to send eighty-gun ships down the St Lawrence as they were 
thought unfit to sail into the river due to their size.  Instead, they would patrol the Bay 
of St Lawrence to prevent French sloops from reaching Quebec, but also to pass 
communications on to several British frigates and transports that would follow the 
main fleet.  Walker‘s flag was, therefore, transferred to the Edgar, whilst Hill would 
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be carried in the Windsor, both vessels of seventy-guns.
186
  First they had to find their 
way.  Despite a lack of knowledge of the St Lawrence, Walker did his utmost to 
ensure the voyage was as safe as possible.  An armada of seventy-seven vessels of 
varying types and sizes departed Boston on 30 July.  Such a journey cannot be 
adequately compared with that of Phips‘ voyage in 1690, which included less than 
half the number of Walker‘s vessels, each being of a much smaller tonnage.  The 
logistical aspect of conveying such a fleet through uncharted and dangerous waters 
was a daunting one.  Walker organised the transports into three divisions, each led by 
the warships, with the Humber and Devonshire, the eighty-gunners, taking up their 
positions to the rear.  A place of rendezvous had been identified, if poor weather 
caused the fleet to fragment, at Spanish River (modern Sydney) on Cape Breton 
Island.  Walker‘s flagship sailed in the van.187 
The expedition offered the chance to relieve the garrison at Annapolis Royal 
which had been severely depleted by disease since its capture the previous year.
188
  
Vetch, as governor, also had a difficult time battling with Indians who had killed 
some of his troops, whilst many of his marines deserted as they were allegedly ‗Irish 
papists‘.189  Captain Southack was sent to Annapolis Royal to take on the marines and 
some extra coehoorn mortars for use on the expedition.  Two companies of New 
Englanders were garrisoned in their place, but it is not known if Deputy-Governor 
Hobby allowed the withdrawal of the marines as he had already refused their 
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deployment with the fleet once before.
190
  Meanwhile, the fleet progressed at a steady 
pace, but sheltered at Gaspé Bay as their approach to the St Lawrence was met by 
strong winds which risked scattering the fleet.  Here they acquired wood and water, 
and a French fishing vessel was seized by the crew of the Monmouth and burnt, along 
with some small settlements ashore.
191
   
Hill‘s unease since leaving Boston soon became apparent in a desperate letter 
that he scribbled to St John.  Previously, he had appeared very calm and efficient in 
the administration of his command.  Hill implied that if he failed, then it would be St 
John‘s fault for employing a general ‗so little capable‘ and it demonstrated that many 
on the expedition were Tories: ‗all your friends with me are well‘.  He further stated 
that all matters for settling government and colony business should be referred to 
Walker, which would contravene his orders.  Of course, Walker already had 
experience in dealing with difficult colonials.  Hill pleaded ‗for God‘s sake let me 
come home when I have done my business‘.192  Qualms were arising about how he 
would perform in such a remote and alien environment and were taking their toll.  
This is not to take away from Hill the fact that he had been a decent, capable and 
brave commander.  It had been less than two years since he had been injured in action 
at Mons, after suffering the indignity of being made a prisoner in Spain.  He probably 
never wanted to go to Canada, but was the pawn St John needed to gain the Queen‘s 
support and it is clear that he was prepared to do his duty.  Walker‘s fears of the 
approaching season were at the forefront of his mind.  There was a distinct possibility 
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that the fleet might get stranded at Quebec once the St Lawrence began to ice over.  
Walker even envisioned a scenario where his ships would have to be hauled onto land 
in cradles to prevent ice damage.
193
 
It was therefore essential that the fleet made good progress and Walker 
continued his voyage up the St Lawrence.  Despite being battered by heavy gales, fog 
increasingly enveloped the fleet to the point where, lacking precise charts, they were 
sailing blind.
194
  Consequently, the pilots could not be certain of setting a precise 
course, owing to both the fog and the currents.  Equally, there were no soundings to 
judge the distance from shore (the current and drift would create an inaccurate result 
and parts of the St Lawrence were too deep).
195
  Consequently, they had little choice 
but to navigate according to pure guesswork.  Walker brought the fleet too, facing 
south, because of the strong winds and currents in an effort to drift mid-course on the 
river.  No danger was detected and it was assumed, accurately, that they were moving 
closer to the north shore.  Setting a slight sail, Walker changed tack to proceed 
towards the south shore.  He retired for the night on 23 August, comfortable in the 
knowledge of steady progress on an uncharted route, despite the poor visibility and 
stormy weather.  Such actions demonstrate a confidence that his detractors do not 
normally associate with Walker.  Those who were navigating could only judge their 
position from where they last sighted land and Walker had the concurrence of his 
flag-captain, George Paddon,
196
 his master and the pilots.
197
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Just as Walker was retiring to bed, two and a half hours after changing tack, 
Paddon alerted Walker that he saw the south shore.  From the comfort of his cabin, 
Walker naturally ordered a change of tack in order to head back towards the north 
shore once again.  It was likely that Paddon had in fact sighted the Île aux Œufs (Isle 
of Eggs) which lay one mile from the north shore.  Shortly after, an alarmed Captain 
Goddard of Seymour‘s regiment entered Walker‘s cabin to notify him that they were 
surrounded by breakers.  The Admiral remained calm, trusting his naval officers 
rather than this soldier: ‗I had little regard to what he said, believing it to be the result 
only of his fear that might make him see danger where there was none‘.  Goddard was 
dismissed, but again returned in an agitated state.  Walker, hearing a commotion on 
deck, put on his gown and slippers to investigate.  The French pilot had not been on 
deck, but when he appeared he confirmed to Walker that it was the north shore.  
Nobody had expected this.  Visibility must certainly have been very poor, otherwise 
the watch officers would have spotted the impending danger sooner.  That Walker had 
not been roused by a sailor is not as inexplicable as has been suggested as surely all 
hands would have been working to avert disaster, leaving a landsman to act as the 
messenger.
198
   
The Monmouth, which led the division furthest from the shore, saw the land a 
mile away in the darkness as the fog cleared and immediately ‗contradicted the signal‘ 
to change tack and heard the guns of the endangered vessels frantically firing their 
warning.
199
  A simple navigational error due to the fog had combined with opposing 
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currents to push the fleet against their assumed heading.  Walker recorded that they 
were at least forty-five miles further west than was indicated in their logs.
200
  The 
confusion over their position can be adequately explained by the fact that the St 
Lawrence rapidly narrows from approximately seventy to twenty-five miles wide near 
to the Isle of Eggs, as the north shore sharply juts south.  Ships sailing on a direct 
mid-channel course, therefore, would meet the north shore, which geographically 
could more accurately be described as the west shore at this point. 
Still, Walker managed to regain control of the situation.  Paddon, in a panic, 
had released an anchor before Walker could oppose its deployment.  The Admiral 
ordered the cable cut so that they could sail away from danger to the safety of mid-
channel.  By morning, the Edgar had reached the south shore and was tacking to the 
north again.  Here, Walker learned of the loss of several transports, and also that the 
Windsor and Montague, along with some other troopships, had to anchor for the night 
as they had been caught between the shore and Isle of Eggs.  Whilst the fleet had 
sailed extremely close to the mainland, these islands lying just over a mile from the 
north shore were the cause of the expedition‘s demise.  The vessels caught amongst 
the islands faced a constant fight throughout the night against the rocky peril often 
only yards away.  They were in constant fear of hitting the rocks as their anchors 
could have dragged them onto the islands because of the strong currents.  However, 
owing to the proximity of the islands, they could not cut their cables either because 
they may have drifted onto them.  All they could do was wait for calmer weather and 
daylight.
201
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Given that the Edgar‟s records were subsequently lost, the logs from the 
Windsor, Hill‘s ship, and the Montague best serve to confirm Walker‘s account and 
give an accurate picture of the night‘s events, as they were closest to the tragedy.  
Captains Arris and Walton had recorded that there was a thick fog and strong winds 
blowing on the night in question.  Guns were fired in the fleet every hour to transmit 
instructions and to try and keep the fleet together.  At eleven o‘clock in the evening, it 
became apparent that they were close to the shore and the Windsor could not keep its 
position, necessitating the cutting of cables in order to effect a difficult escape before 
anchoring again in the hope they would not strike the rocks.  At the same time the 
unfortunate transports were wrecked.  The Montague was slightly more fortunate, 
although it too was surrounded by rocks a quarter of a mile from shore.  They had 
anchored in a good place with a decent depth of seven fathoms, whilst smaller ships 
assisted her throughout the night.
202
  Logs show that the fleet was plagued by thick 
fogs since after it set out from Gaspé Bay two days previously.
203
  King, also on the 
Windsor, gave a similar account to the logs.  He stated that they had travelled forty-
five miles westward in the fog and were brought to a halt in fear of meeting the shore.  
They too were surprised to see the rocks, as they were convinced they were in mid-
channel.  The Windsor could not sail away and had to anchor, riding a storm that 
suddenly ceased in the early hours.  The wind fortunately shifted to the north, 
allowing them to break their strained cables and sail clear of the rocks.  ‗All the night 
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we heard nothing but ships firing and showing lights as in the utmost distress‘.204  It 
was remarkable that the warships escaped unscathed and that Walker was able to 
safely guide the rest of the fleet away from imminent peril. 
The result was the loss of seven transports carrying soldiers, a storeship and a 
sutler‘s sloop from New England.  At least 705 officers and men from Seymour‘s, 
Windress‘, Kane‘s and Clayton‘s regiments were lost, in addition to thirty-five 
women.
205
  Approximately 150 sailors also drowned.
206
  Colonel Lee, commander of 
the Rhode Island contingent, reported that children were also amongst the dead.
207
  
These were perhaps drummer boys (twenty-seven drummers were killed) or offspring 
of the women lost.
208
  Also, many minors were listed as subalterns in some of the 
regiments, but may not have actually been present with the expedition due to the usual 
practices of the period.
209
  Most of the transports lost were in the right-hand division 
of the fleet, which is logical, being closest to the north shore; however, the warships 
experiencing most difficulty were in the central division, as was one transport, the 
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Marlborough, which was lost.
210
  However, it might be assumed that the formation of 
the fleet altered upon entering the foggy St Lawrence.  Walker ordered the Leopard 
and two tenders to scan the shore for survivors, where any seamen found were to be 
put aboard the Windsor which was very weakly manned.
211
  Almost 500 men were 
saved from the wrecked transports.
212
 
After a day‘s recovery Walker tried to find an anchorage but was told Sept-Iles 
was inappropriate.  He felt uncomfortable returning all the way to Gaspé as it was at 
the very mouth of the river.  Walker decided it was necessary to confer with Hill.  The 
General determined that a consultation of the sea officers should be held.  In addition, 
Walker asked for the pilots to attend.  Unusually, Walker, as commander of the naval 
forces, had to go aboard the Windsor, Hill‘s ship, to meet him and hold the 
consultation.  Walker was not concerned about blame for the disaster; however, he 
was worried that if he proceeded further upriver without his captains‘ agreement, then 
if a second catastrophe occurred he would have no ‗excuse‘.  A decision to return was 
likely when some of the captains relinquished responsibility by saying that they had 
not previously been consulted, at Boston, about the feasibility of the navigation.  
Walker‘s instructions explicitly forbade any other possibility other than to sail for 
Quebec.  The pilots all stated that they were unqualified to safely take the fleet further 
– which the captains said was well known before they left Boston.213  Walker was 
slowly losing the support of his squadron to proceed with his instructions.  It was 
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decided to abandon the attempt on account that the pilots were ignorant of the river, 
two admitting that they had only been soldiers, not sailors, on Phips‘ expedition.214   
This consultation was Walker‘s insurance policy for not continuing on to 
Quebec.  It was also one of the greatest errors made by St John.  His instructions left 
little room for operational flexibility.  The secrecy surrounding his project meant no 
professional advice was taken about the feasibility of the navigation of the St 
Lawrence.  Pilots and expert navigators, or cartographers, should have been appointed 
to aid Walker from the beginning, with the Admiralty assisting in this critical matter.  
It was Dudley who attempted to find proper pilots for Walker, but those that were 
found were not considered to fully understand the river and the decision to abandon 
the attack on Quebec was unanimous.
215
  Walker set a course to rendezvous at either 
Gaspé or Spanish River.
216
  Meanwhile, in Britain during the week of the disaster, The 
Evening Post reported that Walker and Hill were sailing up the ‗Quebec‘ river and 
Nicholson was marching by land to Quebec, with a wildly exaggerated force of 4,000 
‗English inhabitants‘ and 8,000 Indians.217   
 
VII: Nicholson’s Expedition 
Nicholson was not, of course, immediately aware of what had happened on the St 
Lawrence.  His march to Montreal, combined with the planned simultaneous assault 
on Quebec, would have held New France in a pincer movement, although its prime 
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aim was to prevent reinforcements from strengthening Quebec.  The instructions were 
again specific.  Nicholson was to march via Lake Champlain and after 
 
reducing Chambly and Sorel
218
 get in the River Canada [St Lawrence], about the time our 
squadron and forces shall arrive at Quebec, in order to intercept any assistance that place may 
expect from Trois-Rivieres or Montreal, which place being only [defended by a palisade] may 
be taken sword in hand, [or] at least blocked up until the affair of Quebec is determined.
219
 
 
Even if they found Montreal to be lightly defended, this was an arduous task for the 
invaders given the route they would take and the logistical complexities it would 
involve.  With Walker‘s retreat, there was no support and supply lines would have 
been overly extended.  Montreal did not boast great defensive works (it was protected 
by a wooden palisade and a wooden fort), however, there were approximately thirty 
small forts controlling the approaches to the city; some were primitive and built of 
wood, others of stone.
220
  The frustrating order to retreat saved Nicholson‘s men from 
annihilation as they would have stumbled into a superior French force and were 
already succumbing to disease.
221
 
The Mary storeship (not to be confused with the ship stranded in Ireland) 
detached from Walker‘s fleet with the Kingston on 22 May, carried uniforms, artillery 
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and miscellaneous stores for the land expedition‘.222  Due to fog and contrary winds 
and currents, it did not arrive at New York until 12 July, but the Mary also ran 
aground in the bay delaying it further.
223
  The good news was that the Joseph and 
Neptune transports carrying the ordnance supplies and the thirty lieutenants, which 
Nicholson left at Boston, had finally arrived on 11 July.
224
  These were the transports 
St John had organised first, so that they could reach New York as early as March, yet 
they docked over two weeks after Walker‘s arrival at Boston. 
Benjamin Ashe of New York noted Nicholson‘s arrival and even that of 
Walker‘s fleet, as well as its composition.  If he knew of this then the Quebecois 
certainly did.  Ashe reported that 150 cedar wood flat-bottomed boats were being built 
in New York, each capable of holding about twenty men.  They were expected to be 
ready around 18 June, whilst more were being built at Albany.
225
  It would have been 
clear, combined with the sudden raising of troops, what their purpose was and Ashe 
wished the expedition great success.  Nicholson‘s army consisted of approximately 
2,300 men, including British regulars of the independent companies based in New 
York, and around 800 Indians of the Five Nations of the Iroquois.
226
  Of the colonials, 
                                                 
222
 Walker, ‗Journal‘, p. 98, 22 May 1711 and appendix, p. 179, list of transports; TNA, CO 5/898, 
King‘s journal, 21 May 1711, also in Graham, ‗The Walker Expedition to Quebec‘, p. 318. 
223
 TNA, CO 5/898, King‘s journal, 17 July 1711, also in Graham, ‗The Walker Expedition to Quebec‘, 
pp. 324; TNA, CO 5/9, Hill‘s journal, 13 July 1711; also in Graham, ‗The Walker Expedition to 
Quebec‘, p. 346; Walker, ‗Journal‘, appendix, p. 210, Hunter to Walker, 14 July 1711. 
224
 Walker, ‗Journal‘, appendix, pp. 203-204, Hunter to Walker, 12 July 1711. 
225
 The Bodleian Library, Oxford (hereafter cited as BLO), Clarendon MSS, vol.102/210, Ashe to an 
unknown recipient, 6 July 1711.  These boats may have been for Hill and Walker as Hunter was 
building 330 batteaux at Albany, each of which could carry six men and their provisions, CSPC, 1711-
1712, pp. 100-104, no. 96, Hunter to [St John?], 12 September 1711.  
226
 The quotas were: New York 600; Connecticut 360; East and West Jersey 180 each and Pennsylvania 
240.  TNA, CO 5/898/33 and CSPC, 1710-1711, pp. 556-560, no. 893, minutes of a council of war,  21 
June 1711, also Graham, ‗The Walker Expedition to Quebec‘, pp. 302-307; ibid., p. 308, Dudley to St 
John, 11 July 1711; Osgood, The American Colonies, I, p. 442.  However, Hunter to Board of Trade 17 
August 1711, Graham, ‗The Walker Expedition to Quebec‘, p. 310, stated that the Pennsylvania troops 
did not arrive which conforms with their Quaker principles, whilst the other colonies were just short of 
their quotas but fully supplied.  Hunter makes clear the Indian contribution was 800.  Morgan, William 
Thomas, ‘The Five Nations and Queen Anne‘, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. XIII, 
 220
300 were Palatines, possibly volunteering through economic necessity.
227
  The troops 
were distributed into three regiments plus the Indian contingent.  Colonel 
Ingoldesby‘s consisted of 600 men, including the regulars from New York which, due 
to a number of invalids being amongst their ranks, had to be made up by 100 Palatines 
and around 200 men raised in the Jerseys.  Schuyler‘s regiment of 550 men included 
provincials raised in New York, ninety Long Island and Connecticut Indians (‗these 
sea-coast Indians being of great use for managing batteaux and canoes and all other 
hard labour‘) and the remaining 200 Palatines.  The 360 men raised in Connecticut – 
the only colony to meet its quota for Nicholson‘s force – formed Colonel Whiteing‘s 
regiment.
228
 
Part of this landward colonial thrust was planned to split from Nicholson to 
carry out another mission.  Major Livingston, who visited Quebec after taking Port 
Royal, was to be sent with 100 provincials and 300 Indians to reconnoitre and act as a 
forward unit to prevent the juncture at Quebec of all of New France‘s troops.  He was 
also entrusted to carry a ‗manifesto‘ to distribute amongst the people of New France 
‗to incline them with more ease to submit themselves to the Queen‘.229  Once that was 
completed he was to conceal himself, and his small number of Indian companions, in 
the woods around Quebec to gain intelligence, which would be disseminated to Hill 
                                                                                                                                            
no.2. (September, 1926), p. 187, n. 80, indicates a dispute in Indian numbers where there were said to 
be over 1,000, however, the Reverend Buckingham estimated there to be around 600 in camp, although 
more may have been scouting elsewhere, Acorn Club, Roll and Journal of Connecticut Service in 
Queen Anne‟s War, 1710-1711, The Acorn Club, Thirteenth publication, (New Haven, 1916) (hereafter 
cited as Buckingham, ‗Diary‘), p. 34, 1 September 1711.  The regulars were the northern American 
colonies garrison which theoretically consisted of four companies of 100 men, two at New York and 
two at Albany, Chartrand, Colonial American Troops, I, p. 13.  Of course the thirty lieutenants would 
also be included in this force. 
227
 Black, Crisis of Empire, p. 36; Dickinson, H. T., ‗The Poor Palatines and the Parties‘, The English 
Historical Review, vol. LXXXII, no. 324 (July, 1967), p. 482; CSPC, 1711-1712, p. 194, no. 251, 
Hunter to the council, 1 January 1712; Morgan, ‗The Five Nations and Queen Anne‘, p. 187, correctly 
asserted that the Palatines and Indians made up approximately half of the army. 
228
 CSPC, 1711-1712, pp. 100-104, no. 96, Hunter to [St John?], 12 September 1711. 
229
 Walker, ‗Journal‘, pp. 112, 115, 6-7 July 1711; TNA, CO 5/898/21, Manifesto. 
 221 
upon the arrival of the fleet.  King remarked that ‗these 400 men can alarm the 
country as well as 4,000‘ although Walker stated he was only to take ‗two or three‘ 
Indians.
230
  Livingston was already familiar with the territory, and also the task, as he 
had married the daughter of Major-General Winthrop who led the overland expedition 
in 1690.
231
  Preparations for the 2,300 men took a substantial amount of time as 
Nicholson did not leave Albany until the end of August – after Walker had abandoned 
the Quebec expedition. 
Fortunately, the diary of Reverend Thomas Buckingham survives to relate the 
experiences of Nicholson‘s expedition.232  Whilst he only travelled with the 
Connecticut companies and did not receive any personal insights from Nicholson or 
his headquarters, Buckingham offers an account of the expedition from the viewpoint 
of the infantry.  His account reveals an impressive organisational capability on the 
part of the colonials in their difficult journey north.  This industriousness was 
unfortunately wasted as news arrived of the mishap in the St Lawrence.  Nevertheless, 
this expedition serves to illustrate the growing confidence and abilities of the 
Americans.  Buckingham‘s diary describes the activities of the Connecticut forces 
raised for the expedition and their journey as far as Fort Nicholson, from where they 
retreated.  This would have been familiar territory to many British, French and 
indigenous forces fighting during the Seven Years War.  Later in the century, the area 
would see particularly ferocious fighting when many more British and French forts 
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were established and would see the innovative use of irregular forces such as Roger‘s 
Rangers.
233
  Isolated, and being true wilderness, the area would lead to the 
development of new types of warfare suited to the woodland environment half a world 
away from the regimented structure of European battlefields. 
Nicholson would not get the opportunity to fight here, however.  It was as well 
that he did not, as the season was very late in the year when they headed out into the 
wilderness.  It was 28 August before the Connecticut companies had even left their 
rendezvous point at Albany in the colony of New York.
234
  At this point Walker was 
already contemplating what to do next, having abandoned the attempt on Quebec.
235
  
It was risky that Nicholson was even prepared to proceed with the expedition at such a 
late stage in the year.  Marlborough‘s siege at Bouchain had been successfully 
concluded in mid-September allowing the armies of Flanders to enter into winter 
quarters.
236
  The Canadian weather would soon become much harsher than the milder 
climate of Europe.  If any tragedy were to occur, be it through sickness, extended 
lines of communication, or even military defeat, the impending weather conditions 
could only hamper and decimate such a small force, as escaping the clutches of the 
climate would not be a quick process.  After the aborted expedition Buckingham did 
not return to Albany until 1 October.  It was thanks to the good organisation of this 
hardy force of colonials that he was able to make this journey through wilderness in 
only eleven days.  It would still take him another eleven, however, for Buckingham to 
return to his native Connecticut to be reunited with his family.
237
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Nicholson did not even travel halfway from Albany to Montreal.  It took over 
one month to complete his seventy mile advance, establishing supply depots, sending 
out scouting parties, and maintaining camp sites.  All of this was done in relative 
safety from French and Indian attack.  Progressing further required increasing caution 
as they had started to meet Indian tribes allied with the French at Lake George.  Small 
French scouting parties were also believed to have been in the area, searching out 
Nicholson as many of his men fell sick.  With the onset of winter and the crossing into 
enemy territory, sickness could only have become increasingly prevalent.  Assuming 
the march progressed well, and forts Chambly and Sorel neutralised, then it was likely 
that Nicholson would have been in a position to attack Montreal in November.  The 
colonials would have expected to face extremely cold temperatures.  If the operation 
had progressed badly then their supply lines would have stretched back over 200 
miles, through wilderness infested by combative enemies, which is why it was 
important that Nicholson built forts along his route to Canada. 
Buckingham‘s diary, from which the following narrative is derived, details his 
selection of sermons, all of which were inspired by the Old Testament, whilst his 
preaching was Calvinistic.
238
  He took seriously the need to enforce camp discipline 
for the benefit of the mission.  However, the Chaplain did not travel into the 
wilderness without carrying a few home comforts, such as an assortment of clay 
pipes, which were ‗apt to break‘, a powder horn ‗with the union flag cut out upon it‘, 
and some silk handkerchiefs.
239
  For Buckingham, travelling from his home town of 
New Haven on the Connecticut coast to the rendezvous point at Albany was a feat in 
itself.  Having set out on 10 August, the companies he joined had to march over 100 
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miles to rendezvous there.
240
  They may have worn the red coats supplied by Britain 
and one company was composed of elite grenadiers.
241
  During that time the 
Chaplain‘s horse fell, trapping his left leg.  Thankfully, Buckingham was not hurt and 
he was able to carry on recording the expedition in his diary.  His first expedition 
sermon was taken from Psalm 20:3, which refers to offerings and sacrifice – preparing 
his men for their service against New France.  Despite bringing along good quality 
clothing, Buckingham was issued with a ‗regimental suit‘ and a fusil from a 
commissary at Albany.  The Connecticut companies were there on 23 August – the 
date of the St Lawrence tragedy.
242
  
Whilst at Albany, Buckingham took the opportunity to buy essential supplies 
of chocolate, gingerbread and pipes, as ‗leaky‘ bateaux delayed the advance of some 
of the troops.  About 400 Indians entered Albany when three companies, along with 
cattle drivers, were sent upriver, launching the expedition.
243
  This was the beginning 
of a complex series of logistical exercises, whereby companies would be sent to 
establish strong points along the Hudson which could then be used as camping 
grounds and supply depots for the main body of troops, which was reminiscent of 
Marlborough‘s march to the Danube in 1704.  So as not to strain the system by 
overloading the roads and rivers, those in the vanguard reconnoitred a forward area, 
whilst following companies would take advantage of the good work achieved by their 
comrades to make their journey as efficient as possible.  These preparations had not 
gone unnoticed in Quebec as an Onondaga (a Five Nations tribe) spy passed on 
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information to Vaudreuil.
244
  Buckingham‘s duties were resumed on Sunday 26 
August at Albany, when he instilled a sense of discipline into the minds of the men 
with a sermon from Isaiah about the fruits of innocence and the consequences for the 
guilty.
245
 
It was not until 28 August that Buckingham and the Connecticut men, under 
Colonel Whiting, left Albany.  Their next stop was twenty miles upriver, where 
Buckingham suspected that the small group of Indians he had seen enter their camp 
were planning on securing some Canadian prisoners, whilst waiting for repairs to their 
bateaux.  On the last day of August, his spirits were lifted with the arrival into camp 
of General Nicholson himself.  After a triple huzza was given, the camp swelled in 
number with the arrival of 600 Indians.  Some scouts and men left to drive cattle to 
Saratoga, indicating that the next move upriver would follow shortly.  However, 
danger lurked nearby as a captain standing next to the Hudson River was only yards 
from where a bullet struck.  The next day the Iroquois were in a ‗running fire‘ across 
the river, presumably with enemy scouts, when a soldier from Ingoldsby‘s regiment 
was hit in the shoulder.
246
 
On a rainy Sunday 2 September, Buckingham preached from Proverbs 14:9 
about fools mocking sin and the righteous receiving favour.  Perhaps the righteous 
would receive New France.  The men of Connecticut arrived at Saratoga the following 
day.
247
  Work continued with the building of camps and the securing of provisions and 
arms.  Some bateaux had to be carried inland, on carriages and on men‘s shoulders, as 
the Hudson curved away and the army had to cross overland towards Lake George to 
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continue onwards to Lake Champlain.  At Fort Nicholson, Buckingham told of the 
first death from disease of a New Jersey soldier, likely to be the one wounded in the 
shoulder.
248
  On 8 September, the difficult part of continuing the journey was 
evidenced as some Connecticut men were detailed to help clear the way overland to 
Wood Creek.
249
  In doing so, enemy tracks were spotted although no further evidence 
of their presence was found.
250
  It was at Wood Creek in August 1690 where 
Winthrop retreated, one reason being that birch bark was then unsuitable for building 
canoes – a natural indication of the lateness of the season.251 
Buckingham‘s fourth Sunday was his busiest.  The Chaplain preached in both 
the morning and the afternoon from two different texts at Fort Nicholson.  He began 
with Exodus, which was, perhaps, indicative of their journey through the wilderness 
terrain, for the passage in question referred to God blessing their bread and water, and 
purging sickness, and states that nothing shall be barren in their land.
252
  Sickness may 
have been spreading making this lesson both comforting and appropriate.  His later 
sermon, from Deuteronomy, may have given a nod to discipline once again, as it was 
about walking in the path of the Lord and not turning from it.
253
  That path was taken 
up by Schuyler‘s regiment the next day as he marched out of camp, along with some 
Indians and over thirty wagons – some of which carried around twenty bateaux.  
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Buckingham records that these wagons were guarded by Palatines
254
 and New 
England troops.  Whilst they marched out, others marched into camp, as Nicholson 
and some irregulars arrived.
255
  On 11 September, more wagons departed to mend 
roads around Wood Creek.  In the camp, Nicholson ordered that no communication 
should be held between soldiers and the native forces, reinforcing the suspicious view 
of the colonials towards the Indians that was not in evidence amongst the French.
256
   
A scout had deserted to the enemy and camp discipline was exposed to be a 
problem as several men were described as being tied ‗neck-and-heels‘ for going into 
the Indian camp, against Nicholson‘s orders.257  An exasperated Buckingham 
remarked: ‗the camp laws were again read to our people; and oh! that they were duly 
and impartially executed‘.258  Buckingham intermittently implied that camp discipline 
was not what it should have been, giving explanation to his choice of sermons. 
Whilst Buckingham remained at Fort Nicholson, stores were continually being 
sent to Wood Creek and the presence of the enemy was posing challenges.  Eighty 
Indians and six Palatines were sent to find an enemy force of about twenty whose 
tracks had been discovered ten miles from camp.
259
  Buckingham‘s next sermon from 
Proverbs 18:10, given on Sunday, 16
 
September, about the Lord being a ‗strong 
tower‘ which the righteous can enter, may have referred to their fort, or those they 
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were planning on taking from the French.  Tumultuous events followed in camp as an 
Indian mortally wounded a Connecticut man with a knife and begged to be pardoned 
by Nicholson.  Useful intelligence was recovered the same day by Indians tracking an 
enemy force.  They found the remains of an Indian shoe in a bush along with a paper 
which stated that 171 Indians, nine Frenchmen and two officers were in the area, and 
gave details of where they were patrolling.
260
  If true, then this was a sizeable 
contingent to monitor the preparations of the colonial force.  It could, of course, have 
been a well placed deception to entice Nicholson into an ambush, but it is certain that 
enemies were concentrating around the invaders.
261
  It was evident from the skill of 
the Indian trackers that colonial warfare was already adapting to the local conditions.   
The death toll increased as disease claimed a victim.  Buckingham noted that 
Sergeant Hall of a Connecticut company was buried after a triple discharge by several 
files of musketeers.
262
  This death was clearly more personal to Buckingham because 
of his connection with this unit.  It was described in detail in contrast to the noting of 
the anonymous death of the Jersey man ten days before.  Several Palatines entered the 
camp on the following day, reporting that one of their number had been snatched by 
six Indians.  One Hundred Indians and ten ‗Christians‘ were sent to Crown Point 
where it was thought the French were entrenching themselves, whilst stores were still 
being moved up to Wood Creek.
263
   
That evening, Buckingham recorded an unusual episode where Mr Sharp, the 
chaplain to the regulars, seemingly deserted in a canoe.  This was poor timing as it 
was the very next day, 19 September, when news of the disaster on the St Lawrence 
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was received.  The Sapphire had been dispatched to Boston to inform the colonials of 
what had occurred in the St Lawrence and to recall Nicholson from proceeding 
against Montreal.
264
  Nicholson was then at Fort Anne, which he had built at Wood 
Creek in 1709 with a wooden palisade.  This was set alight, along with Fort 
Nicholson, as the retreat began to prevent the French from occupying it.  Nicholson 
was described as being ‗so enraged, that he endeavoured to tear his wig, but it being 
too strong for him, he flung it to the ground, and trampled on it, crying out ―roguery, 
treachery.‖‘265  Buckingham too, was obviously disappointed, but he was also 
resigned to what had occurred: ‗An awful frown on New England in particular, and 
the poor captives in the land of our anti-Christian and pagan enemies.  Oh, what will 
those say; how will they triumph and blaspheme, reproach and deride!  But God 
governs.‘266  He was clearly worried about how New France would react, particularly 
concerning the fate of prisoners.  Buckingham‘s comments also sum up the religious 
divide in North America.   
Various elements of Nicholson‘s force turned back to Albany the next day and 
it was reported that two Indians had been taken, as well as two redcoats guarding 
stores (although all of the beer and rum was missing too).
267
  Buckingham‘s 
disappointment had not abated, however, as he remarked that it was, ‗a melancholy 
thing to be turned back – but God is righteous in all his ways‘.268  It was fortunate that 
they halted their advance and retreated.  Upon hearing of the fleet‘s calamity 
Vaudreuil ordered all of his available forces to attack Nicholson, who would have 
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been outnumbered.
269
  Had Nicholson persisted in the attack, the outcome would have 
represented an even greater disaster for the colonies than that presented by the 
accident on the St Lawrence. 
On Buckingham‘s return, his final sermon was preached from Leviticus about 
the priest burning all on the altar for his sacrifice, which was very apt given the 
circumstances.
270
  The days following were unremarkable, other than a militiaman and 
an Indian dying before their return to Albany on 1 October.  Orders for a general 
muster were given and then Nicholson, perhaps feeling some guilt knowing that his 
men had laboured for nothing, organised a competition in shooting, running and 
wrestling, where each winning company would receive a guinea.  Buckingham was 
justifiably proud that Captain Crane‘s Connecticut company won both the shooting 
and the running as he does not mention the victors of the wrestling.  He eventually 
arrived back at his home in New Haven on 12 October.
271
     
Buckingham‘s short account provides a useful insight into the expedition.  He 
was not involved with the organisation and he was never at the front; indeed, he did 
not even proceed as far as Wood Creek.  However, his observations gave a broad 
perspective on how these operations were conducted.  He was only attached to a small 
proportion of the force, probably a company, although they were affected by a couple 
of deaths after a relatively short journey.  Nothing really came of the expedition, the 
colonial authorities had wasted both time and money, but they showed remarkable 
zeal in their task and were obviously frustrated at not being able to carry out their 
mission – especially  after all of their efforts establishing bases, planning logistics and 
providing transport.  The relations with the Five Nations were hampered by this 
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failure and it can be seen why most Indian tribes favoured cooperation with the 
French, especially as segregation was imposed in the camp at Fort Nicholson.
272
   
 
VIII: The Loss of the Feversham 
Tragedy was not only confined to the St Lawrence River as it also trickled into the 
stormy waters off the north Atlantic coastline of Acadia.  On 7 October, after both 
expeditions had retreated, the Feversham frigate and the three transports it was 
escorting foundered on the rocks of Cape Breton Island only half a day‘s sailing from 
Spanish River, where Walker‘s fleet took shelter only a month before.273  The ships 
had been en route to Quebec laden with provisions in anticipation of success for Hill‘s 
land contingent.  The Feversham had been delayed because it had been seriously 
undermanned due to sickness, death and desertion.  Its voyage stemmed from the 
Boston resupply debacle which could not provide the large quantities that the 
expedition needed, necessitating additional victuals to be gathered at New York in 
case the fleet needed to winter at Quebec.  The transports carried supplies from 
Virginia and Maryland, particularly salted pork.
274
  Their cargo was vital to the 
sustenance of a garrison at Quebec over the winter months and it was imperative that 
it arrived in the St Lawrence in October, before ice made the route impassable.
275
   
The wrecked transports were the Mary, Joseph, and Neptune, being the same 
transports that earlier sailed to New York.
276
  Losses on the Feversham were 
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considerable – of the 140-150 sailors aboard, only forty-nine were saved.  Captain 
Paston perished, as did the master and five of the Neptune‘s crew.  Both crews of the 
Mary and Joseph survived.
277
  Whether a knowledgeable pilot was obtained for the 
Feversham is unknown, as Abraham Miller, assigned to the role, was one of the pilots 
who could not be found at Boston.
278
  It can be assumed, however, that the crew were 
fairly experienced in this theatre, as they had been based on the American station for 
two years.
279
  Unfortunately, Paston had not been intercepted by the Montague, which 
carried orders to alert any vessels due to rendezvous with the fleet that the expedition 
had been cancelled.
280
  It was also unfortunate that the Feversham was lost in such a 
manner, as it participated in the only real success of British arms in the Canadian 
theatre.  It was stationed at New York and had joined the small squadron under 
Commodore Martin in 1710 which assisted in the reduction of Port Royal.
281
   
Paston was posthumously acquitted for the loss of the Feversham by a court-
martial.  The loss was attributed to a mistake in the judgement of the pilot and to the 
strong current.
282
  Gunner John Knox‘s testimony described stormy winds and strong 
currents being responsible for the incident.  Of the transports, one ship ‗broke and the 
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rest bilged‘.283  The Joseph and Neptune were both included in a valuation list of all 
vessels lost on the expedition, possibly for insurance purposes, but the Mary was 
notably absent.
284
 
Another account of the foundering of these vessels was given by Nicholas 
Savers, a young mariner aboard the Neptune.  Arriving at New York, Savers said that 
the ship had lain at anchor for six weeks when Hunter and Paston ordered Captain 
Rouse to fit the Neptune with provisions for a voyage to Canada.  Rouse refused, 
reasoning that the ship‘s owners in London would not agree to this and that it was too 
late in the season to sail into those waters where Walker‘s fleet was then located.  
Savers described how they then threatened to commandeer the ship.  The Neptune 
therefore sailed without a pilot, following the Feversham, when both struck rocks off 
Cape Breton Island.  Four of its nine crewmembers survived.
285
  Unfortunately, the 
ocean surrounding Cape Breton Island shared in the notoriety gained by the St 
Lawrence.  The foundering of the four vessels here does not demonstrate any 
deficiency in seamanship.  It simply illustrates the enormous challenges faced by early 
eighteenth-century navigation. 
 
IX: Quebec 
Such was the scale of mutual distrust between the British and the New Englanders 
that when the French gained intelligence of Walker‘s fleet heading for America, they 
presumed it was tasked to subdue the perceived republican tendencies of the colonies, 
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particularly Massachusetts and New York.
286
  Rumours of a British attempt to impose 
direct government upon the colonials were spread around Boston by the Frenchman, 
Sieur de la Ronde Denis, who was there ostensibly to negotiate prisoner exchanges.
287
  
He was detained upon Nicholson‘s arrival.288  Vaudreuil naturally remained alert to 
British intentions regarding Canada since the capture of Port Royal and the aborted 
expeditions of 1709 and 1710.  At Quebec, royal authority was usually required to 
improve defences, which was duly invoked in 1710.  Such authority was not needed 
in emergencies, however, and in 1711 works were improved without proper 
authorisation.
289
  This involved fortifying the Beauport shore, where Phips landed in 
1690, as well as other potential landing sites, in addition to mills and houses on the St 
Charles River which flanked Quebec and feeds into the St Lawrence.  In the lower 
town, the batteries were repaired and a new one constructed; in the upper town, 
various works were repaired and the Grand Battery built.  This was all organised by 
the engineer, Beaucours.
290
  The Grand Battery would have rained shot and shell upon 
any ship that sailed too close to Quebec, positioned as it was on an impressive vantage 
point atop a rocky outcrop.
291
  Vaudreuil initiated his defence plans earlier in the year 
when he ordered that the women, the sick and the elderly, along with spare cattle, 
were to flee to the woods on first sight of the enemy.
292
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Fortunately for the French, their sudden flurry of activity was unnecessary and 
effective defences would not be needed for almost another fifty years.  Despite French 
knowledge of a possible attack, had Walker continued he may have found an ill-
prepared city as intelligence received on 9 September indicated that the French had 
expected them during the normal season for such operations in June or July.
293
  In 
fact, Vaudreuil had set up his headquarters at Montreal to face the threat from 
Nicholson and the Five Nations, not leaving until mid-September.  Although the 
British were then not expected, Vaudreuil remained upon his guard as Nicholson 
threatened further action against New France.
294
   
Whilst at Boston, Hill and Walker had also been devising a strategy about how 
they would attack Quebec.  A colonial lieutenant who had been prisoner there had told 
them that it was ‗indifferently fortified [with] not many people to defend it‘.295  
Quebec was also rumoured to be short of powder which would negate the usefulness 
of its numerically superior cannon.  Hill had accurate intelligence that Vaudreuil was 
at Montreal with most of his troops.
296
  He consulted Major Livingston, who imparted 
his recent knowledge of Quebec‘s defences.  Livingston was very much involved in 
planning the prospective siege of Quebec.
297
  Colonel King had advised that Walker 
consult with Livingston too.  The Admiral consequently thought ‗it would be 
necessary for us to provide cranes to get the cannon up the high rocks about the town, 
in order for raising batteries against it‘.298  This demonstrates a shocking gap in the 
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knowledge of the expedition‘s commanders for the task ahead and illuminates how 
little intelligence of Quebec was acquired by St John for their use.  Quebec‘s raised 
position would clearly defy any effort made by a ship-of-the-line to engage it with 
broadsides.  The lower town could be engaged, but would surely respond in kind with 
its strong batteries at the shore.  Walker and Hill may have planned to support the land 
regiments with a naval bombardment, although it was clear from Livingston that only 
the bomb vessels would be able to provide any assistance to take the upper town and 
this suggests that an attack from the landward side of Quebec was deemed the most 
appropriate course of action.   
King himself had already been pondering how such a siege would be 
conducted after learning that Quebec was a strong place surrounded by ‗woods, rocks 
and precipices‘.  To assemble the artillery in an effective location he had 
‗provided…a crane and other engines‘ as well as forty horses acquired in Boston.299  
King stated the reason for acquiring horses was because the seamen would be needed 
to contend with preserving their ships from the ‗fireworks‘ released by the defenders 
on rafts to attempt to burn or drive ashore the ships, similar to what was described by 
Major Lloyd in 1709.  Evidently the cannon were originally intended to be 
manoeuvred by the men equipped with 500 harnesses.
300
  Whilst optimistic of 
success, King also proved to be prophetic:  
 
if storms, contrary winds, and the difficult navigation of the river don‘t defeat us, I believe it‘s 
certain nothing else can…these losses [desertions], delays [at Boston and New York] and 
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lateness of the season I don‘t think are sufficient reasons to [doubt]… succeeding; so that I 
still firmly believe nothing but the navigation of the river of St Lawrence or a force form 
Europe can defeat us.
301
 
 
However, in his journal entry on the previous day, he added that the lateness might 
have an effect and, in the usual manner of a British officer, blamed the colonials: ‗I 
can‘t imagine what their designs could be by all these delays if they were not to detain 
us here till the advanced season of the year will probably defeat us‘.302  His engineer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel George Vane, was also initially optimistic, but the information he 
had at Boston indicated that Quebec was ‗much stronger than was at first 
represented‘.303   
There had almost been a significant alteration to their strategy, however.  St 
John had held back a dispatch vessel, in August, from delivering a letter to Hill for a 
surprising reason.  Part of the expedition was considered to be sent on another 
‗enterprise‘ in the West Indies after conquering New France, in a complete reversal of 
Wheler‘s and Walker‘s previous expeditions.304   Although it was made clear that this 
plan had been ultimately decided against, it was clear, in a similar letter to Walker 
(although the West Indies was not named to him), that it was proposed only once the 
expedition had departed British waters.
305
  Such a task may have been more feasible 
for Walker to accomplish, given the season of year.  Nevertheless, his instructions 
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stated that Newfoundland was his secondary target.  With the abandonment of the 
Quebec project it was time for the commanders to decide what to do next. 
 
X: The Homeward Voyage 
Colonel King was disappointed that his preparations did not bear fruit.  After the 
consultation of the sea officers, he went to see Walker concerning a proposed attack 
on Placentia.  The Admiral had actually suggested attacking there rather than Quebec 
whilst at Boston.  Given the known difficulties of the St Lawrence and coupled with 
the unwillingness of the pilots, it would have offered the greatest chance of success, 
but the idea was dismissed because of the restrictions imposed in St John‘s 
instructions.
306
  As the fleet was about to depart Boston in July, Hill wrote to St John 
noting that he thought it already too late in the season to attack Placentia once Quebec 
was taken.
307
  Walker agreed with King, however, and decided that the fleet would 
rendezvous at Spanish River, being nearer to Newfoundland.  A pilot was acquired, 
whilst those employed to guide them up the St Lawrence were released from service 
and sent back to Boston in the Sapphire.  Walker also received a plan of Placentia 
from Vane.
308
   
The fleet arrived at the rendezvous on 4 September and Walker was 
determined to attack Placentia, or at least wait in the colonies during winter to attempt 
something in the next campaign.  Failing that, he considered sailing to the West Indies 
to attempt something there.  King and Captain Paddon agreed with his sentiments but, 
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upon consultation with Hill, again aboard the Windsor, he found the discussion 
turning towards a homeward voyage.  Hill‘s outburst in his letter to St John begging 
to be sent home may explain this.
309
  He suggested that they were within their rights to 
return, whilst Walker was of the opinion that he could not without receiving further 
instructions from London.  The Admiral had grown enthusiastic about an attack on 
Placentia, perhaps attempting to counter the blame he knew that he would inevitably 
receive for his failure on the St Lawrence.  In light of this, he found some men 
embarked upon the transports that were familiar with Placentia and then sent out a 
small expedition to sound possible anchorages and attack routes.  Placentia‘s defences 
were reportedly strong in 1710.  Admiralty intelligence suggested that it had a 
garrison of 350 soldiers and two strong points.  One was Fort Louis which contained 
fifty guns and two mortars; the other was a castle dominating the town which 
mounted twenty guns and four mortars.
310
  Paddon had found a good place to land and 
had even set himself ashore to find that the soil was good enough to establish a 
camp.
311
 
However, it became apparent that, with the progress of the seasons and the 
Atlantic stirring into its usual wintry stormy nature, an attack would have to be 
postponed until spring 1712.  Early on 5
 
September, Walker boarded the Windsor 
once again to discuss plans, but discovered that Hill was not yet awake.  Instead he 
visited King who agreed that it would be more appropriate to attack in the spring.  
Once Hill finally joined them he let it be known that he disagreed, remaining of the 
belief that they should return to England.  He saw the disaster as a convenient reason 
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to abort the expedition and Walker noted in his journal that Hill ‗did not perceive that 
returning to Britain could be the least prejudicial to me‘.312  There was some 
ambiguity here as both Walker and Hill were positively ordered to attack Placentia, 
but only if the ‗season will permit‘. 313  The instructions also assumed success at 
Quebec and were very unclear on what to do in the event of failure as there was no 
criterion for returning until the capture of that city.  Indeed, the orders did not state 
what they were to do in the case of failure.  Walker needed the cooperation of Hill to 
make a success of the expedition and was dismayed when he became aware that this 
was not forthcoming.   
Hill responded to Walker‘s persistence by calling a council of war, which 
Walker agreed to but stated again that his instructions forbade a return to Britain.  
French vessels were intercepted around Placentia, where letters from its governor 
were captured, but such successes proved ultimately fruitless.  A great storm had 
delayed the meeting of the council of war until the 8
 
September, but this time it was 
held aboard the Edgar.
314
  A letter from Dudley the day before may have swung the 
decision.  In it he stated that there would be a delay in accumulating the extra 
provisions for the fleet and therefore would not be ready to sail until the beginning of 
October.
315
  This would have taken at least another month to join the fleet – which 
they expected to find at Quebec.  The Feversham and its transports, of course, were 
unable to deliver these stores and they were unaware of the misfortune inflicted upon 
the fleet.  At the council of war, it was calculated that provisions were rapidly 
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diminishing.  They correctly assumed the transports would not have arrived until 
November, when the coastal waters of Newfoundland were very dangerous.  The 
agent-victuallers, including Netmaker, calculated that there were only enough 
provisions for the remaining 7,643 men
316
 to last until the end of November, at short 
allowance.  No mention was made of remaining on station, probably as such a large 
force could not winter at Boston given its lack of capacity to feed and shelter large 
numbers of men, and repair naval vessels.  The West Indies was the only real option 
despite the threat of disease.  In light of overwhelming uncertainties and the fear of 
losing more men and ships, Walker gave in and it was decided to return to Britain.
317
  
This was eerily reminiscent of his service under Vice-Admiral Graydon in 1703 and 
Walker‘s knowledge of Newfoundland from back then may have inspired him in his 
effort to attack Placentia. 
Colonel Clayton was sent ahead in the Leopard to inform the ministry in 
London of this decision.
318
  With Clayton‘s arrival in England there were no orders 
forthcoming for the continuation of the war in America for the following year.  The 
Irish ports were, however, notified to prepare victuals in case Walker had to put in 
there.
319
  One letter from the fleet, possibly carried by the Leopard, found its way into 
the hands of James Craggs, a prominent Whig and a supporter of Marlborough.  The 
letter was from Lieutenant Hughes of the train and informed the ministry‘s opponents 
of the events in the St Lawrence.  Hughes thought the entire fleet had nearly 
succumbed to the same fate as the lost transports.  Seymour‘s regiment, in particular, 
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took heavy losses of more than 160 men, along with twenty of their women.  After the 
disaster there was ‗various discourse as to what had happened‘, but it was agreed that 
Walker had mistaken what side of the river the fleet was on, which was true enough, 
although his subordinates had thought likewise.  Strong words reportedly ensued 
when Hughes described the Master of the Colchester
320
 telling the Admiral that ‗his 
damned signal had ruined him, and was the cause of the destruction of 1,200 people‘.  
The figure was exaggerated, but the rage is understandable.  The master further 
confirmed the confusion over their position by saying that he had not seen the south 
shore which Paddon thought had been observed earlier.  Hughes concluded the 
account by declaring sardonically, ‗I believe we are bound home, if we can find our 
way‘.321  Hill asked St John for understanding in another private letter and hoped he 
would not ‗lose your good opinion [for it] would very much add to the trouble‘.322  
Walker‘s explanation was more confident and forward-looking, and even 
communicated the strategic value of Spanish River as the perfect springboard for 
another attempt as it ‗[commands] the bay of St Lawrence as that of Gibraltar the 
straights‘.323 
The fleet redistributed what supplies it had left amongst the ships.  Whilst 
watering and preparing to sail, Indians attacked and killed some of the men ashore and 
set a small ship on fire; meanwhile the Sunderland‟s cook was tried for sodomy.  
Walker‘s final act, to ease his conscience and salvage some honour, was to employ a 
carpenter to make a decorated board to fix upon a tree, declaring that the Queen had 
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claim to this land.
324
  Ironically, as this was Cape Breton Island, it was the only part of 
Acadia that was not ceded to the British at the peace.  The fleet departed Spanish 
River on 16 September and embarked upon a stormy but quick passage across the 
Atlantic.  The colonials were returned to Boston and reinforcements sent to Annapolis 
Royal to counter the French and Indian threat there.
325
   
The entire fleet sailed into St Helens on 9 October, only six days after the 
Leopard‟s arrival at Plymouth.326  Three weeks before, The Daily Courant reported 
the return of the Devonshire and Humber – the two eighty-gun ships Walker ordered 
to cruise at the mouth of the St Lawrence.  They carried an update of Walker‘s 
progress, stated as being eighty leagues from Quebec – approximately the point where 
the disaster occurred.
327
  Remarkably, while Walker was journeying to London, the 
Edgar exploded destroying all of his charts and papers along with 500 crew.  The 
cause has not been fully established, but it was probably due to a spark inadvertently 
caused by a thief in the gunpowder magazine.
328
  Such catastrophes did occur from 
time to time, including the destruction of the Carlisle which blew up whilst under 
Rooke‘s command in 1700.329  Nevertheless, the accident resulted in years of 
investigation by the Admiralty, primarily into the accounts of the expedition, which 
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were destroyed along with Walker‘s personal clerk and property.330  Disney‘s 
companies that were stranded on the Mary, which sought shelter in Ireland, only 
arrived at Boston when the fleet had almost returned to home port.
331
   
 
XI: Conclusion 
After a successful transatlantic voyage, free from the threat posed by Duguay-
Trouin‘s squadron, Walker and Hill faced a very difficult time at Boston in preparing 
their force.  Desertion had reached epidemic proportions, and problems of supply and 
demand had created a friction with the colonials that frustrated the expedition‘s 
departure for over a month.  This was exacerbated by Nicholson‘s unusual neglect in 
not sending his transports to New York.  Boston had risen to the challenge, however, 
and had managed to supply a large quantity of victuals, but the expedition was 
dependent on receiving further supplies after its departure.  Walker and Hill had done 
all that was in their power to prepare for an attack on Quebec.  Several vessels were 
lost on the St Lawrence due to a simple navigational error, which was a common 
eighteenth-century occurrence and should not be ascribed to poor seamanship.  The 
unknown navigation, combined with inexperienced pilots sailing at night in poor 
weather, resulted in the accident. 
Although the senior officers on the expedition were unaware of the fate of the 
Feversham, the decision to abandon Quebec proved justified.  It would not have been 
sensible to continue to Quebec when so many had been lost and the naval officers 
knew it.  This did not indicate fear, they had a duty to provide for the safety of the 
fleet and that could not be guaranteed if they progressed further.  More danger would 
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certainly be found if the fleet had continued into the unknown and they also risked 
having to winter at Quebec with few supplies.  Provisions had been dangerously 
depleted by the return journey to Britain.  The fleet could not realistically winter in 
the colonies as it would put pressure upon both their finances and the colonials, who 
were in no position to feed them.  The colonies at this stage could not maintain such a 
fleet either, as ports and harbours, such as Boston and New York, lacked dry dock 
facilities, and the manpower and expertise to maintain and careen numerous large 
vessels.  Walker suspected he would face difficulty back in Britain, but Hill could not 
be convinced to attempt an assault on Placentia so late in the year.  Walker finally 
kissed the Queen‘s hand on 19 October to apologise for the disappointment of the 
Quebec expedition.
332
  He was unprepared for what was to come. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE EXPEDITION 
 
The expedition‘s failure was not as detrimental to British interests as it could have 
been.  When the preliminary articles of the peace negotiations were finalised in 
autumn 1711, news of the disaster on the St Lawrence had not yet reached the Tory 
negotiators.  Therefore the expedition had not affected, positively or negatively, the 
outcome of the peace.
1
  The British, with an eye on potential Canadian success, 
managed to defer the future of Canada to be determined in the general treaty.  The 
issue of Newfoundland was settled in the preliminaries, meaning that had Rear-
Admiral Walker taken Placentia it would have made little difference as it was to be 
ceded to Great Britain anyway thanks to the skill of its diplomats.
2
  Whilst 
Newfoundland was to be given to the British, albeit with the liberty of French 
fisherman to use its northern shore, St John inserted into the eighth clause that Britain 
and France should retain whatever territory in North America remained in their 
respective possession in the hope that the expedition would succeed.
3
  The 
preliminaries were signed on 27 September 1711
4
 and were made public.
5
  News of 
the disaster arrived only a week later which temporarily weakened Britain‘s 
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negotiating position, but its diplomatic strength at Utrecht was evident and the 
expedition probably had no impact on the decisions made there.
6
  With the articles 
signed, the Dutch followed Britain‘s lead – otherwise they would be left without 
anything to show for ten years of fighting.
7
  They only learnt of British treachery 
when the peace preliminaries were revealed to them, around the time of the 
expedition‘s departure.8  Nevertheless, despite the extent of the failure, Acadia was 
confirmed to be British, as was Newfoundland and Hudson‘s Bay.9  The Canadians 
clearly suffered from the decisions made by the French diplomats; even so, its small 
population could not have secured a lasting advantageous settlement when the British 
colonies were so populous.
10
 
Divisions between Harley and St John were accentuated by the failure of the 
expedition.  When Harley returned to business after his recovery from the injury 
inflicted by Guiscard, in May 1711, he was created earl of Oxford and Mortimer, 
whilst his authority was reinforced by his appointment to the position of lord 
treasurer.  This angered St John whose ambition craved a peerage and greater power.  
He could only hope for good news from Canada, the glory from which may have 
secured such desires.  When the expedition returned with the unfortunate truth, 
Jonathan Swift, present at supper with both rivals, witnessed their emotions: ‗The 
Secretary [St John] is much mortified about Hill, because this expedition was of his 
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contriving, and he counted much upon it; but Lord Treasurer [Harley] was just as 
merry as usual‘.11   
 
I: The Effect of Failure 
The Quebecois were in an equally jubilant mood to Harley.  Upon learning of the fate 
of Walker‘s fleet, the churches of New France celebrated the destruction of the 
transports with the singing of Te Deums.  Father de la Colombière explained to his 
congregation that the Virgin Mary had intervened to wreck Walker‘s fleet.  His 
sermon was identical to the one he had given in 1690 in response to Phip‘s 
expedition.
12
  To mark their release from danger, the church in the lower town was 
renamed Notre-Dames-Des-Victoires to thank the Virgin Mary for Quebec‘s 
deliverance.  Above its altar, a mural still depicts an angel smiting the British fleet on 
the rocks of the St Lawrence.  A salvage vessel later proceeded to plunder the wreck 
site.
13
  Furthermore, the French retaliated with reprisals on the frontier between the 
empires, which Governor Robert Hunter described as having become ‗infested…by 
the French Indians‘.14  This was probably caused by the treaty of neutrality that the 
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Five Nations signed with the French in the spring of 1712, owing to their 
disappointment with the expedition‘s outcome.15 
 Governor-General Vaudreuil had been preparing an expedition to recapture 
Annapolis Royal in early 1711, which was postponed indefinitely because of the 
British expedition bound for Quebec.
16
  This, at least, was one positive outcome of the 
expedition, leading to Acadia, bar Cape Breton Island, being confirmed as a British 
possession at the Treaty of Utrecht.
17
  Walker‘s presence had deterred the French 
from altering the strategic balance in North America and put them on the defensive, 
although the British garrison at Annapolis Royal still suffered from local attacks and 
desertion.
18
  If the Acadians had received reinforcements, then it is perfectly possible 
that the territory would have remained in French hands after Utrecht. 
As the threat on the St Lawrence had subsided, Quebec‘s defences continued 
to be improved.  Intercepted letters revealed that the Quebecois believed that the St 
Lawrence was their best defence.  However, after the expedition‘s demise, further 
improvements to Quebec‘s fortifications were made in addition to those hastily 
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constructed since 1709.
19
  Expenditure on fortifications increased by an estimated 
ninety-seven per cent in 1711-1712 – an obvious response to British strategy.  This 
then decreased by fifty-eight per cent in 1713 – lower than spending in 1710 – when 
peace was secured and with fortifications either completed or thought no longer 
necessary.
20
  Redoubts were constructed in 1712, along with a wall along the eastern 
cliff almost 660 feet long, as well as a temporary masonry curtain wall and demi-
bastions to cover the redoubts.
21
  Fortification became so important that stonemasons 
were not even allowed to work on private contracts for individuals.
22
  After the 
construction of the fortress at Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island, which began in 
1719, the population of Quebec became complacent behind their earthworks, until the 
former fell in 1745.
23
  This resulted in Quebec‘s first permanent masonry walls being 
constructed.
24
  Similarly, the expedition served to prompt the improvement of 
Montreal‘s defences when in 1713 it was decided to replace its wooden palisade with 
stone walls.
25
   
Vengeance was wrought by the French during the summer of 1712, as the 
Grand Alliance was disintegrating.  A small French privateer squadron, under Jacques 
Cassard, harassed various allied possessions in the Caribbean and South America.  
Cassard attacked the Cape Verde islands, Montserrat, Antigua and Surinam and, 
according to Thomas More Molyneaux, the French court ‗insisted… he had only 
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general instructions which he had misapplied‘.26  Messages declaring the cessation of 
war were only just arriving in the West Indies.
27
  French claims of innocence were 
refuted by John Campbell when he proclaimed in his naval history: ‗I have been 
informed, by some who were very well acquainted with the politics of the French 
court, that this expedition was projected in revenge of that undertaken against 
Quebec‘.28  The French perhaps felt they could be duplicitous, despite St John staying 
the hand of the Duke of Ormonde (Marlborough‘s replacement as captain-general of 
British troops in Flanders) in operations against Marshal Villars, because of the 
previous year‘s simultaneous Quebec expedition and secret peace negotiations.29  It 
was a most fitting time for Cassard to attack, if revenge was truly the motive, as the 
commander of the Jamaica squadron at the time was none other than Rear-Admiral 
Walker.   
Governor Walter Douglas of the Leeward Islands was worried about the 
possibility of an insurrection against him.  To provide for his own immediate security 
needs, Douglas consequently failed to alert Walker to the expected presence of nine 
French men-of-war.  Cassard was alerted of Walker‘s approach whilst he was sacking 
Montserrat and immediately departed, diverting his attention towards the Dutch at 
Surinam where he had greater success by carrying off 800,000 pieces of eight.
30
  The 
Jamaica squadron‘s presence was deterrent enough for Cassard to evacuate the 
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immediate vicinity of the British colonies.
31
  As Cassard had also attacked Portuguese 
and Dutch colonies, revenge against Britain cannot have been the only factor in his 
mission, but the attacks on British possessions were probably intended to be punitive. 
  Walker successfully secured the valuable West Indies trade despite the 
proximity of the French privateers, but the failure at Quebec may have left the 
northern British colonies fearing for their security.  The American colonists could 
only be left disappointed by the fleet‘s retreat and the expedition confirmed that there 
was a growing rift in Anglo-American relations.
32
  Naturally, recriminations were 
exchanged between the British and colonials.
33
  The expedition commanders had 
already quarrelled with Governor Joseph Dudley, perceiving the colonists to have 
hindered rather than aided the preparations at Boston.
34
  Whilst there, Colonel King 
correctly noted Nicholson‘s failings:  
 
this want of convoy for our provisions…is entirely owing to Colonel Nicholson‘s neglect [in 
not sending the transports to New York]…he not only risked disappointing the diversion [to 
Montreal] he is to make, but even the whole expedition by detaining us here for want of 
provisions, till the season is too far advanced.
35
   
 
However, King‘s frustrations were mainly targeted against the Massachusetts 
authorities: 
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The government here did not put in execution any of the promises they made us.  For the 
bread…to subsist our men…was not delivered.  The fresh provisions…was not 
sufficient…And all other things to be provided, were wrought at with that sloth and 
indifference, there could be no fixing any time when they would be finished.
36   
 
King was not entirely prejudicial towards the Bostonians, however, as after the 
disaster he wrote:  
 
I can‘t express…the uneasiness it gives me to think what a loss it will prove to our poor 
American colonies; how much it will contribute to depopulate their frontiers, to diminish their 
trade, and discourage all people, by constant wars they must now be obliged to maintain… 
[and] that they dare hardly expect any relief for the future, when they see this great effort 
England made to succour them thus ruffled and defeated…37 
 
Colonial judge, Samuel Sewall, like many of his colonial contemporaries, was 
‗stunned‘ to hear of the failure.38  Jeremiah Dummer, the colonial agent in London, 
was distraught but continued to lobby for the reduction of the French colonies and 
passed intelligence to the Board of Trade and Plantations to that end.
39
  In an attempt 
to gain public support, Dummer produced two tracts, both defending the colonials 
against British charges of incompetence.
40
  Governor‘s Dudley and Saltonstall (of 
Connecticut) both petitioned for another expedition to be sent, fearing further French 
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reprisals.
41
  The colonial governors were also frustrated by some of the financial 
aspects of the expedition which were not cleared for years, including the pay of the 
thirty lieutenants, expedition charges to New Jersey and the costs of the Province 
Galley.
42
   
Colonel Lee of Rhode Island assumed Walker was probably at fault, but only 
because he was in charge.
43
  Samuel Vetch, as the colonial instigator of the plan to 
take Quebec, was highly critical of Walker for abandoning the attempt.  After 
conveying his suspicions of the French pilot to Walker, Vetch regarded himself to be 
the best pilot on the expedition, probably due to his 1705 visit to Quebec.
44
  
Nevertheless, he did not have any real experience of piloting and admitted as much 
himself, stating he ‗never was bred for sea‘ and that it was not his ‗province‘ but that 
of the pilots, especially with a fleet of large ships.  He also admitted to St John that 
getting to Quebec ‗by reason of the difficulty of the navigation I look upon to be the 
[most difficult] part of the enterprise‘.45  Vetch initially sailed at the head of the fleet 
in the Dispatch, along with two other smaller vessels to guide the fleet.  Once past 
Cape Breton, he was asked to transfer to the Sapphire frigate which then joined them.  
It was twice the tonnage of the Dispatch and possibly was to serve as a more suitable 
guide for the larger vessels, but Vetch refused on account of being unable to transfer 
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his baggage.
46
  It was more likely that he was a little uneasy with the prospect of 
navigating the notorious St Lawrence in a larger vessel.  Remaining on the Dispatch, 
Vetch was told that Walker would signal when he wanted him to go ahead again, but 
this signal never came.
47
   
Vetch was asked after the accident, at the consultation of the sea officers, if he 
could continue to guide the fleet.  He replied: ‗he could undertake nothing that related 
to sea affairs‘, but was happy to venture upriver in a smaller vessel.48  Vetch later 
regretted not being more confident after the council of war had decided not to proceed 
and sent a letter to Walker asking for a further consultation, possibly to prevent any 
recriminations directed against him.  In the letter he also wondered if the French pilots 
were responsible for the navigational errors that contributed to disaster.
49
  This was 
nonsense as aside from putting their own lives at risk, Paradis, for example, was 
joined on the Edgar by Bonner, the respected New England pilot, where they 
conducted decisions together.
50
   
A storm had later battered the fleet whilst anchored in Spanish River to 
recuperate.  It was so terrible that Vetch even admitted that a second disaster would 
likely have befallen the fleet had they continued, with either all ships lost, or if in the 
Gulf, driven onto Anticosti Island or the coast of Labrador.
51
  Given these 
contradictions, it was wise that Walker did not heed Vetch‘s insistence to be given a 
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second chance to guide the fleet.
52
  Vetch stated that General Hill had the ‗zeal‘ to 
continue, which clearly conflicts with Hill‘s overwhelming desire to return home.  It 
was notable that Hill left the decision to continue with Walker and his captains, 
knowing that most would not be inclined to continue and that he could not be held 
accountable for their decision.  Vetch‘s unwillingness to follow Walker‘s orders to 
change vessels before the disaster is highly suggestive of his apprehensiveness for 
taking responsibility for such a large fleet in dangerous waters.  Only once he realised 
that the British intended to abandon the expedition, threatening his plans for a 
continent free from French influence, did Vetch‘s confidence materialise when he 
pleaded to guide the fleet onwards. 
The colonies were reduced to squabbling with each other in the months after 
the failed venture, but hoped for another expedition nonetheless.
53
  Walker was vexed 
by the way colonials thought how easy it was to sail to Quebec with a fleet.  He 
compared these perceptions to it being ‗as easy as a citizen riding home in his chaise 
from Hamstead or Highgate, calling at a cake-house by the way, to regale himself and 
his spouse with a glass of cider and a cheesecake‘.54  The expedition intensified the 
divisions between the obstructive, profiteering colonial and the arrogant, officious 
British officer, which could only reinforce a mutual sense of mistrust and suspicion.
55
  
Herbert L. Osgood described this as a ‗natural antipathy between the British courtier-
soldier and the provincial‘.56  Douglas Edward Leach has more recently seen in the 
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Bostonians of 1711 ‗a rising tide of self-assertive Yankee individualism, [reluctant] to 
make sacrifices for a distant crown‘ which was an attitude which ‗[threw] a shadow 
toward Lexington Green‘.57  G. M. Trevelyan correctly stated that the Atlantic ‗kept 
the two parts of the empire in gross ignorance of one another‘58 and Governor Hunter 
revealed that 
 
without speedy and effectual remedy [Her Majesty] can make no state of any government in 
this place, and in a little time, the disease may prove too strong [to] cure… it is in a bad state, 
the frequent tumults in all parts, and the general aversion to the support of government in 
most, are sufficient indications…putting all North America under one uniform plan of 
government, would most certainly be a sure remedy, but I am afraid it is too lingering a one 
for the present exigency.
59  
 
This might explain why the French were spreading rumours around Boston that the 
British intended to impose government upon them.  The road towards independence 
was being laid. 
Initially, there was a fairly muted reaction in Britain to the disastrous events of 
August 1711.  Many newspapers were full of anticipation: ‗we may suddenly expect 
to hear that the great enterprise has been crowned with the desired success‘.60  Instead, 
subsequent reports were full of news of the expedition‘s failure.  The first report of 
the disaster was printed on 6 October, shortly after Colonel Clayton had returned in 
the Leopard.
61
  The ministry quietly ignored the whole scheme and attention was 
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instead directed towards the Duke of Marlborough who would soon be dismissed 
from his offices.  Accounts relating to the expedition were sent by Dudley, whilst 
Francis Nicholson presented himself to the Board of Trade and Plantations in January 
1712, but little was investigated until the fall of the Tories in 1714.
62
  Of course, the 
fight against France, despite the significant progress in negotiating an advantageous 
peace, was ongoing and this took priority with both the administration and the public.  
The only reaction of the Cabinet was to give orders to put what was left of 
Walker‘s stores ashore at Portsmouth and to decommission the hired transports.63  
Commissary Netmaker‘s job was not finished, however, as he was still responsible for 
the stores.  He had to inspect and find warehouses for them, especially given that a 
fair proportion of stores ‗may be damaged, as having been long aboard leaky ships, 
and in bad weather‘.64  The soldiers of the regiments were given their marching orders 
and were distributed across the country to begin recruiting.
65
  Upon their immediate 
arrival, however, they were given ‗refreshment‘ in port and ‗the surrounding towns 
and villages‘, having been ‗so long on shipboard‘.66  The same applied to the horses.67  
King, as a valued engineer, was sent on to Gibraltar.
68
 
Walker and Hill were given further military duties almost immediately, 
showing that they retained the confidence of the ministry.  Walker‘s authority 
remained intact as he served on a court-martial in December 1711, a court which 
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acquitted Captain Rouzier of endangering the Baltic trade when a strong Danish 
squadron broke his convoy.
69
  Walker was then assigned a new command.  In 
response to Jamaica‘s request for protection against French privateers, Walker was 
sent to command the Jamaica squadron in 1712 where Cassard had managed to avoid 
him.
70
  Walker‘s flagship was the Monmouth which had formed part of his Canada 
squadron.
71
  On his outward voyage, the Admiral escorted 100 merchant ships for the 
trade in Portugal and the West Indies.
72
   
Walker set to work in the Caribbean by sending a ship to reconnoitre enemy 
ports; however, a hurricane struck and several of his squadron ran aground, losing 
their masts.
73
  The Admiral then became embroiled in petty arguments with Governor 
Hamilton of Jamaica, an ex-naval captain.
74
  The war had created a deficiency of 
supplies in Jamaica and, consequently, Hamilton negotiated a six months‘ truce with 
the enemy to trade.  Walker disagreed with this policy and continued to enforce 
wartime regulations.  He consequently ignored some orders from the civilian council 
in response.  These grievances were further indicative of the poor cooperation 
between colonial governors and British naval captains, where issues of command and 
authority were not sufficiently defined.  This sort of quarrel was quite common as 
naval commanders including Benbow, Martin, Legge, Norbury, Lisle and Constable 
all engaged in arguments with colonial governors.  Even the West Indies governors 
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themselves had serious disagreements with one another, such as Parke and 
Codrington, and Hamilton and Lowther.
75
  Captains often received blame for their 
inability to counter the French maritime threat in the West Indies.  Nevertheless, they 
did their utmost, especially as there were great financial incentives in capturing 
prizes.
76
  Walker demonstrated his ability to operate independently far from home, but 
also the naval officer‘s trait of poor cooperation with the colonial administration, 
albeit one which was breaking the law.  He commanded in these dangerous waters, 
safely securing the trade and capturing small prizes, until returning to Britain a year 
later in May 1713, after proclaiming the cessation of arms and the end of the war.
77
  
Clearly, Walker retained some personal influence as the next month saw him hearing 
petitions from the African Company about a new Bill which would affect the African 
trade.
78
  Geoffrey Callender‘s assertion that the expedition ended Walker‘s career is 
therefore not true; it was the volatile political scene that followed the Hanoverian 
succession that eventually terminated it.
79
   
Whilst the Admiral undertook his duties, Hill was given command of the force 
that would occupy Dunkirk and became the port‘s governor, whilst Clayton was 
appointed governor of the citadel.
80
  Hill arrived there in July 1712 and ‗universal joy 
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spread over [Britain], this event being looked on as the certain forerunner of peace‘.81  
Dunkirk‘s fortifications were to be dismantled, as agreed with the French in the peace 
negotiations, as the naval port remained a serious threat to Britain due to its close 
proximity.  However, complete demolition did not occur, despite what much of the 
historiography states.  Some demolition work had begun at an extremely slow pace, 
whilst other improvements were simultaneously being made to the fortifications.  
Work had ultimately ceased with the shifting alliances with the French and Spanish, 
leading to the Quadruple Alliance.   
With the French becoming British allies under the regency of the Duke of 
Orleans, their non-committal attitude to the 1715 Jacobite uprising made relations 
more cordial, whilst Spain became a more assertive European power.  Britain needed 
to remain on friendly terms with France after Utrecht and used Dunkirk as a 
bargaining chip in future negotiations, whilst the opposition party would naturally 
always complain about the threat it posed.
82
  Whilst Clyde L. Grose has remarked that 
Dunkirk was dismantled immediately by the ‗youthful and efficient‘ Hill, John Robert 
Moore has pointed out that only limited demolition work actually occurred.
83
  Moore 
was very critical of Hill‘s military capabilities and declared it was just the ministry‘s 
way of covering the Quebec fiasco.  This was unfair, as his actions at Almansa and 
Mons demonstrated Hill had the ability to command and act honourably, yet it is 
undeniable that he was at Dunkirk purely for political reasons, probably, as Moore 
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stated, to deflect any criticism of the expedition‘s failure.  Nevertheless, the Dunkirk 
project was never taken seriously by either the French or the British, and this extended 
into the pro-French policies under Prime Minister Robert Walpole.  Moore stated that 
Hill returned to London after only three months ‗for the alleged recovery of his 
health‘; he may have had a fear of the notorious ‗Dunkirk fever‘.84  However, Moore 
did not note that Hill later returned to oversee the work because the French were being 
obstructive.  Hill had to tread a diplomatic line between the British and French, and it 
was political procrastination that ensured that the fortifications at Dunkirk were still 
debated in Parliament in the 1730s.
85
 
Hill may have regarded military service as a necessary evil to attain office, as 
perhaps indicated by his letter to St John, after leaving Boston, begging to return 
home after completing his duty.  Hill‘s promotion to major-general in 1712 and his 
appointments as governor of Dunkirk, privy councillor and lieutenant-general of the 
ordnance were his first steps towards high office in London – roles which he may 
have been more comfortable with than tactical command.  Hill stood down from his 
parliamentary seat in 1713, possibly in the hope of being elevated to the peerage in 
the manner of his brother-in-law, Samuel, Baron Masham – Abigail‘s husband.86  
Masham was created a Tory peer simply to force the peace preliminaries through 
Parliament which had been opposed by the Whigs.  This came at the same time that 
Marlborough was stripped of his command; he later fled into a brief exile.  With the 
collapse of the ministry after the Queen‘s death in 1714, Hill lost all of his offices 
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and, if it was ambition that drove him, it was here extinguished.  Although he was not 
persecuted under the Whigs – his commission as a major-general was renewed – he 
nevertheless sold his regiment, never to attain office or command again.  Hill became 
friends with Swift and must have been regarded as a man of intelligence and wit, as he 
was elected to the Brothers‘ Club along with Colonel Disney.87  This Society of 
Brothers was St John‘s answer to the Whig Kit-Cat Club and excluded Harley, 
although it was primarily concerned with dining and pleasure rather than business.
88
  
It is a distinct possibility that this was the sort of life Hill would rather have had, and 
was perhaps content with his early retirement and his sister‘s loss of influence.  
The expedition has been criticised for the withdrawal of five regiments from 
Flanders in Marlborough‘s final campaign, who himself disapproved of sending an 
expedition in 1710 because of this issue.
89
  The Whigs would certainly have opposed 
the expedition as the Flanders army had been left weakened for the 1711 campaign.  
These Quebec regiments were fairly weakly manned given that some of Colonel 
Grant‘s soldiers were redistributed amongst the others, whilst those remaining stayed 
in Britain, so in effect only four continental battalions actually accompanied the 
expedition.  Marlborough, however, was able to find replacement regiments from 
Germany, albeit during the summer.
90
  Nevertheless, he was still thirty battalions 
weaker than the previous year, but this owes more to the need to garrison twenty-five 
of them at Aire, Bethune, Douai and St Venant, which he had captured in 1710.  
Marlborough judged that he would need a ‗favourable opportunity‘ to attack the 
                                                 
87
 Swift, Journal to Stella, Letter XXXV, 29 November 1711, p. 348. 
88
 Holmes, Geoffrey, British Politics in the Age of Anne, (second edition, London, 1987), pp. 21, 296-
297. 
89
 Snyder, Henry, L., The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, (Oxford, 1975), III, p. 1484, 
Marlborough to Godolphin, 5 May 1710. 
90
 Murray, George, (ed.), The Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, 
from 1702 to 1712, (London, 1845), V, p. 388, Marlborough to St John, 22 June 1711. 
 264
French, as they were deemed stronger than in 1710 and the allies were in ‗no 
condition to undertake any siege‘.91  The withdrawal of five regiments was 
insignificant by comparison and would have had very little impact upon 
Marlborough‘s campaign, which was quite successful in any case.  In terms of 
numbers of troops available to conduct offensive operations, Marlborough was more a 
victim of his own success, from the previous year‘s campaign, than the political 
machinations of St John. 
Oxford, meanwhile, was supplanted in the Queen‘s favour by St John when he 
was created Viscount Bolingbroke, but his good fortune would not last long.
92
  When 
the Whigs returned to power, with the accession of the House of Hanover, they 
examined ways of punishing the Tories for imposing a dishonourable peace.  
Bolingbroke consequently fled to France to enter the service of the Pretender as his 
secretary of state.  Perhaps consistently, with the failure of the 1715 rebellion, the 
Pretender blamed Bolingbroke for not sending enough supplies.
93
  The Whigs, 
meanwhile, tried to taint Oxford by accusing him of profiting from the Quebec 
expedition, of which he was guiltless, and from weakening Marlborough‘s army.94  
Oxford opted to face his accusers at his impeachment rather than flee.  After all, the 
Whigs were pursuing the wrong man, as Oxford had pointed out it was Bolingbroke 
who was responsible.  The financial discrepancies arising from the expedition were 
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traced to a sum of £28,036 5s for the poor quality clothing and stores.  This was the 
exact sum of Blake‘s contract for the expedition.  They were also part of the missing 
figures in the ‗summary of extraordinary charges of war‘ that were not vetted through 
Parliament.
95
  These sums were huge and additionally, it was later estimated that it 
cost £42,954 18s 4d to pay for Hill‘s regulars alone whilst serving on the expedition.96 
St John asked Oxford to settle Blake‘s charges in the summer of 1711, but he 
was not told what they were for.  It was only when the Queen signed a warrant in June 
1711 was it paid.  Oxford realised that this sum related to the expedition on its return 
in October.
97
  However, he discovered that the supplies had only cost £7,000 and he 
presumed that the balance was split between Bolingbroke and Arthur Moore
98
 (a 
merchant and trade commissioner).
99
  Oxford answered these charges with the truth; 
he was not in favour of the expedition, did not organise it, nor did he pocket any 
public funds.  He too was suspicious of the sum in question and wanted to investigate 
at the time, but was overruled by the Queen.
100
  However, he did try to suppress it 
from parliamentary examination, perhaps to keep his ministry intact.
101
  Oxford, after 
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serving many months in the Tower of London, was finally acquitted in 1717.
102
  
Despite some historians claiming that the expedition was Harley‘s project, it was clear 
that he deeply opposed it.
103
  Confusion about his role probably extends from 
Oxford‘s impeachment which accused him of organising the expedition and St John‘s 
early correspondence with him (asking for funds), which described the expedition as 
‗our‘ project to try and secure his support.104  Oxford faced down his accusers, if 
Bolingbroke had been in Britain, he would have clearly been an easy target for the 
Whigs bent on taking their revenge.  
Hill was never caught up in any of these recriminations, despite the Whig 
purges of the army.
105
  It may have been realised that he was simply a Tory pawn and 
not worth pursuing.  However, one account may be suggestive of Hill‘s possible 
Jacobite tendencies, when in 1717 it was rumoured ‗Bolingbroke… [was] positively 
said to be…at General Hill‘s house…where many others are often in the night‘.106  
However, it was at this time that Bolingbroke was supposedly in exile.  Hill was also 
in communication with Sophia, Electress of Hanover, before the death of Anne, when 
he briefly summarised the political scene in England and his support for her 
succession.
107
  This suggests that, in true Marlburian style, he was securing his 
position in the eventuality that either a Hanoverian or a Stuart ascended the throne.  
Any further political activity remains unknown.  It was likely that he lived the rest of 
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his life in quiet comfort at his estate and his London house – in stark contrast to 
Walker – until his death in 1735.108 
 
II: Walker’s Fall from Grace 
The 1714 accession of George I to the British throne did not serve to create trouble for 
Walker immediately, although his suspected Tory connections eventually escalated 
suspicions of Jacobitism against him, forcing him to flee.  Walker was one of three 
admirals to be dismissed from the service in 1715 and struck off the half-pay list.
109
  
The other two were Sir James Wishart and Sir Edward Whitaker.  John Charnock says 
of the latter:  
 
he was deprived [of his pension] on the accession of King George the First, and that complete 
political change which took place immediately afterwards.  This extended even to the 
[dismissal] of persons, whose long and eminent services, intrinsic worth, and noble conduct 
justly entitled them to the praise, friendship, and the protection of Englishmen of all parties; so 
that the treatment is not to be considered, as it would be in common cases, a mark of infamy 
or public disgrace.
110
   
 
Charnock‘s defence should also be applied to Walker as he suffered a similar fate.  
Admiralty Secretary Josiah Burchett sent Walker a letter in November 1714 which 
initiated all of his troubles, asking yet again why he charged the Navy Board so much 
for stores at Boston.
111
  The new Whig ministry desired revenge against the Tories, 
but petitions from New England merchants, concerning unpaid bills for the Quebec 
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expedition, were also accumulating.
112
  Therefore, when the new administration was 
looking for ammunition against the expedition, the only aspect that they felt could be 
investigated was Walker‘s expenditure at Boston, amounting to £1,000.  Had St John 
equipped him properly then no charge may have been found.  Walker‘s actions on the 
St Lawrence were not criticised or thought worthy of investigation, neither was the 
decision to return home.  
Burchett required a copy of Walker‘s instructions as he said there were none in 
his office.  Accordingly, Walker pointed out that ‗fifty or sixty officers in all, were 
obliged to deliver their journals of the voyage, before they could receive any of their 
pay‘.  Having already given evidence in 1713, Walker was taken aback.  It took him 
some time to find the relevant journals and letters that he possessed to resubmit them 
as evidence.
113
  He wondered where his letters and accounts, which he sent to the 
Admiralty in 1711, had disappeared to: ‗have the cooks of Mr. Secretary [Burchett], 
and his clerks, made use of them all for their Christmas pies and apple tarts?‘114  Little 
did he know the long-term consequences of the essential spending of Admiralty funds 
at Boston to provision the fleet.
115
  After all, Walker drew attention to the fact that 
Wheler, on his 1693 expedition, had received £2,000 for such contingencies.
116
  
Walker‘s suspicions were aroused when his London attorney, who took care of his 
pay, told the Admiral not to contact him.  He immediately departed for London where 
Walker found that his half-pay had stopped and a newspaper had reported his 
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arrest.
117
  After this was published, the inevitable rumours and accusations began, and 
Walker decided to flee.  Not, he stressed, to serve a foreign nation, where British 
naval officers were highly regarded,
118
 but to Carolina, where he could remain a 
subject of King George (but as far away from London as this would allow).   
The Evening Post reported in January 1716 that Walker had arrived at 
Charlestown, South Carolina, the previous October.
119
  Walker‘s experience in 
Carolina has hitherto remained hidden, but he was very much involved in a rebellion 
in 1719 against proprietary government.  The South Carolinians were concerned about 
Spanish encroachments and the colonial government‘s corrupt self-interest.  A 
Convention against the lawful government of the colony staged a bloodless coup 
when the militia sided with the rebels.
120
 One official deposed by these events wrote: 
‗Sir Hovenden Walker has been one of the chief incendiaries, and it is by his scheme 
that they model their present government.  He is made president of their council‘.121  
The usurpers placed the colony under the direct authority of the British government 
and London subsequently approved their actions, which coincidentally saw the 
installation of Nicholson as the first royal governor there.
122
  This proves how active 
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and belligerent Walker could be and shows a great independence of mind in difficult 
circumstances.  He formed part of the rebellion despite the fact his entire situation had 
recently altered as Secretary Burchett re-established links with Walker and helped him 
to claim his back-pay.
123
  This cleared the way for Walker‘s return to England to be 
exonerated.   
Burchett was an interesting figure.  In a climate of momentous change, the 
Admiralty Secretary was a constant as he held the post for almost fifty years until 
1742.
124
  Despite being a Whig member of Parliament for the majority of his career, 
he survived the political turbulence of the Tory years and was the only member of the 
Admiralty Commission not to be replaced in 1714 – the first cull of the commission 
since 1679.
125
  Burchett‘s access to such a vast wealth of information regarding the 
rise of English maritime power enabled him to write A Complete History of the Most 
Remarkable Transactions at Sea in 1720, the first general naval history written in the 
English language.  He probably knew more about naval affairs than the Lord 
Commissioners of the Admiralty themselves.
126
  This was the man with whom Walker 
corresponded on both occasions when the Admiralty required him to provide details 
of his Boston expenses.  The first was shortly after the expedition and not followed by 
any charges, but rather a new command; the second was once the Whigs assumed 
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power, who seemingly wanted to implicate a greedy and corrupt Tory Walker in a 
badly executed mission to the detriment of British interests.  Burchett‘s demands on 
behalf of the Admiralty, for Walker to provide evidence, led to the fit of hysteria 
when the Admiral fled to the colonies.   
However, in 1719 Burchett began assisting Walker‘s wife and friends in an 
effort to restore his half-pay, and corresponded with the Admiral himself.
127
  In his 
book, Burchett was notably defensive of Walker.
128
  Burchett was the one man in the 
Admiralty who really knew all of the office‘s little secrets and it must have been 
flattering for Walker to be exonerated by such a man.  However, Walker did not miss 
the opportunity to remonstrate with Burchett as he believed, ‗had you used your 
endeavour at a proper time my affairs would not have been reduced to this 
extremity‘.129  It was all the more scandalous that Burchett had met with Walker prior 
to his sailing for Quebec and agreed that he was allowed £1,000 for contingencies – 
which was the focus of the investigation into Walker.
130
  This would suggest that he 
had been persecuted for purely political, rather than operational, reasons.  Obviously, 
Burchett‘s political flexibility assured his longevity in office, but Walker‘s case must 
have weighed heavily upon his conscience.  The award of Walker‘s half-pay did not 
amount to much, as it was the sum that he would have received from the time when he 
was struck off the half-pay list until the beginning of his self-imposed exile – a matter 
of weeks.   
Significantly, a similar occurrence, in 1749, regarding naval funds issued 
without proof of vouchers resulted in an investigation examining the results of similar 
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cases.  An investigator researching precedents in Royal Navy cases sent a letter to the 
Admiralty listing five other situations and their outcomes, including that of Walker in 
1711: 
 
Sir Hovenden Walker by order of the 19 January 1713 allowed on his accounts £1,013 s2 d2 
without producing vouchers, it being impossible for him to produce any, in regards all the 
accounts and papers relating thereto were blown up in the Edgar at Spithead where she returned 
home, and that Mr Weston [Walker‘s deputy treasurer] who had the charge of the money had 
made oath to the expense thereof on His Majesty‘s service.131 
 
Being absolved of this issue, Walker needed to return to England before he 
could be awarded any half-pay in order to prove he was still alive.  Whilst completing 
his affairs in South Carolina he wrote to the Admiralty of his poor predicament.  
Walker had complained of living off ‗corn and potatoes (because I could not afford to 
buy plumb cake in London)‘.  He also stated, given a command, he would have 
‗[extirpated] …the [Spanish] pirates, which have done a great deal of mischief to all 
the [American] settlements‘.  Walker hoped to discuss such a stratagem on his return 
to London.  This document seems to be the basis for the publication of his journal 
which he hoped would clear his name in the eyes of the public.  In it, Walker was very 
critical of St John, but without naming him and explained that the ‗last ministry of the 
late reign, did not themselves, like an ass milling upon thistles, think fit in any public 
manner to bite me, for fear of pricking their own guns, and making them bleed, and 
therefore I escaped them.‘132  Walker ‗bought‘ a sloop to sail to England, but had to 
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put in at Jamaica because of the stormy weather.
133
  Walker eventually responded to 
his critics in 1720, when he published A Journal: or Full Account of the Late 
Expedition to Canada.  He utilised the newspapers to advertise it upon his vindication 
in 1719.
134
  Besides containing his private journal and correspondence covering the 
event in question, his introduction sets his main case for his defence, summarised 
hereafter.  Walker must have compiled the Journal in the West Indies as he was 
reported to have returned from his uncomfortable colonial life to England on a sloop 
from Jamaica in August 1721.
135
 
Walker had cause for much complaint about his poor treatment as he came 
from an age when maritime disasters were a common occurrence.  His introduction 
subtly alluded to Admiral Shovell‘s destruction on the Scilly Isles in 1707 and to the 
wrecking of the Coronation at Plymouth in 1691.
136
  Walker did not name the 
commanders responsible for those events so that he could not be critical of those 
‗great men…for I know time and chance happen to all‘.  He was also aware that other 
naval officers got into trouble for acquiring victuals in the Mediterranean, despite this 
occurring when it was absolutely necessary for the wellbeing of their squadrons.  
Walker had expected to receive criticism for the expedition, but was greatly surprised 
that the Admiralty treated him so badly, especially as this occurred four years after the 
event and particularly as he had served alongside or under most of those sitting on the 
Board.  His striking-off the half pay list in 1715 without the opportunity to defend 
himself was, he claimed, without precedent.  He did not steal money or supplies, all 
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bills and accounts were signed and, with the loss of the Edgar along with his papers, 
Walker had to spend a great deal of time filling the gap in the paperwork through 
memory.   
Walker asked: ‗what then is my crime?‘  The expedition was not his idea and 
he was appointed to command it long after the force began assembling.  Nicholson 
was required to prepare everything well beforehand at Boston, and Walker used 
monies there in the manner allowed by his rank and St John‘s instructions.  Pointing 
out that he did not eat all of the provisions himself, or use the stores to ‗build houses 
and coaches‘, then he cannot be accused of profiteering.  The expedition was also not 
the only one to be dispatched that ‗desired success‘.  Whereas ships and men were lost 
‗in the Channel and upon our own coasts…under…the most expert and best of our sea 
officers‘, Walker‘s were lost in an ‗unknown navigation‘ and did not include naval 
vessels.  He declared the obvious – he could not control the weather, nor would he 
whip up storms just for the ‗pleasure of doing mischief‘ if he had such power.  He 
declared his party neutrality, having never received particular favour from either Tory 
or Whig, and that he had no choice in any of his commands but was nevertheless 
happy to do his duty.  Walker protested that he was not a Tory and his promotion to 
flag-rank was due to his seniority rather than factional favour.  Whilst he was not 
compensated for the loss of his belongings aboard the Edgar, despite personally 
petitioning the Queen, Walker was nevertheless given a new command.  He had not 
received any office or post other than what he was accustomed to in the navy and had 
not profited as he could not even afford to live in London.   
 275 
Walker‘s loyalty was clearly important to him.  He offered his long service, 
his time as a prisoner in France,
137
 and his loyalty to Britain as his defence.  Like 
other purged naval officers, he did not offer his skilled services to the navies of other 
nations.
138
  Walker even declared that he would happily have retired on a pension if 
his services were no longer required.  When the Admiralty had struck him off the list 
of flag officers he continued to serve as a justice of the peace in Huntingdonshire, 
where his colleagues treated him with civility.  Walker‘s devotion to service was 
illustrated in his account of the dangerous nature of his voyages to the West Indies, 
where sailors often succumbed to terrible diseases and where captains would often lay 
down their commands rather than serve in such an appalling environment.
139
  Walker 
never declined the service, but took the fight across the Atlantic unlike many of the 
more famous naval commanders of his age. 
  Walker also made clear that he agreed with the aims of the expedition, which 
would have given advantage to Britain, and he alleged that he made proposals for 
other American expeditions when the Whigs were in power.
140
  However, he argued 
that only Bolingbroke could judge whether he acted appropriately.  Oxford was also 
mentioned in Walker‘s introduction because of his opposition to the project.  The 
Oxford ministry did him ‗no good‘ and ‗no harm‘ and a ‗thousand living witnesses‘ 
could attest to the truth of his journal.
141
  Walker praised both George I and the 
memory of William III, possibly to counter rumours of his political sympathies.  He 
also condemned the newspapers, particularly the Post-Man and the Gazette, for 
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obfuscating the expedition‘s story by not detailing the ‗desperate navigation‘ of the St 
Lawrence, or the loss of the Feversham and its transports.  This meant that they only 
had food for six to nine weeks and hence, Walker thought, he would have to wait ten 
months (an exaggeration) for further provisions.  ‗By the loss of part, Providence 
saved all the rest‘ he concluded, perhaps accurately.  Whilst condemning the armchair 
generals of the period, he then outlined every possible deadly outcome had the 
expedition continued and been stranded at Quebec in the midst of winter.  Walker 
even defended the pilots, whom he acknowledged could not take full responsibility for 
guiding a fleet through an area they were unfamiliar with, especially one as hazardous 
as the St Lawrence.  He also compared himself with Phips, who met disaster when 
retreating down the St Lawrence, but in stark contrast to Walker, was still applauded.  
After offering some sardonic advice to other captains who might be chosen for such 
expeditions, Walker explained why his version of events was not published sooner, 
particularly his having been ‗disturbed‘ in Carolina and his consequent displacement 
to Barbados.
142
  His final words condemned the Admiralty for mislaying the accounts 
relating to the expedition and that they should remember ‗they took away my half-
pay, and made me angry first, and that losers… always have had leave to speak‘.143 
Walker was completely exonerated of all wrongdoing on his return from exile.  
He was even introduced to King George by the Earl of Lincoln, where he kissed 
hands in September 1721, possibly resulting from the publication of his Journal.
144
  
The Prince of Wales also ‗gave him a very gracious reception‘ and the Whig ministry 
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‗seemed to look on him, with a favourable eye‘.145  Such preferment did not extend to 
the employment that Walker then desired.   The naval chronicler, Thomas Lediard, 
met Walker in Hamburg and Hanover in 1725, gaining a favourable impression of 
him: ‗I found him a gentleman of letters, good understanding, ready wit, and 
agreeable conversation; and withal the most abstemious man living; for I never saw or 
heard that he drank anything but water, or [ate] anything but vegetables.‘146  However, 
this may be indicative of Walker‘s desperate financial situation.  During the 1720‘s, 
Walker made attempts to recoup further monies that he believed to be owed him and 
even applied for positions in the navy despite a decade‘s absence.  In 1722, he wrote 
to the Admiralty asking for a pension equal to the half-pay of a rear-admiral.
147
  The 
following January he applied for the post of comptroller of the navy on the death of 
the incumbent.
148
  Not long before his own death, Walker was clearly desperate and 
even attempted to claim some money he believed was due to him from 1703 whilst at 
Guadeloupe.  He had noticed after perusing his accounts that he had identified some 
claims that he maintained were not paid: ‗how it came to pass that I never applied for 
such allowance sooner, I know not‘.  He also claimed forty-three days more half-pay 
as he believed the Admiralty had erroneously recorded 1 June 1715 as the date of his 
flight from England and not 14 July which was Walker‘s calculation.149  This would 
suggest that Walker did not receive the pension that he applied for and that he was 
gravely in need of even a few days‘ extra pay. 
Parker‟s Penny Post of 19 January 1726 stated that Walker died ‗recently‘ at 
his house in Dublin, coincidently a couple of paragraphs under news regarding the 
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advancement of the careers of colonels Kane and Disney.
150
  His sudden death in the 
land of his birth, so soon after numerous attempts at petitioning the Admiralty for 
money, suggests he may have died in poverty and he probably lived off the proceeds 
of his published Journal.
151
  Walker‘s movements in Germany were to perhaps find 
employment and favour with the House of Hanover.  Whilst Walker was seemingly 
rehabilitated, his efforts at finding suitable employment came to nought.  These 
endeavours may, however, have provided for his child in her time of need.  Forty 
years after his death, Walker‘s only living descendant, his daughter Margaret, 
unmarried and childless, was given a £40 pension ‗in consideration of her distress, 
and of being the daughter of Sir Hovenden Walker, formerly a rear-admiral‘.152  This 
was some small tribute to the memory of a broken man.   
 
III: The Path to Success 
The task Walker was given in 1711 was achieved during his daughter‘s lifetime.  
After the Treaty of Utrecht, North America became increasingly important to British 
interests, although a strategic initiative did not materialise until the War of the 
Austrian Succession.
153
  Britain‘s government of 1740 was clearly concerned about 
the strategic importance of Quebec as war with France looked a likely prospect.  The 
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southern secretary of state‘s office, under the Duke of Newcastle and future prime 
minister during Quebec‘s capture in 1759, conducted an investigation into previous 
expeditions.  His office was clearly unimpressed by what it discovered with regards to 
the 1711 attempt, as few records could be found in relation to the expedition.
154
  The 
secrecy surrounding the expedition had obviously permeated the administration of St 
John‘s office.  Louisbourg was captured in 1745, during the War of the Austrian 
Succession, but was returned at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.  During 
Louisbourg‘s brief occupation, the ministry was in disagreement over whether to 
follow it up with an attack on Quebec as the lessons of 1711 inclined them against 
acting.
155
  In 1746, The Dublin Journal, in anticipation of Britain sending an 
expedition, printed an historical account of the 1711 expedition.
156
  A force was fitted 
out, but not sent, as the politicians reverted to bickering about the advantages of a 
maritime versus continental war.
157
  Also, the Lord Chancellor wrote to Newcastle 
informing him that it was too late in the year to begin preparations and that he was 
mostly concerned for success in Scotland against the Jacobite uprising.
158
  Yet again 
the colonies needlessly answered the call to arms and had even raised 9,100 men for 
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the purpose.
159
  The Canadians had actually attempted to retake Louisbourg, but a 
storm defeated their progress.
160
  Britain had exploited neither Annapolis Royal, nor 
Newfoundland, as a strategic counter to Louisbourg.  The French retention of Cape 
Breton Island at Utrecht caused this British headache.  This meant that before Canada 
could be overcome, Louisbourg must be taken yet again.   
Walker‘s expedition was naturally overshadowed by the success of 1759.  
Whilst 1711 probably did not offer any inspiration to those planning the Seven Years 
War, it was probable that they learnt from those mistakes and a blue-water policy was 
executed.  Newcastle originally regarded William Pitt the Elder‘s ideas for global 
strategy as undesirable.  This period was reminiscent of the old continental versus 
maritime debates.  Pitt, nevertheless, was in the ascendant and effectively carried the 
war in the office of southern secretary.
161
  Issues of supply, navigation, secrecy and 
command had obviously been dealt with by 1759.  Pitt, determined like St John to 
conquer Canada, was prepared to continue pouring resources into the North American 
theatre, as he possessed the strategic vision to realise that it takes time to see a project 
through.  St John faced a different predicament as he was trying to end a war with a 
final coup and did not have the luxury to impose a time-consuming strategy.   
The Seven Years War saw a protracted three-pronged approach over four 
campaigns, from 1757-1760, as part of a grand strategy which focused on Canada, 
which proved the death-knell for the French colony.  This was illustrated by troop 
numbers where a massive 45,000 troops were stationed in America, as opposed to 
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10,000 that were fighting in Germany.
162
  One of the navy‘s main policies was also to 
maintain forces in North America, which deviated from the European-centric strategy 
of the later Stuarts.
163
  The success against Quebec, therefore, came after years of 
prior effort and Wolfe‘s campaign in 1759 was not a lightning assault, but the 
culmination of a siege which lasted almost three months.   The battle on the Plains of 
Abraham was the result of a last-ditch attempt at victory before the campaigning 
season dictated a withdrawal.  Potentially, the capture of Quebec could still have 
resulted in failure as the French harried the British in 1760, until a fleet sailed up the 
St Lawrence to relieve the remainder of the army.
164
   
The fall of New France was only possible once Louisbourg was taken in 1758 
and after the establishment of Halifax in Nova Scotia, which provided the British with 
their first true naval base in the region.
165
  A follow-up attempt on Quebec was 
deemed unfeasible in early August 1758 owing to similar factors that affected the 
expedition of 1711.  These included the limited duration of the campaigning season; 
the lack of supplies; ignorance of the navigation of the St Lawrence; and the provision 
of few experienced pilots.  Admiral Edward Boscawen may have been thinking of 
Walker when he decided that the conquest of Louisbourg was more than enough 
compensation for one season‘s fighting.166  With Boscawen refusing to sail up the St 
Lawrence, his fleet departed for Britain at around the same time as Walker left Boston 
                                                 
162
 Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, p. 451, does make the point that 25,000 of the American 
troops were colonials, whilst Britain was funding a further 50,000 German troops on the continent. 
Nevertheless, this was a prime example of the success of a blue water strategy. 
163
 Ireland, Bernard, Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: War at Sea, 1756-1815, (London, 2001), p. 21. 
164
 Gwyn, ‗The Royal Navy in North America‘, p. 140; Manning, Stephen, Quebec: The Story of Three 
Sieges, (London; New York, 2009), p. 114. 
165
 Gwyn, ‗The Royal Navy in North America‘, p. 137; Harding, Richard, ‗The Expeditions to Quebec, 
1690 and 1711: The Evolution of British Trans-Atlantic Amphibious Power‘, in Guerres Maritimes, 
1688-1713, (1996), p. 212; Rodger, N. A. M., The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 
1649-1815, (London, 2004), p. 276. 
166
 Boscawen, The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758, (awaiting publication), chapter 11. 
 282
destined for Quebec.  Brigadier-General George Townshend recognised that 
operations in the St Lawrence during winter would be ‗madness‘, where, if the fleet 
was not trapped by ice in the river, it would be exposed to the mercy of the 
tempestuous Atlantic.
167
  Ice was not something to be sneered at, for in April 1759, it 
held ships near Newfoundland for twenty-two days and Wolfe was hampered by ice at 
Cape Breton during May.
168
  However, in contrast to 1711, better charts of the St 
Lawrence were obtainable prior to sailing in 1759, pilots and small buoy-ships were 
available, supplies were more than adequate and the establishment of Halifax allowed 
Major-General James Wolfe and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Saunders to take full 
advantage of the short campaigning season.
169
   
Saunders had the advantage of time and more accurate methods of navigation, 
and was able to send a small group into the St Lawrence to provide soundings.
170
  He 
sent Vice-Admiral Durell into the river at the earliest opportunity the ice allowed.  
Durell was extremely cautious given that the navigation was still unknown.
171
  
Captured French charts proved to be poor and (the future Captain) James Cook began 
to correct them in 1758, when he methodically charted the River and Gulf of St 
Lawrence, after first learning how to use the plane table.  He compiled charts over 
many months and his efforts were of immense value to the navy.
172
  Saunders 
proceeded upriver after Durell had allowed Cook to buoy its difficult parts.  The 
soundings were taken only from the Isle aux Coudres – fifty-five miles from Quebec.  
This was much further than where the fleet met disaster in 1711, where the river was 
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wide and at a point where it was not expected to cause difficulty.  Saunders‘ squadron 
was able to appear before Quebec only once Cook had surveyed the ‗traverse‘ on the 
St Lawrence shortly before the city.  The French were amazed as ‗the enemy passed 
sixty ships of war where we hardly dared risk a vessel of a hundred tons.‘173  These 
narrows posed a great danger to larger vessels and Walker‘s pilots would have been 
oblivious to this peril, which might have seen the destruction of his naval vessels.
174
  
If Walker had made similar cartographical preparations to Saunders, he would have 
had to ignore the immediacy of his orders and wait until 1712 before proceeding to 
Quebec. 
Wolfe had famously defeated the French after brilliantly, and covertly, 
deploying his army on the Plains of Abraham after a night landing upriver of 
Quebec‘s defences.  A previous landing to the east of the city went horrendously 
wrong.  Quebec‘s fortifications, whilst vastly improved since Walker‘s day, were still 
fairly poor and it was its strong geographical position that proved to be its most 
effective defence.  Therefore, Wolfe was able to draw out the Marquis de Montcalm 
from behind Quebec‘s walls and inflicted a decisive defeat upon the French after a 
battle lasting only fifteen minutes.  Yet after the fighting, the French could still 
frustrate British expansionist ambitions by besieging the victors at Quebec.  However, 
with the advancing winter, the experience of Brigadier-General James Murray 
(replacing Wolfe after his death), may indicate what Hill could have expected fifty 
years earlier.  Murray‘s army was largely decimated during the winter of 1759-1760 
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when almost fifty per cent of his men were sick or dead.
175
  He was completely 
isolated, without any prospect of resupply until May at the earliest, as Saunders 
evacuated the St Lawrence in November.  The troops succumbed owing to inadequate 
clothing, which was particularly needed for the snowy treks into the surrounding 
wilderness to maintain the supply of firewood, but also as a result of Wolfe‘s 
scorched-earth tactics against the local population in the previous summer.
176
  Murray 
nevertheless held out at Quebec after losing the battle of Sainte-Foy as the consequent 
French siege was broken only by the arrival of the Royal Navy in May 1760.  When 
news arrived in London, The Monitor looked back at the history of Britain‘s attempt 
to conquer New France, including that of 1711.
177
   
Only one more attempt was ever made to take Quebec and it was not a 
vengeful French force that challenged the British, but an American one whose 
differences had finally blown into full-scale rebellion.  Shortly after the outbreak of 
the War of American Independence (1775-1783), Colonel Benedict Arnold marched 
on Quebec in September 1775 from Maine.  Arnold‘s bateaux were leaky and poorly 
constructed, and by October the temperature at night had dropped below freezing, 
rains flooded their passage and eventually snow slowed their progress.  Combined 
with hunger resulting from a dearth of provisions and barren surroundings, the 
inclement weather inflicted disease, considerably affecting the effectiveness of those 
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that survived.
178
  Arnold linked up with General Richard Montgomery, who, in an 
operation comparable to that which Nicholson had undertaken, took Montreal after it 
was evacuated by the British to reinforce Quebec.
179
  It was December and the frozen 
ground meant that trenches could not be opened for a siege against Quebec.  A brave 
assault on the lower town was launched on New Years Eve with drastic results.  The 
superior British defenders inflicted forty per cent casualties on the Americans.
180
  
Captain-General Guy Carleton, the British governor, had learnt the lesson 
demonstrated by Montcalm not to leave the protection of the city walls.
181
  The 
remainder of the Americans attempted to maintain a blockade, but the climate and an 
outbreak of smallpox had taken its toll.  This blockade was ineffective against a well-
provisioned Quebec and, with the arrival of British reinforcements sailing up the St 
Lawrence, the Americans were beaten back never to return.
182
 
 
IV: Conclusion 
The 1711 expedition served to preserve the British conquest of Acadia and otherwise 
did not affect the outcome of the peace treaty.  It did, however, have some negative 
effects in the Americas.  The expedition had clearly strained relations with the 
colonists, which furthered American suspicions of the motherland.  The unimpressed 
chiefs of the Five Nations concluded a neutrality agreement with the French, who 
consequently harassed the colonial frontier, further improved their defences and 
dispatched privateers to harass the West Indies.  Ironically Walker could have 
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prevented the latter event, but was denied the opportunity because he was not given 
intelligence of the French squadron by the colonial authorities.  Nevertheless, his 
presence limited the damage caused by Cassard who was unwilling to face him. 
The paranoia of the new regime concerning closet Jacobitism created a period 
of hysteria in which many capable officers were wronged.  Hill managed to evade 
such speculation, but lost some of his offices.  Oxford suffered temporarily, whilst 
Bolingbroke fled to support the Pretender.  In Walker‘s case, there is no evidence to 
suggest that he was overtly political and accusations of him being an ardent Tory 
seem to have been made simply to explain the reason why he was appointed to 
command on the expedition.
183
  He was a senior naval captain and his promotion to 
rear-admiral was not unusual for such an officer and Admiralty records do not 
condemn Walker‘s service.184  Hill did not receive a knighthood even though his 
advancement was critical for securing royal support for the expedition, yet one was 
awarded to Walker as was the case with most flag-officers.  This indicates that he was 
made a scapegoat when Bolingbroke could not be punished, but Walker was evidently 
vindicated by the Whig administration and had also received favour from their pre-
1710 ministry.   
Such events illustrate, along with St John‘s motives, that the Quebec 
expedition was dispatched for political as well as strategic reasons.  The advent of 
peace would deny the colonials another opportunity to achieve their ambitions until 
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the War of the Austrian Succession thirty years later.  Their dreams were eventually 
fulfilled when the French North American empire was finally conquered another war 
later in 1760, however, it was no easy victory.  Growing divisions between colony and 
motherland eventually became permanent.  Ironically, this would see a role reversal 
with Britain defending Quebec from its former subjects and allies in 1775-1776.
185
  
All three eighteenth-century sieges of Quebec, by the British, French and the 
American rebels, show how difficult a task Walker, Hill and Nicholson had faced.  It 
can be no coincidence, however, that during the 1740s, which saw a resurgent interest 
in Canada, Bolingbroke (who repented his Jacobitism and returned to Britain in 1725 
after being pardoned)
186
 was well acquainted with Pitt the Elder, who later oversaw 
the strategy which saw the eventual conquest of New France.
187
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CONCLUSION 
 
The 1711 Quebec expedition was an unprecedented British operation that saw the 
largest military force ever deployed to North America fail, because the unknown 
navigation of the St Lawrence River invited disaster.  Constraints imposed on the 
expedition commanders by Henry St John had also ensured that success was unlikely 
to have been forthcoming.  The force St John assembled was, however, proficient.  
Constant delays caused by poor weather and late organisation endangered the entire 
enterprise, particularly with the late dispatch of Lieutenant-General Francis 
Nicholson.  Worse, St John‘s obsessive endeavours to keep the preparations for the 
expedition secret were completely unnecessary, resulting in his decision to allocate 
the regiments with only three months‘ provisions, thus necessitating a massive 
revictualling operation at Boston.  Nicholson‘s belated arrival in America added to the 
strain in New England.  These factors combined to impede the operation which 
essentially had to take place in a seasonable time of year if it was to succeed.  
Governor Joseph Dudley, oblivious to the existence of an expedition, wrote to London 
on 22 May 1711 ‗if we have not the advice in ten days more, it will be almost 
impossible to be seasonably ready for so distant a descent [at Quebec] and so difficult 
a river‘.1  If the fleet had sailed fully provisioned earlier in the year, only a short pause 
would have been required at Boston to take on the provincial troops and a smaller 
quantity of supplies to replenish what had been consumed, but not on such a scale that 
pressurised the local population, souring relations between colonial civilian and 
British regular.  Also, if St John had not assumed that the New Englanders possessed 
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adequate knowledge of the problematical St Lawrence, he could have recruited 
sufficient expertise from the Admiralty to give guidance on this crucial matter.   
Had the fleet managed to feel its way  through the ‗traverse‘ to Quebec safely, 
it was then reliant on the Feversham successfully escorting further supply ships to 
them before the harsh winter made the St Lawrence impassable.  In such an era, 
starvation and disease would have claimed many troops if they had not already 
suffered at the hands of the enemy.  Had the prospective siege of Quebec been a 
success, then inevitably the garrison would have starved or had to turn back 
prematurely with the onslaught of the icy conditions which accompany the Canadian 
winter.  Gerald S. Graham commented that there was substance to Rear-Admiral 
Walker‘s worry about the stock of provisions and compared it to Brigadier-General 
Murray‘s predicament in the winter of 1759-1760.2   
The expedition did not have any detrimental effect on the Treaty of Utrecht.  It 
confirmed Annapolis Royal as a British possession by potentially preventing the 
French from retaking it.  Consequently, Nova Scotia was used as a platform, with the 
establishment of Halifax, for future conquests in North America.  However, the 
expedition also initialised a substantial building programme to improve the 
fortifications at Quebec and the peace treaty was not specific about the new 
boundaries, allowing the French to construct the great fortress of Louisbourg.  It was 
established on Cape Breton Island, not only to guard the approach to Quebec, but also 
to be used as a major port for trade with France and the West Indies, allowing 
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merchant vessels to make two round trips a year by avoiding the dangers of a frozen 
St Lawrence.
3
   
The Quebec expedition also served to develop Britain as a major military and 
naval power by demonstrating a power projection which the French simply could not 
compete with.  It thus initiated the resurgence of a true blue-water strategy.  The 
minor deviation from this policy came after the Glorious Revolution, under influence 
from a Dutch King usually allied with the Whigs.  It was William III‘s influence that 
saw English involvement in the Nine Years War and saw the making of the Grand 
Alliance in preparation for a large land commitment in the Spanish Succession War.  
The British experience of having a monarch with Dutch interests allowed the 
politicians to later dictate policy to German Kings concerned with Hanoverian 
survival, who were naturally more concerned with a continental approach to warfare.
4
  
Britain‘s fiscal expansion during the war transformed it into an economic superpower, 
allowing it to later provide money for continental warfare and the protection of 
Hanover, rather than having to send its own sizeable land army.  The British Army 
would instead be used to cooperate with the Royal Navy, to seize profitable and 
strategically important colonies from the European powers focused upon continental 
campaigning.   
Indeed blue-water strategy could not be put into effect without such 
continental diversions.  In the American War of Independence, Britain had lost in part 
due to there being no European conflict to divert the attentions of France, and as this 
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was also a time when the French Navy was enjoying a resurgence in funding, it was 
able to capitalise upon this.  Post-1713 European wars gave Britain a series of 
continental alliances to exploit and concentrate instead on acquiring colonies for the 
economic and mercantile well-being of the British state.
5
  In this respect the War of 
the Spanish Succession was a missed opportunity. 
In less than thirty years, England had progressed from a relatively peripheral 
naval power under Charles II to a position where it dominated the maritime sphere.  
By asserting their strength in naval affairs, the British were able to supersede both the 
French and Dutch at sea, as they were increasingly concerned with the security of 
their land frontiers.  It achieved this by adopting an ultimately successful 
Mediterranean maritime strategy.  In doing so, Britain indirectly played off its two 
primary naval rivals, who were struggling with the financial implications of 
maintaining navies whilst simultaneously conducting a major land war.   
An entrenched confidence in British naval power had taken root during the 
war.  After the Treaty of Utrecht the balance of power had altered, and that was due to 
an emergent Britain, no longer at ease with remaining on the periphery of European 
politics.  Britain‘s naval policy was able to provide for future security through 
maritime superiority.  The British fleet was to be larger than any of its rivals.  British 
peace negotiators were able to identify a distinct naval and colonial approach to future 
policy that would be ultimately beneficial to the country.  By dominating the 
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Mediterranean and continuing that policy into the peace by maintaining naval bases 
there and neutralising the Spanish threat at Cape Passaro in 1718, Britain ensured that 
it would remain seated at the top-table of European nations.
6
  It achieved this through 
its wartime Mediterranean strategy espoused by the Earl of Nottingham, which 
enabled it not only to deny control of that sea to the enemy, but also to influence its 
allies and other smaller states.  Britain could then influence continental affairs without 
the need to deploy an expensive army.   
Britain in 1711 had asserted itself as the leader of a European alliance.  The 
retention of control over the Mediterranean allowed Britain to confidently look at 
expanding its military capabilities outside European waters and regard Quebec as a 
viable target.  The Quebec expedition served partly as an experimental example of 
this blue-water war strategy.  The British then proceeded unwittingly down an 
imperial route that would later be defined by Pitt the Elder during the Seven Years 
War.
7
  As the Tories, and much of the influential public, were becoming increasingly 
concerned by the prolongation of the war, many began to question the wisdom of the 
continental war strategy.  Jonathan Swift‘s propaganda to a war-weary public was 
firmly planted in the Tory maritime school of thought.  In communicating his 
arguments, Swift did not try to conceal the Quebec failure, rather he referred 
positively to the expedition as exactly the sort of operation that should have been 
conducted throughout the war.
8
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The expedition of 1711 had not been the culmination of any ongoing colonial 
strategy, but had demonstrated the value of power projection in a way never before 
seen.  Its scale was unprecedented and, with its dispatch, the colonies acquired a new 
importance.  London was finally listening to the colonial governors and responded 
accordingly.  It was ironic that the strain placed upon them to provide supplies for the 
fleet, combined with the apportioning of blame after news of the disaster had spread, 
resulted in the deterioration of Britain‘s relations with its colonies which would set an 
ominous precedent for events sixty-five years later, when the colonists‘ dreams of 
security from the French had finally been realised.   
Colonial governments needed the help of the mother country with respect to 
Britain‘s resources, financial capacity, and the professionalism of its regular forces.  
This had been demonstrated with Sir William Phips‘ attempt in 1690 which raised an 
undisciplined, ill-equipped militia at huge expense which almost bankrupted 
Massachusetts.  The 1690 expedition has been celebrated for having arrived at Quebec 
in October, but this only proves that Phips lacked judgment.
9
  To campaign so late in 
the season in such harsh conditions could only result in failure.  Both his fleet and its 
component vessels were much smaller (and more suited to those waters) than 
Walker‘s and Phips suffered too in the St Lawrence on his return.10   
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The constant clamouring for assistance by the colonies eventually received the 
attention of London.  Samuel Vetch, in particular, can be credited with formulating 
the plan for the intended expedition of 1709 and creating the conditions which would 
inspire St John.  Reverend Buckingham‘s diary records the impressive operational 
effectiveness of Nicholson‘s force in the wilderness – as ever the colonials had met 
the tough challenge of organising themselves in conjunction with a British force.  
Once again they were left disappointed.  Failure in 1711 tainted British relations with 
the colonies and helped create the conditions for rebellion once the French threat had 
been extinguished.   
Much of the historiography concerning the 1711 expedition is extremely 
critical of the expedition‘s commanders.  Instead, St John should receive the most 
censure.  His project was, however, a good concept to reassert a blue-water strategy at 
a time when the ministry was reconsidering its war aims because of Marlborough‘s 
endless, and expensive, campaigning.  C. T. Atkinson made grand assumptions about 
war strategy when he optimistically stated: ‗had Marlborough had a free hand in 1711 
he might have won not only Canada, but even Martinique and Guadeloupe, at the 
gates of an ill-fortified Paris‘.11  In another article, Atkinson grandiosely claimed that 
the five regiments withdrawn from Flanders, uselessly employed in Canada, was the 
reason why Marlborough did not offer battle with Marshal Villars in 1711 after 
crossing the lines of Ne Plus Ultra.  Such a battle would have ‗opened the road to 
Paris, when Louis XIV would have been powerless to hold out for the retention of 
Quebec‘.12  This concept not only buys the Whiggish propaganda of an invincible 
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Marlborough (who, after Malplaquet in 1709, may have been wisely displaying more 
caution), but that a mere five under-strength battalions would have been enough 
reinforcement to convince him to fight a resurgent French army entrenched in a strong 
position.  Replacements for the regiments had been secured in any case.
13
  Even so, 
the Duke had actually offered battle previously when he himself was strongly 
entrenched, which Villars naturally refused, and it was always Marlborough‘s 
intention to invest Bouchain anyway.
14
  After all, it had taken a decade before 
Marlborough was in a position to take that fortress, so the myth that Paris was about 
to fall, which had also been thought after previous campaigns, should be extinguished. 
As if to compare Whig success against Tory failure, in Bishop Burnet‘s 
popular 1734 History of His Own Time, the description of the Quebec expedition was 
dissected by a specially inserted article detailing the plan of Marlborough‘s successful 
siege at Bouchain.
15
  This unfortunate coincidence was further compounded by the 
symbolic fact that the operations were conducted almost simultaneously.  The 
trenches at Bouchain were opened on 23 August, although the army operated under 
the New Style calendar whilst on mainland Europe making 3 September the 
Gregorian date of the disaster on the St Lawrence.
16
   
St John was not only motivated by an attempt to reclaim a strategy 
advantageous to Britain, but also by personal ambition.  His timing was completely 
wrong.  The series of royal deaths which both propelled the Archduke Charles onto 
the Emperor‘s throne of the Holy Roman Empire, and threatened to unite both France 
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and Spain under the Duke of Anjou, significantly altered the balance of power.  This 
should have induced St John to cancel all preparations associated with the expedition.  
Further, upon learning of the secret peace negotiations with France he should not have 
risked dispatching Walker.  His desire for personal glory proved too tempting for him 
to reconsider, particularly after Guiscard‘s attack on Harley.  Therefore, his 
organisation of the expedition should have been more competent.  R. E. Scouller 
disparaged his abilities when he stated that ‗St John…inspired – for it could hardly be 
dignified with the word organised – Jack Hill‘s Canadian filibuster‘.17  Of course, St 
John was hampered by securing proper authorisation, but the late dispatch of 
Nicholson, and his arrival at Boston rather than New York, was a significant 
contribution to failure.   
Burnet was also deeply critical of St John‘s organisation.  He singled out the 
issue of supply: ‗a commissioner of the victualling…told me, he could not guess what 
made them be sent out so ill furnished, for they had stores, lying on their hands, for a 
full supply‘.  Burnet also accused the Tory ministry of hypocrisy when, as the 
expedition was being organised in secret, they were simultaneously investigating 
military operations authorised by the Whigs that had not been properly supplied or 
sanctioned by Parliament.
18
  He was referring to the Almansa investigation for which 
St John was partly responsible as he was secretary at war at the time in 1707.
19
  
Burnet‘s criticism of a lack of investigation into the Quebec expedition before the 
Hanoverian succession justified St John‘s fear that ‗if it fails [it] will perhaps be 
particularly prejudicial to me, who in the carrying it on hitherto have not been backed 
                                                 
17
 Scouller, R. E., The Armies of Queen Anne, (Oxford, 1966), p. 3. 
18
 Burnet, Bishop Burnet‟s History of His Own Time, VI, pp. 1145-1146. 
19
 The Journals of the House of Lords, (London, 1803), XIX, 1709-1714, p. 209, 31 January 1711, 
shows that in 1707 there were only 13,759 soldiers in British pay in Spain when there should have been 
29,395. 
 297 
by those forms and orders, which are necessary safeguards in a government‘.20  
Nevertheless, the warped concept of obfuscation by providing a mere three months‘ 
victuals for General Hill‘s army was a major cause for failure.   
Winston S. Churchill was wrong to assert that St John ‗rightly attached so 
much consequence to secrecy‘.21  The limited victuals issued to the expedition 
ensured that the fleet‘s visit to Boston was unavoidable, but as P. K. Watson pointed 
out, St John ‗omitted to ask the victuallers if the New England colonies could supply 
the necessary provisions…if he had…they would have been able to assure him that 
his plan would not work‘.22  Thomas Lediard noted an anonymous author blamed the 
disaster on St John for acquiring inadequate supplies: ‗this indeed preserved the 
secrecy, but it destroyed the design‘.23  He also criticised him for presuming a passage 
to Quebec would be easy as he did not consult the Admiralty.  Admiralty Secretary 
Josiah Burchett‘s criticism of St John‘s lack of consultation with his department was 
scathing.  Walker‘s instructions were, he stated:  
 
prepared without so much as consulting the then Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
either as to the fitness of the ships appointed for the expedition, or the nature of the 
navigation; but, on the contrary, the design on which they were bound was rather industriously 
hid from them…by which a certain person [St John] seemed to value himself very much that a 
design of this nature was kept a secret from the Admiralty; who, had they been consulted, 
would not, I am apt to think, have advised the sending ships of eighty- and seventy-guns to 
Quebec, since the navigation up the River of St Lawrence was generally esteemed to be very 
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dangerous.  Nor were their lordships permitted to know anything of this matter, at least not in 
form, until advice was received that the French were equipping a considerable squadron at 
Brest, which some of the ministry were apprehensive might be designed to intercept Sir 
Hovenden Walker; but it was too late to take any proper measures for preventing it, if the 
enemy had really had any such intentions.
24
   
 
St John‘s obsession with this secrecy was extremely detrimental.  His methods meant 
that expert opinion could not be consulted and the expedition‘s supplies were limited, 
which unnecessarily placed an unbearable burden upon Boston.  Combined with 
Walker‘s delayed departure, this ensured the expedition had little time remaining in 
the campaigning season to attempt an attack on Quebec.   
Regarding Burchett‘s opinion on taking larger ships up the St Lawrence, 
Walker did not take the eighty-gunners as he was informed that the French had lost 
many sizeable ships on the river.
25
  Thomas More Molyneux wrote that Walker 
‗rightly judged‘ that the larger vessels should not proceed given the unknown 
navigation.
26
  Trevelyan is of the opposite opinion, noting that Rear-Admiral Saunders 
had managed in 1759 with vessels of both eighty- and ninety-guns.
27
  However, this 
was after the river was meticulously charted; nevertheless, Admiral Boscawen had 
previously refused to sail into the St Lawrence, in which the French only employed 
small vessels.
28
  Walker was wise to abide by such advice when he was entering the 
unknown. 
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Such opinions which dismiss the difficulty of eighteenth-century voyages are 
prone to error, as stated in S. B. A. Willis‘ excellent article which aimed to challenge 
inaccurate assumptions about how a fleet‘s cohesion is managed.29  There was no ship 
standardisation in Walker‘s fleet which offered a huge challenge in keeping it 
together, which is why divisions led by subordinate commanders were created.
30
  
‗Fleet cohesion in sailing ships…[was] hard to maintain, and always impossible to 
guarantee‘.  Walker was able to maintain cohesion within the unknown navigation of 
the St Lawrence River at night and in fog, which caused only a small proportion of his 
fleet to founder.  Therefore, a leaf should be taken from Willis‘ article when he stated 
that ‗historians could do worse than take a lesson in humility from the contemporaries 
they study‘.31 
G. M. Waller agreed that controlling a fleet was extremely difficult, but was 
contradictory in his perceptions of Walker: ‗to shepherd a large and motley 
assemblage of ships of the line, auxiliaries, transports, and supply vessels across the 
North Atlantic called for a high order of leadership and seamanship, but these were 
qualities which Walker did not possess‘.32  Walker‘s record of managing fleets across 
the Atlantic speaks for itself.  However, Waller later wrote that ‗Walker made an 
unusually fast crossing [to Boston], just over seven weeks‘, implying that his crossing 
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was well conducted after all.
33
  Even so, it was not the dangerous North Atlantic that 
challenged Walker‘s seamanship, it was the confines of the St Lawrence that bested 
him – and even then when he had retired for the night.  Throughout his description of 
the events, Waller accused Walker, his pilots and captains, and even Colonel King, of 
fearing sailing on the St Lawrence.
34
  When Waller echoed Vetch‘s belief that Walker 
should have sailed on 14 August, rather than sheltering at Gaspé, he implied that 
‗fear‘ of running into the shoals around Anticosti Island paralysed the fleet from 
pushing on.
35
  Walker was simply, and sensibly, following his pilot‘s advice at the 
time.
36
  To proceed in the hasty manner suggested by Vetch would have amounted to 
recklessness.  If excessive caution resulted in the losses of 23 August, then what 
would have been the consequences of a more confident approach?  Waller‘s statement 
that Walker‘s ‗careless assurance [when he retired before disaster struck] contrasted 
strangely with his frequently expressed fears‘ again proves that his character has been 
unjustly smeared.
37
  Walker showed not fear, but concern for completing a daunting 
task, and he more frequently displayed considerable confidence. 
William Thomas Morgan erroneously stated that Walker opened his orders at 
sea and Stephen Martin-Leake even suggested that Walker would have refused to go 
had he been aware of his destination.
38
  Yet Walker was quite aware of the facts – his 
instructions did not include caveats on their opening like others involved in the 
expedition, Commissary Netmaker for example.  Even Colonel Kane knew the 
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expedition‘s purpose when organising the regiments in Flanders.39  Walker did not 
display any trepidation when he learnt that he would operate in the feared Caribbean 
in 1702, 1706 and 1712.  Richard Harding has stated that ‗to conclude that it was only 
Walker‘s timidness that lay between the expedition and the capture of Quebec does 
little justice to the situation at the time‘.40  Morgan additionally advertised the 
instances when Walker delayed sailing because of contrary winds or lack of pilots, 
which displays an ignorance of sailing procedures.
41
  The ubiquitous Whig discourse, 
which propelled Marlborough into the role of a hero, has contributed to such opinions 
of Walker.  Again, Willis noted that commanders airing such concerns have been 
mistaken for being ‗overcautious and pessimistic‘.42 
Graham, having been one of the few historians to have examined the 
expedition in any great detail, arrived at a fairly balanced appraisal of Walker given 
the political circumstances of the time:
 ‗In view of the savage political vendettas 
which affected the careers of soldiers and sailors as well as statesmen, it is not easy to 
sort the wheat from the chaff of controversy, and to pass final judgement on the 
quality and conduct of a minor figure who lived in the age of Swift.‘43  Incidentally, 
Swift attributed the disaster solely to the stormy weather on the St Lawrence.
44
  
Graham concluded, however, that ‗nothing we know about Walker‘s career would 
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seem to justify his appointment to high command‘, agreeing with Churchill‘s remark 
that Walker ‗had not any notable war achievements to his credit‘.45  This thesis has 
demonstrated that, for the type of operation that the expedition was, Walker had the 
best qualification – he was a successful convoy commander.  Herbert L. Osgood alone 
described Walker‘s ‗long and varied service‘ to be ‗an honourable one‘.46 
Nevertheless, Graham remained mildly critical of Walker‘s abilities, whilst 
acknowledging the difficulties he faced: ‗lacking provisions, without pilots and 
without competent leadership, the expedition had turned into a gigantic gamble long 
before it reached the River St Lawrence, with the odds weighted heavily against 
success‘.47  The expedition was constrained by the actions of St John and competent 
leadership was displayed – the decision to return home was rational and sensible.  D. 
E. Leach was guilty of hyperbole when he described Walker as: ‗an officer of rather 
modest qualities, which unfortunately did not include determination, tenacity, and 
bulldog courage‘.48  Walker was responsible for the safety of a massive fleet, not 
sailing into a sea battle.  In a similar vein, J. H. Owen compared Walker unfavourably 
to Rear-Admiral John Baker who was to lead the planned expedition in 1709.
49
  Baker 
was an outstanding officer, but his naval experience was generally limited to 
operations in the Mediterranean, whereas Walker had wider experience in long-
distance colonial operations.
50
  If Baker had commanded in 1711, he would still have 
been inadequately supplied, subject to the same advice by inexperienced pilots in an 
unknown navigation, and been the victim of a politically incited scheme 
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overshadowed by excess secrecy.  Leach, however, noted that historians critical of 
Walker have benefitted from hindsight.
51
  Harding was right to note that ‗judgment 
about Walker‘s competence is based upon less than secure foundations.  Some 
historians have been tempted to deduce cowardice and ineptitude in Walker from the 
fact that Phips successfully navigated the St Lawrence‘.52 
Such an attitude to Walker is entirely understandable as the greatest fault can 
only be attributed to the failure of accurate navigation, but the limitations of the 
period, and the dangers of the St Lawrence, should not be ignored.  Longitude could 
not be accurately calculated, nor would it for another fifty years when Harrison‘s 
chronometers began to be taken seriously.  Latitude could be broadly determined, 
although it too could not be calculated precisely as the sextant did not appear for 
another twenty years, making comparisons with 1759 unhelpful.
53
  In fact, the fleet 
which carried Wolfe to victory encountered similar problems to those Walker faced, 
particularly in the unsavoury meteorological conditions of that part of the world and it 
had been determined by 1746 that operations on the St Lawrence should proceed no 
later than the end of July.
54
  Aside from the unpredictable weather, the constant 
shifting of magnetic north was unknown at this time.  A compass was then believed to 
point to true north which meant ships could travel several degrees off course.  Also, 
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the only chart available to Walker lacked a description of the passage of the St 
Lawrence.
55
    
With or without such navigational aids, the St Lawrence proved hazardous to 
captains of all vessels.  The iron rich shore of the river affected compass needles 
which could deviate by a third.
56
  The Isle of Eggs and the rocky English Point, where 
Walker lost his transports, posed a significant danger as the mainland that forms the 
backdrop is low-lying, which may be concealed when combined with low-lying fog 
along with the islands themselves.  This may have convinced Walker‘s crews, as there 
were no obvious signs of land, together with possible magnetic variation, that they 
were in the middle of the river.  The reefs that run from the Isle of Eggs create a very 
shallow passageway to the rocks exposed to the north, whilst a further reef stretches 
over 1,000 yards northeast away from the island and the rocks.  Walker would have 
been sailing in water of a depth of around 200 feet which would have suddenly given 
way to these rocky reefs.
57
  Coupled with fog and the darkness, the fleet was lucky 
that only nine vessels were lost.  Walker sailed at a time when there had been no 
major advances in navigation.
58
  One of the greatest problems was the lack of charts.  
Vetch‘s vocal criticism of the decision not to continue upriver was a powerful weapon 
against Walker; however, he himself refused to guide the expedition.  Geoffrey Plank 
suggested that, as he had never been in the area in winter, Vetch underestimated how 
terrible the Canadian weather could be.
59
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The problem of navigation, fog, winds and ice created dangerous 
circumstances in which to sail on the St Lawrence.
60
  These dangers were even echoed 
in the mid-nineteenth century when steam-powered vessels were prevalent and despite 
the navigational advances made along with the charting of the river.  The Premier was 
a steam-powered troopship which foundered in thick fog at the mouth of the St 
Lawrence in November 1843.
61
  Nine other vessels were lost in the same month, 
including one commanded by an experienced seaman on his twenty-fifth voyage on 
the St Lawrence.
62
  Warships were consequently forbidden to enter the river after 
October and even maritime insurance could not be bought for winter sailing.
63
  As late 
as May 1914, Canada‘s worst maritime disaster occurred in the St Lawrence, again in 
thick fog, when the Empress of Ireland ocean liner was struck by another vessel 
resulting in over 1,000 deaths.  The problems of navigation, particularly in winter, 
posed continual problems for Canadian communications even into the twentieth 
century.
64
 
The dangers of the St Lawrence are excellently summarised by a pilot guide 
from 1860, shortly before the Admiralty initiated a survey of the river:  
 
The navigation of the Gulf and River of St Lawrence has always been supposed to be attended 
with a considerable degree of difficulty and danger, and the numerous accidents which are 
constantly occurring to vessels there seem to show that the opinion is well founded. The want 
of soundings, in many parts, near the shores; the irregularity of the tides and currents; the 
severity of the climate, especially towards the close of the navigable season; and, above all, 
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the frequent fogs, are difficulties which may well cause much anxiety in the mind of the 
seaman, and which call for the exercise of all his vigilance, prudence, and ability. 
Nevertheless, a large proportion of the losses which annually take place may justly be 
attributed to other than these natural and irremediable causes. Erroneous charts, a want of 
knowledge of the direction and strength of the tides and currents, and a false variation of the 
compass, are, although not the only, certainly the most frequent causes of shipwreck in the St. 
Lawrence.
65
 
 
This implied that little had changed since Walker‘s day.  Advances in shipbuilding 
and propulsion had not stemmed the tide of disaster upon the river.  Indeed, Graham 
observed in 1953 that ‗within recent times even more astute seamen than Walker have 
not avoided disaster in similar circumstances.  All the instruments of the twentieth 
century have not prevented ships from going ashore in gale and fog‘.66  Neither were 
the French immune in 1711, as some storeships dispatched from Quebec to supply 
Placentia with flour and peas foundered on the St Lawrence.  Placentia only received 
half of the stores sent.
67
   
Morgan relented slightly in his criticism: ‗granting that the disaster to the fleet 
was unavoidable (although even here it seems probable that a little more speed and 
somewhat more of courage by Walker might have carried him safely through the 
fog[!])‘ before continuing to say that Walker did not continue because he was 
‗overpowered by a fear of [the] Canadian climate‘.68  This hyperbole does not add to 
the debate, but only ridicules Walker‘s character when there were real concerns about 
maintaining the safety of the fleet on the St Lawrence in winter.  It has been easy for 
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historians to scoff at the 1711 disaster, yet praise has been widespread for the Stuart 
naval hero, Sir Cloudesley Shovell (‗one of the greatest admirals of the age‘),69 who 
managed to steer his fleet into the Scilly Isles with four of his five warships lost, along 
with 2,000 men – in British waters.  This occurred only four years before Walker‗s 
much larger expedition suffered in confined and uncharted foreign waters.
70
 
Trevelyan commented that St John ‗had chosen the wrong admiral in Walker, 
and it therefore mattered the less that he had also chosen the wrong general in Hill‘.71  
Hill was usually attacked in the historiography because of the obvious symbolism of 
the brother to the Queen‘s favourite being appointed to lead a flagship Tory 
expedition against the interest of Marlborough‘s continental strategy.  As he was 
effectively a political pawn and owed his position to patronage, it has been assumed 
that he was an incompetent commander, usually owing to Marlborough‘s disparaging 
comments about him, which were probably at the behest of his wife.  This should not 
throw into question his military capabilities demonstrated by his actions at Almansa 
and Mons.  Abel Boyer, writing his political commentary of Anne‘s reign during the 
Hanoverian period, described Hill in the year 1711 as ‗brother to the new favourite, 
and a gentleman, who…had behaved himself with signal bravery and conduct in the 
battle of Almansa‘.72  The French Baron de Carlscroon, also described Hill at the 
battle: ‗[he] behaved there with such distinguished prudence and valour, that the 
preservation of some of the British infantry was attributed chiefly to him.
73
  More 
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recently, I. F. Burton declared that ‗the second line [at Almansa], led by Colonel Jack 
Hill, saved the day‘ – albeit temporarily.74   
Unfortunately, the Duchess of Marlborough‘s view has been widely espoused 
as Trevelyan stated that if the expedition had reached Quebec then ‗even Hill could 
scarcely have failed to take the town‘, implying that it did not even matter who was 
appointed to command the land forces.
75
  If Quebec‘s substantial defences had offered 
little resistance because, for example, its defenders lacked powder or were at Montreal 
to counter Nicholson, Hill would have faced great difficulty in holding it over winter 
whilst repelling irregular attacks.  Alas, Trevelyan‘s view was echoed by Morgan as 
‗the British forces still available [after the disaster] were so manifestly superior to the 
French that all French North America might have fallen to a dashing commander‘.76  
This does not take into consideration the massively demoralising effect which the loss 
of so many lives would have had.  Although the British lost approximately ten per 
cent of their declared manpower, the proportion of the total number of effective men 
is unknown considering women, children, servants and administrative staff were all 
included.  It was the challenge Hill posed to Marlborough‘s authority that has perhaps 
mostly coloured the perception of his incompetence, but thankfully this view is slowly 
altering.  Richard Holmes has indicated that Hill was ‗far better qualified from a 
purely military point of view‘ to command Essex‘s dragoons than Marlborough‘s 
candidate, when the Duke‘s authority was first challenged in 1710.77   
Hill‘s administration at Boston was admirable and he certainly knew how to 
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organise.  King wrote positively of Hill that ‗no man living but one of General Hill‘s 
good sense and good nature could have managed [the Bostonians] with that patience 
and dexterity he has done‘.78  However, the fact that he was at the centre of a political 
struggle, and his obvious desire not to be in North America, must have impacted the 
decision not to reduce Placentia or anywhere else after the disaster.  Hill was a 
capable commander, but after the rational decision not to progress with the original 
mission to Quebec, it was ultimately he who should be held responsible for returning 
to England. Hill‘s instructions clearly gave him greater authority over the expedition 
than Walker and it was he who called both councils of war which abandoned Quebec 
and then Newfoundland.
79
  He wanted to return home and a council of war was his 
method of doing this without attracting too much responsibility to himself, although 
King remarked that Hill ‗did all that was humanly possible to make it successful‘.80 
Francis Parkman was extremely critical of both commanders, but he has been 
discredited.
81
  Owen thought that Walker ‗was no more a Saunders, however, than 
Hill was a Wolfe‘.82  Matthew Bishop did not think likewise as his entertaining 
‗memoirs‘ declared: ‗there was not one officer but what was capable of performing 
everything he undertook.  So their not having success ought not in the least to stain 
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their character; nor no one in justice can say there was any ill conduct‘.83  Walker was 
certainly not a great figure in naval history, but nor should he be remembered as a 
terrible incompetent.  Owen was correct – Walker was not a Saunders, he was also not 
a Nelson, nor was he even a Rooke, Shovell or Leake.  He was a good convoy 
commander – the sort of naval officer who remains in the background of history.  
Ironically, if it were not for the Quebec disaster, then Walker may have been long 
forgotten, because he was generally successful in what he did.  He was not noted for 
his fighting prowess, but this was not necessarily a quality that was required for the 
missions he was given.   
Amphibious and combined operations, particularly in the early eighteenth 
century, were an undeniably risky business that saw few successes and many 
disasters.
84
  Rooke‘s attempt on Cadiz had failed in 1702, and Shovell and Prince 
Eugene were unable to cooperate effectively to capture Toulon in 1707.  Three other 
descents planned against France ended in complete failure.
85
  The storming of 
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Gibraltar in 1704 and the capture of Minorca in 1708 proved to be exceptions. 
However, comparisons with the 1711 expedition have also naturally been made with 
the success of Saunders and Wolfe in sailing to and capturing Quebec in 1759, yet this 
was the only time in history when Quebec had been successfully taken, with failed 
sieges occurring in 1690, 1760 and 1775-1776.  The Seven Years War was unique and 
should not be comparable to events fifty years beforehand because pilots, provisions 
and better charts were available, whilst the colonies had developed to allow the 
execution of sustained operations in North America.
86
  Nevertheless, Wolfe could 
easily have withdrawn in September 1759 after his initial failures, Murray could 
easily have capitulated in 1760 and it was only the logistical advantage offered by 
British supremacy of the seas that ensured a reversal of fortunes in Canada.  If disaster 
had not occurred on the St Lawrence in 1711, then Walker would have arrived in 
Quebec at around the same time as it was finally captured forty-eight years later – just 
before Wolfe had to withdraw.   
Walker‘s critics were correct in respect of his caution.  When it came to 
convoying transports, this quality was no doubt desirable and it was only on the St 
Lawrence where he actually lost any vessels.  This was, perhaps, why he was selected 
to lead such an expedition, and trusted again to sail to Jamaica.  Caution was not 
desirable, however, when facing the enemy in battle at sea.  Such wariness would 
become endemic in naval commanders to the point that Vice-Admiral John Byng was 
executed in 1756 for not defending Port Mahon by engaging with the enemy.  It can 
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be no coincidence that after this point, the Royal Navy of the Seven Years War began 
to enjoy huge success – commanders being afraid of the consequences of inaction.  
This conduct was even taken to the point of recklessness.  Nevertheless this attitude 
won battles, such as Admiral Sir Edward Hawke‘s pursuit of the French at Quiberon 
Bay (unconcerned by a lack of pilots) which would have been unthinkable during the 
War of the Spanish Succession.
87
  Walker may have suffered in a later, more 
belligerent, era punctuated by increasingly frequent naval engagements, but he should 
not have been persecuted in his own time in a war which lasted a decade and only 
featured one major fleet battle.  Sensible decisions were taken by him to reduce the 
scope of disaster. 
Britain became the dominant naval power, as the Dutch struggled to maintain 
their prowess at sea and the French surrendered their capability in order to maintain 
their strong armies.
88
  Britain was subsequently successful in asserting itself as a 
global power in the eighteenth-century world after it had established the essential 
foundations for doing so at Utrecht.  A maturity in naval affairs had been attained 
which allowed massive British expansion in the proceeding century.  Whereas Queen 
Anne‘s navy attained dominance in a primarily transatlantic and Mediterranean 
sphere, this acted as a stepping-stone when, during the Seven Years War, it provided 
global superiority at sea.  Lessons had been sufficiently learnt during this period for 
Britain to successfully capture far-flung outposts of opponents‘ empires in 
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amphibious operations, such as those at Havana and Manila in 1762, and of course, 
Quebec. 
The 1711 Quebec expedition should not be discounted as a failure unworthy of 
scholarly attention.  It offers great insights into the politics of Queen Anne‘s reign, 
and is an example of how not to organise a combined operation, illustrating all of the 
problems which this included.  Some unusual aspects are also involved, such as the 
simultaneous promotions to lieutenant of thirty men from the ranks and the brief 
enlistment of black men into the army at Boston.  It was also the first serious attempt 
by the British to conquer New France.  The force that was assembled under Hill was 
the largest regular military force that the North American colonies had ever seen, 
outnumbering the combined populations of the two capitals of Boston and Quebec.  
The immense efforts of the colonies to wage war against their neighbours, which 
brought the expedition to its shores, was an unprecedented military endeavour in that 
theatre of conflict and this shift to blue-water operations indicated a major alteration 
in British strategy for the rest of the century.  The French, by neglecting their navy for 
too long, were powerless to stop the onslaught prompted by the desire of the English 
colonials to be rid of their northern adversaries.  Phips‘ small expedition in 1690 
demonstrated that they could not achieve this on their own, despite the disparity in 
population between New England and New France.  To ensure success in both attack 
and defence, the resources and expertise of the mother country were required.  In 
1711 even that was not enough for the British.  It needed the backing of the entire 
state to organise such an undertaking, rather than the narrow, secretive expertise of St 
John.   
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Secrecy was impossible in a world where communications were so slow and 
vulnerable to interception or surveillance; where a fleet, even in the vast Atlantic, 
cannot be hidden; nor the trampling of several thousand troops through tracts of forest 
be concealed.  By the time of the Seven Years War, the process which had begun in 
1711, and which was only unenthusiastic speculation during the War of the Austrian 
Succession, had become a clearly defined war aim.  Walker‘s failure is not in itself 
important; it is the strategy that would evolve into British domination of North 
America, and the attitudes that would eventually see the secession of the Thirteen 
Colonies, already apparent when Walker arrived at Boston, which were to have such a 
great impact on the eighteenth century.  Walker demonstrated the value of power 
projection on a scale that other societies were unable to replicate.  Great Britain had 
shown that it was potentially capable of taking the battle to the enemy given the 
correct backing, expertise, planning and organisation.  Maritime operations on such a 
scale began with Walker‘s expedition and ended with British domination of the extra-
European world during the Seven Years War.
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